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2TOWARDS A CRITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND
PRACTICE FOR ARCHITECTURE AND.PLANNING
by
Ben Bezalel Rosenbloom
Submitted to the Departments of Architecture and Urban Studies
and Planning on August 9, 1974 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degrees of Master of Architecture in Ad-
vanced Studies and Master of City Planning.
The intention of the thesis is to critically investigate
.the senses in which architecture and planning have participated
in the historical forms of social order. This investigation
helps to provide a basis for architects and planners to.trans-
form the class domination of the liberal social order, and in
doing so resolve their own crises.
The thesis makes and attempts to justify the following ar-
gument, assuming a class analysis of history and society as
well as a dialectical materialist epistemology:
1) Since the origins of liberal society, the architectural
and planning project of unifying and "rationalizing" the en-
vironment has failed. This failure has created a crisis of pro-
fessional theory, practice, meaning and survival.
2) The crises of architecture and planning derive pri-
marily from the crises of the liberal social order of which the
professions are an element. The resolution of the professional
crises is then possible only with the transformation of the
liberal social order.
3) The professions, to resolve their own crises, must
then participate in the project of social transformation. Four
central tasks are involved: a) the creation of a non-dominat-
ing communal social order; b) the creation of an appropriate
.epistemology and knowledge as an instrument of critique and
critical action, grounded in a normative theory of the self;
c) the creation of whole and unalienated selves; and d) the
creation of a critical architectural and planning practice
which participates in the project of social transformation.
4) The modes of professional participation involve:
a) a major critical investigation and revaluation of profes-
sional history, theory, ideology and practice in terms of its
relation to the- social whole, and b) critical transformative
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action on personal and professional levels in the public world.
A critical history of architecture and planning theory and
practice in relation to the structure of the major social forms
is first presented. The history traces the connections between
architecture, planning and the social whole, in order to under-
stand the meanings of present and future professional theory
and practice. This history concentrates on the way in which
each social order has resolved the general human problems of
creating a legitimated ocial order, an epistemology and way
of knowing, forms of self and consciousness, and the environ-
mental concretization of social relations.
The nature and crises of the dominant liberal epistemology
is then examined, and dialectical materialism is shown to be
the general form of a necessary resolution to the epistemologi-
cal crisis. Finally, the conditions of a critical knowledge
and practice for architecture and planning are presented, along.
with specific projects for architects and planners who are com-
mitted to develop a critical epistemology and practice leading
towards a liberated society.
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The crises of liberal society
Consciousness and thought are essential elements of human
action. Unlike the action of most. other animals, human action
presupposes intention and choice since beyond elementary gene-
tic programming since the sources of human action are not bio-
logically determined. The very lack of genetic programming al-
lows thought to yield a variety of alternative responses to the
fundamental issues of human life, responses reflected in the
variety of social forms through history. When within each so-
cial form a consensus of value ard meaning exists (whether
freely-chosen or imposed by domination), consciousness
and action is not problematic. The value bases of action are
not in question, the basic range of alternative modes of living
haVe been chosen, and the thinking out of patterns of action
has been accomplished. Consciousness and thought in this situ-
ation applies essentially predetermined and unquestioned general
values and solutions patterns to specific choices to be made.
The centrality of intention, value and choice to action is often
forgotten; the dominant form of social order and consciousness
becomes reified as a dense and solid natural fact, ceasing to
reflect its true status as a human choice.
But while liberal society as an alternative has become an
apparently "natural" given fact, clearly a consensus of value
and meanirig does not exist today. The public world appears
contradictory and confused, .violent and incomprehensible. Many
feel that they are the pawns of social and economic forces be-
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yond their control, while the traditional democratic political
mediations between individual and society have lost their ef-
fectiveness and meaning. There is a contradiction between per-
sonal values and needs and the public world which seems not to
be a comprehensible society of interacting human beings but an
independent force operating with its own alienating logic. The
traditional social bases for valuing and meaning, the partici-
pation of the whole self in a multidimensional life incorpora-
ting but not restricted to work, are discredited as a value and
a potential. .The institutional basis for community is destroyed
as human beings compete against each other .on the labor market,
while reaping commodity benefits from their labor which have no
communal content and can be only individually experienced. The
whole self, which is possible only as an integration of auton,4
omy and community, is in the absence of community, fragmented,
alienated, split. The liberal world, like the self, is experi-
enced as partial, fragmentary, immaterial and unreal. The world
becomes unreasonable, without apparent sense or rational intent
other than in the restricted connection of means to unquestioned
ends; the social map of a comprehensible reality in earlier so-.
cial forms is gone, the abstraction of commodity fetishism and
money substituting for the lost or unattained concreteness of
integral human beings living within a unified society.
The experience of the reality of class domination contra-
dicts the liberal ideal of the dominance- of isolated private
interests; the experience of the conflict of role and class corn-
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tradicts the liberal ideal of the freedom to choose one's
role; the experience.of depoliticization and political
alienation contradicts the liberal ideal of representative de-
mocracy; the experience of gross inequalities in the distribu-
tion of wealth and opportunity contradicts the liberal ideal
of the classless distribution of benefits according to merit.
In these and many other ways,' the liberal social order repre-
sents historically the most extreme distance between the unity
of, self and community which, as will be shown, is a central
need of the self.
Fundamental to this thesis is the assumption that the con-
tradictions and alienations of liberalism are a consequence of
the domination of capitalism, seen not only as a particular
form of economic relations, but as a definition of social re-
lations and the self which isolates and alienates all the ele-
ments of society while denying the intersubjective basis of
individual development. Community, the public world, presup-
poses the autonomous individual just as the individual presup-
poses community. The one defines the other through social
interaction. Yet capitalism creates in its very structure the
illusion that the individual exists essentially independent of
the larger community. The individual is then reified as a
commodity, an isolated object, and community.becomes a fantasy.
Acute isolation, while rationalized as individualism, in
truth is symptomatic of a profound loss of social coherence and
intersubjectively constituted meaning--a deep alienation from
-*.17
both self and society. The quality and content of human inter-
action is subordinated' to the sphere of instrumental problem-
solving action. Meaningful human relations collapses in the
loss of consensual meaning, making an intersubjective construc-
tion and comprehension' of a coherent map of social reality im-
possible. 1
The failures and crises of architecture and planning
The professions of architecture and planning, being con-
stituted by liberal society to construct shelter and allocate
societal resources, share in the crisis of liberalism. Whether
consciously or not, architects and planners personally experi-
ence the societal fragmentation as their personal alienation
as well as their inability to realize the professional inten-
tion of creating a unified and rational environment. The per-
sonal needs for wholeness and the professional intention of
rationalizing the environment, in contradiction to the inability
to realize either a personal or environmental unity, is felt
in professional work as a failure and crisis of practice which
puts the very meaning of architecture and planning in question.
The failure can be characterized in three ways: 1) the fai-
lure of architects and planrers to make the environment into a
unified and intentional whole; 2) the failure of the rational-
izing intent of architecture and planning to become societal
norms by being instituted as a value by the major social
powers; and 3) the failure of architecture and planning to
comprehend with its own theory and methodology the
18
source and therefore resolution of its crises in the nature of
the liberal social order.
The ineffectiveness of architecture and planning practice
is the direct evidence of its function as servant and ideolo-
gue of capitalism and the liberal social order. A rationalized
environment is possible only in a social order which, unlike
liberalism, does not continually fragment the environment as a
normal function of its operation. "Liberal policy makers
(architects, planners), technocrats and social engineers have
common goals:. stability, continuity, neutralization and con-
flict avoidance, through specific interventions" --goals incom-
patible with any comprehensive social/environmental rationality.
The failure of the professions to comprehend their situa-
tion is no accident:
Technical and scientific culture and competence
...clearly bear the mark of a social division of labor
which denies to all workers, including the intellectual
ones, the insight into the system's functioning and
overall purposes, so as to keep decision making divorced
from productive work, conception divorced from execution,
and responsibility for producing knowledge divorced from
responsibility for the uses knowledge will be put to. 2
Unreflective practice inevitably serves the ruling class,
and as evidenced in the current professional crises contains
the seeds of 1ts own destruction. This thesis claims that the
professional's failure rests intheir lack of reflection on the
nature of the capitalist system of social organization which
informs thought as much as it does daily practice. Basic so-
cial issues are perceived then as aggregations of technical
19
problems. Technical problems are solved by technical means,
so these means are generated and solutions proposed within a
dominant but fundamentally unthought consensus of meaning--the
consensus a consequence of taking the existing social, econ-
omic and political organization as a given and natural order.
Within this consensus of meaning, the crises of capitalism
are perceived at a secondary level as aggregates of localized,
largely unrelated fragmented crises, such as the "urban crises",
the "transportation crisis", or the "housing crisis." Pro-
fessionals are then educated and dispatched to put out these
localized crisis fires. But crises are inherent to and a conse-
quence of that largersocio-economic organization, capitalism.
The ensuing multiplicity of specialized meanings serves to
mask the real crisis at the fundamental level, which is that
class conflict is real and objective; there consequently cannot
be a societal consensus of value and meaning within the capi-
tali.st mode of production. The dominance at the secondary
level of the fragmented perception of localized crises in
public consciousness is a mystification which ensures that the
dominant social consciousness will be fragmented and liberal
crises perceived as localized. Then the society awaits only
the intervention of some new technique to "solve" the crisis
andmost important, never discovers the source and nature of
the domination and alienation which conditions their lives.
The personal origins of the thesis: I came to understand
the need for critical reflection and then to write this thesis
20
through a series of professional and educational experiences
which led me to search for a progressively deeper basis for
the grounding and legitimation of architectural and planning
practice--a basis which this thesis attempts to provide. I
relate my particular story in the belief that a widespread com-
mittment among architectural- and planning professionals to a
critical understanding of their personal and professional sit-
uation is necessary to end their failures and alienation. But
this commitment is only made after one suffers personally the
contradictions and alienations of one's self and practice. This
experience is the precondition of a commitment to critical
understanding and action (theory and praxis) which is a neces-
sary response to the personal and professional situation.
I entered architecture school in 1961 out of a long-time
fascination with both the aesthetic and constructional aspects
of building. My undergraduate education alternately stressed
the aesthetic/intuitional and methodological aspects of design.
But common to both approaches was the concern for an entirely
internal order, within the bounds of architectural discourse,
unrelated to any human meaning other than through the conven-
tional architectural concerns with scale, efficiency of con-
.struction- and circulation, and visual pleasure. Like a number
of the more recognized class members, I graduated with a pri-
mary concern with visual design and order. Yet somewhere I had
absorbed a tentative and unarticulated awareness of the class
basis of liberal order and thus chose to work for offices which
6
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had some commitment to working for the dominated classes as
well as to "good" visual design. Linking these two commit-.
ments was my belief to some degree in the "moral efficacy of
design" which underlay modern architecture--the doctrine that
"good" design and the provision of a higher standard of physi-
cal facilities would improve people's lives. In various of-
fices I design attractive bank interiors; tried to bring down
to a comprehensible scale facades of fifteen-story housing
blocks for the elderly whose location and high density the
architect had ho control over; worked on an "experimental"
project which would place low-income black children in dormi-
tories to sleep away from their parents because children's
bedrooms within the individual apartments would be too expen-
sive; designed community buildings and housing which would pro-
vide some subsidized apartments for blacks wanting to move out
of the inner city to the suburbs.
But in my perception the rewards of doing this work were
mostly in seeing designs I had worked on being built as attrac-
tive visual objects. The traditional assumption of the "moral
efficacy" of design for me proved false---the projects in no
important sense transformed the lives and socio/political sta-
tus of the people they were designed for. The bank had a more
pleasant facade while its intents and purposes remained un-
changed; the housing blocks in no significant way dealt with
.the isolated conditions of the elderly in liberal society; the
"experimental" low-cost housing on reflection was a grotesque
22
example of the impac.t of economics as a determination of the
quality of people's lives; the community facilities and
suburban housing became not a spearhead for black entry into
the suburbs but- an attractive setting for predominantly lower-
middle class suburban locals.
I conceptualized the lack of personal meaning
in the projects I worked on as a failure of my knowledge about
the psychological relations of wo/men and environment. If
such relations were known, meaningful environments could be
designed. But there was no time or money within the economic-
ally-bounded world of office practice for the wo/man-environment
research which I thought was necessary.
Then, believing still in "moral efficacy", I entered the
advanced Masters programs in architecture and planning at MIT
in 1971 to try to find a grounding for a so-far elusive envir-
onmental meaning. Deliberately leaving the object-orientation
of my earlier education and practice, I studied fields which
dealt with the human processes in wo/man-environment relation:
architectural psychology and sociology, social science "user-
needs" research techniques, community theory, semiological and
linguistic analysis of architectural form- and symbolism, as
well as standard planning subjects which escaped the limitatiors
of a visually-oriented educaticn. While more human and pro-
cess oriented, the fields were similar to object design in
treating processes as unrelated to any larger context, yet such
relation is the precondition of meaning. The present state of
23
architectural psychology and sociology essentially only re-
verses the object-orientation of conventional architecture--
instead of the architectural object being the prime locus of
reality and concern, now the individual psychology or group
sociology is substituted. The crucial relation of the indi-
vidual or the group to the social whole, which is the precon-
dition of meaning,is largely'ignored. Community theory (such
as in Mumford, Geddes, and the community sociologists) pro-
vides little insight into the means of reconstituting commun-
ity in liberal society; semiological and linguistic analysis
discusses the mechanics of how form and environment mean but
again does not deal with the reasons for the lack of meaning
in liberal society; standard planning approaches (including
urban economics, urban politics, urban transportation and
land-use issues) either take the given institutions of the
liberal order as basically unproblematic or at least accept
them as a condition of practice. The problem of meaning is not
addressed.
These criticisms are only later formalizations of what I
first felt as a profound emptiness in the material which,
whatever its intellectual merits, I could not relate to. The
entire realm of what architecture and planning theory and
practice had to say about meaningful environment was to me not
even right or wrong, but just in some primitive sense incompre-
hensible, an objective babble. If architecture and planning
had nothing to say to me, how could I justify making environ-
24
ments. I felt this alienation from what architecture and plan-
ning was saying as a personal crisis, a personal failure, to
which my friend Shoukrey Roweis responded:
I really think that you misconfigure-to-yourself
the meaning of your alienation. It is not---as you
put it--a personal or idiosyncratic failing or incapacity.
The reverse might indeed be true: you refuse to acquiesce
to a life devoid of purpose/encounter/dialogue/meaning.
(This is a healthier reaction than that of) those who
either rationalize their smooth integration or act as if
the eearch for meaning is meaningless.
ALIENATION IS NOT INSIDE US; IT IS THE DOMINANT
SICKNESS OF 20TH CENTURY SUBJECT/OBJECT RELATIONS.
- This realization was the key to understanding why my at-
tempts to find meaning within the internal practice and 'study
of architecture and planning had failed, and the beginning of
the study which lead to this thesis.
My attempts to find meaning within the internal practice
and study of architecture and planning had to fail, for the
understanding and resolution of the crises of meaning and ef-
fectiveness in architecture and planning is possible only in
relation to the resolution of the crises of the social order
which the professions derive from and serve. More than any
internal structure, the mediations, the connections between
architecture and planning and the social whole are crucial.
-The thesis as a critical project
The fundamental question is:.what shall architects and
planners do, given the failure and alienation of their prac-
tice? Impeded practice refl'ects back to practice's complement,
thought. But -the disciplines of architecture and planning, by.
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virtue of their instrumental nature, do not have within them-
selves the conceptual resources to deal with problems per-
ceived in their own practice. Professionals must escape the
limitations of their own perceptions, theory and practice to
understand their function in the operation of the social to-
tality. This is a project of critical reflection, critical in
the sense of describing, explaining, and uncovering the unre-
flected premises of professional practice and theory. The
critical project, the project of this thesis, must uncover the
assumptions which the dominant professional practitioners and-
theorists have made about the nature of the world they dealt
with; understand these assumptions in light of an analysis of
that world with tools which escape the limitations of profes-
sional understanding; and understand the genesis of those assump-
tions in the processes and structure of the society the pro-
fessions serve.
The epistemological base
The choice of a mode of knowing for the critical project
is. crucial, for knowledge is indistinguishable from the form
of self, society and practice. -The critical search for the
basis of a unified self, society and environment must rest on
a method which can comprehend those elements as interrelated
elements of a toality, going beyond the analysis of fragmented
social elements. This thesis then is based on dialectical ma-
terialism, an epistemology which takes human beings and human
26
meaning as the subject of action and history, and recognizes
self, social order and social products (including architecture
and planning) as human constructions which derive from human
meaning, choice and' intention. Dialectical materialism is
uniquely capable of dealing with reality as a totality of in-
terrelated meanings rather than as a fragmented collection of
analytically-understood logical or causal relations. This
view is the polar opposite of the dominant liberal instrumen-
tal epistemology (termed scientific epistemology or Positivism)
which holds that reality is located not in concrete human choice
and intention b~it in our ideas about the world. This is an
attitude which facilitates the dominant class making its defin-
ition of reality the legitimated mode of knowledge and con-
sciousness for the entire society. Dialectical materialism
finds a grounding for reality, beyond any idealistic definition
of truth, in the concrete processes of human life, and its de-
finition of the nature of the self as revealed not in theory
but in history.
As expressed by Ma.x:
The question of whet1er objective truth- can be at-
tributed to human thinking is not a question of theory
but a practical question. In practice man must prove
the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-
sidedness of his thinking. The dispute over the reality
or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from prac-
tice is a purely scholastic question.
-Marx: Second Thesis on Feuerbach (1845)
Marx expresses the fundamental concern of this thesis with
the practice of architecture and planning as well as the form
of knowledge in its unreflected premises. Theoretical ration-
alizations derived independently of the realities and urgencies
of. everyday life and social relations have proven, as the the-
sis will show, totally inadequate as a basis of practice.
In its commitment to reveal the connections and wholeness
behind the apparent fragmentation of reality, dialectical ma-
terialism is an epistemology of the project of social libera-
tion Land transfdrmation. Class domination is maintained only
through the fragmentation of self, consciousness, community,
environment and this fragmented state is taken as the defini-
tion of "normal" liberal reality. To reveal the connections
between the fragments then is an inherently critical and ra-
dical act which destroys the illusion of the absoluteness of
liberal reality.
The transformative project
Like the epistemology it is based on, this thesis addresses
"1not a question of theory but a practical question," the inten-
tion of social transformation. The professions can only rea-
lize their ideals of creating meaningful and unfragmented en-
vironments if the institutional basis for a whole, unfragmented
society exists. Professionals then must find ways of partici-
pating in the creation of the institutional basis of a whole
society and resolving the social alienations of subject and
object, self and society, which I had first realized as aliena-
tions in myself.
At the economic level, this project means the creation of
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a socialist economy in which wo/men collectively determine what
and how they produce and receive what they need; at a political
level, wo/men must be able to collectively control the public
decisions which govern their lives; at the level of social or-
der, a community must be created in which each person is recog-
nized not as an abstract role-occupant but as a whole being,
unafraid of the social interaction (intersubjectivity) which is
the necessary condition of the development of self and society;
at the level of the self, the conditions must be established
where needs of the self for both autonomy and community can be
realized; and at the level of epistemology, a knowledge must be
created (in its general form termed dialectical materialism)
capable of comprehending the alienated nature of the liberal
self and liberal society, and the class domination from which
self and society derives.
The intention- and argument of the thesis: The thesis is
situated within the general program of transformation just des-
cribed. The intention of the thesis is to investigate the
senses in which architecture and planning have participated in
the historical forms of social. order. This investigation gives
architects and planners a basis for transforming the class dom-
ination of the liberal social order and in doing so resolve
their own crises.
The thesis makes and attempts to justify the following
argument, assuming a class analysis of history and society, as
well as. a dialectical materialist epistemology:
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1) Since the origins of liberal society, the architectural
and planning project of unifying and "rationalizing" the envir-
onment has failed. This failure has created a crisis of pro-
fessional theory, practice, meaning and survival, and is char-
acterized in three forms:
a) The failure of architects and planners to make
the environment into a unified and "rationalized" whole; b)
The failure of the rationalizing intent of architecture and
planning to become societal. norm by being instituted as a value
by the dominant class; and c) The failure of architecture and
-planning to comprehend with its own theory and methodology the
source and therefore the resolution of its crisis in the nature
of the liberal social order.
2) The crises of architecture and planning derives essen-
tially from those of the liberal social order of which the pro-
fessions are an element. Then the resolution of the profes-
sional crises is only possible through the transformation of
the liberal social order.
3) The professions, to resolve their own crises, must
participate in the project of social transformat-on. This pro-
ject involves four central tasks:
a) The creation of a non-dominating communal social
order through critical theory and practice.
b) The creation of an appropriate epistemology and
knowledge as an instrument of critique and cri-
tical practice, grounded on a normative theory
of self.
c) The creation of whole and unalienated selves.
d) The creation of an architectural and planning
practice which aids in the social project of
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transforming the domination of liberal society.
Fundamental to this practice is the recognition
that the meaning of architectural and planning
products is not as aesthetic or instrumental ob-
jects but as concretizations of human meanings
and social relations.
4) The modes of professional participation involve : a)
a major critical investigation and revaluation of professional
history, theory, ideology and practice, in terms of its rela-
tion to the social whole; and b) critical, transformative ac-
tion on personal and professional levels in the-public world.
The structure of the thesis: In order to understand the
meaning of the-architects' and planners' situation today, the
thesis critically investigates both the practice and theory of
architecture and planning in relation to the social structure,
epistemology, and forms of self of the major historic social
forms.
Section II is a critical history of architectural and
planning theory and practice. The meanings of architecture and
planning-as elements in the social order are investigated in
their development through time, as the only means through
which the origins and meanings of the current professional cri-
ses can be understood.
In Section III, the scientific/Positivist epistemologies
of the liberal social order, as well as their impact on archi-
tectural and planning theory and.practice, are described and
critiqued. Dialectical materialism as a resolution to the cri-
ses of liberal epistemology "will then be presented in its unique
nature~ as a critical knowledge which in its-very structure im-.
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plicates practice as a necessary part of knowing. The condi-
tions of a critical knowledge and practice for architecture
and planning are then presented.
Section IV discusses specific projects for architects and
planners in developing a critical epistemology and practice
leading towards a liberated society.
Section V includes a bibliography and notes.
General Notes
1) On reading the thesis as a whole: A central conten-
tion of the thesis is that the crises of liberal society and
architecture and planning are characterized by alienation and
fragmentation of consciousness, self, community and professional
practice. This fragmentation can be understood only from a
point of .view which posits the possibility of these elements
being unified in a non-alienated social order. This point of
view has been described as the liberative intent of dialectical
materialism. The thesis then is committed to describing the
totality of which all social elements now fragmented are parts,
in the belief that the only truth is in knowledge of the whole.
Likewise, the thesiscannot be understood until it is read com-
pletely: the argument of the thesis is not completed until the
end. Terms, concepts and arguments such as the ideas of
"totality", "meaning", and "self" which may be initially unfam-
iliar or unclear should be well defined and gain meaning in a
number of contexts through a formal definition in the body of.
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the text, or in a note. Often, assertions will
be made which will be left as such until a later point when
they are justified. This is done because to fully explain and
justify each assertion at the moment of introduction would dis-
rupt the flow of the argument and create more confusion than
clarity.
The reader then is asked to make a certain "suspension of
disbelief" until the end of the argument, which is the end of
the thesis.
2) The use of notes: Notes are used in the conventional
.way, as:a) citations for quotes; b) clarifications and elabor-
ations of points made; and c) examples supporting general as-
sertions. Clarifications and examples were placed in the note
section when they seemed too specific or general in context of
the argument at a given point. But in many cases it would be
fruitful to read the notes along with the main text.
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Section II:
A CRITICAL HISTORY
OF ARCHITECTURAL AND PLANNING
THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN RELATION TO
THE MAJOR SOCIAL ORDERS
PREFACE
STRUCTURE OF THE HISTORY
A THEORY OF THE NATURE OF
THE SELF
THE PROBLEMS OF ORDER,
METHOD, SELF, AND
ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
HISTORY
THE TRIBAL/MEDIEVAL SOCIAL
ORDER
THE ARISTOCRATIC SOCIAL ORDER
THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
THE POST-LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
PREFACE
STRUCTURE OF THE HISTORY
Introduction: In the Preface, the intent, structure and assump-
tions of the history will be discussed.
The history attempts to portray the social totality in
which architectural and planning practice participates and from
which that practice gains its meaning. It is based on a dia-
lectical materialist conception of reality and history which
holds that the truth is in the whole. "It is irrelevant to ask
whether the (historical) concepts, categories and relationships
are 'true or false'. We have to ask, rather, what is it that
produces them and what is it that they serve to produce."i
The truth of architectural and planning practice and products
is therefore to be found only in the meaning of its interre-
lationships within the totality. The history then presents the
major conditions which simultaneously affect and are affected
by architectural and planning practice during the major forms
of social order.
Formal organization: A fundamental contention of the Thesis is
that social theory and practice, and thus .architecture and
planning within it, are based and derived from the nature of
the self of which various social forms are manifestations. Con-
trary to mechanical materialists who claim that the self is de-
rived entirely from particular historical conditions, this
-thesis takes the particular historic manifestation of self and
society as a result of the interplay between concrete histor-.
35
ical c-nditions and characteristics of the self which are con-
stant through history. This attitude is elaborated in the
following section on A Theory of the Nature of the Self. The
final portion.oftthe Preface, The Problems of Order, Method,
Self and Architecture and Planning, will identify each major
historical period as a resolution to the problems common to
all history of social order, 'method of knowing, the self, and
architecture and planning.
These problems will be described in general and then in
terms of the several resolutions of each problem through his-
tory.
Following the Preface is the History. It is divided into
separate discussions of the resolutions of the problems of
order, method, self and architecture and planning in the four
major historical periods: tribal/medieval, aristocratic,
liberal, and post-liberal.social orders. The discussion of
.each period is divided into separate considerations of the
"four problems". Within each period, elements are emphasized
which are central to the argument. These are particularly the
periods' origin, *evolution and decay, its social,. economic,
and political forms and institutions, the dominant conscious-
ness and nature of the self, the dominant epistemologies, and
the theories, processes, products and practice of architecture
and planning. These elements will not be dealt with in a rigid
order, but will be outlined in a manner (hopefully) appropriate
to their content.
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'The organization and. content of the history reflects
a) the intent of this .thesis to be a basis for liberative
practice, and. b) the assumption that ai'chitecture and planning
can only resolve their crises through .understanding the
mediations-between their practice through history and the his-
torical social forms from which they derive.
Each historic form is then presented primarily in terms
of its resolution of the polarities of the ideal and the actual
- the ideal being an unalienating and therefore non-dominating
.social totality, the actual being the degree of class domina-
tion which each social form represents.
As a basis for understanding the mediations, the issues
of social order, method, forms of self, and architectural and
planning practice must be separately presented before their
interconnections can be traced. This format reverses the usual
dominance in architectural and planning literature of internal
professional histories, supplemented by a short discussion of
the general "historic context", which merely perpetuates the
illusion that the meaning of architecture and planning can be
understood primarily within its own terms.
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Introduction: Each form of social life is based on-speci-
fic modes of the self which are the fundamental grammar of
social life in history. These modes are mediated in specific
ways to the social whole, to constitute definable forms of the
self characterizing each social order. While for Marx history
is a succession of class conflicts which provide the motor
force for historical change, this thesis holds that beneath
class conflict lies the needs of the self. In their continued
irresolution (at least since the end of the medieval period)
these needs provide .the most radical source of historical
instability and will be the foundation of the dissolution of
the liberal order. Further, a definition and understanding of
the nature of the self provides the only normative basis for
the critique and elimination of domination. The basis for the
refusal to accept the destruction of the self in liberal
society can only be in a theory of the self which holds that
there is a need for wholeness which the society cannot meet.
The relations of the self: The self can be understood
in relation to the natural world, to other selves, and to
history.
Self to the natural world: Wo/men's selves become
defined in the interrelations of determinism and choice, nec-
essity and freedom, the natural world and culture. Lacking a
full genetic definition, wo/men must determine (or complete)
their own nature', thus standing apart from the natural world,
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their.consciousness the subjective experience of indeterminacy.
The fundamental human experience as revealed by consciousness
is the inescapable separation of self from the world, subject
from object.. Thus, all human beings mediate behaviour through
consciousness and reproduce the gap between themselves and the
natural world in an internal separation and dialogue. This
dialogue is called reflection, the subjective relationship
between internal subject and internal object (the subject
making.an object out of himself) in which actuality is dis-
solved into the possibility of seeing alternative modes of
existence. Meaning is the relation between the internal dia-
logue and its external expression/realization. This. relation
is inherently ambiguous for meaning always has a double refer-
ence - in simultaneously being subjectively felt and objective-
ly observed. In knowing wo/men, the objective manifestation
of human action cannot be separated from subjective meaning.
Action is not an end separated from the means and neatly
separable from the self, but rather the result of human inten-
tion and meaning. The fundamental experience of wo/men's sub-
jectivity in relation to the natural world is the terror of
its non-human strangeness. Work and knowledge are in part
attempts to humanize nature as forms of practical'activity;
they allow a relation with the natural world on human terms
by creating a "second" nature. Yet, particularly in the
liberal fetishism of commodities, the products of wo/men's
labor acquire their own life. Wo/men then relate to their.own
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work is a substitute for human relations rather than as a
means to reduce the distance from the natural world.
Further, all knowing changes both'wo/men and the natural
wo'rld. The development of Western thought has been through
an increasing abstraction from sensuous concrete reality. As
thought gained in the power to control and predict, the .natur-
al world became a means for human ends. Thus the more wo/men
understand rature through instrumental rather than contempla-
tive knowledge, the greater gulf there is between social
peality and the ideal of natural harmony which humanizes nature
and naturalizes wo/men. 1
Self to others: The fundamental human experience in.
relation to others is individuality, initially felt in the
irreduciable fact of having a separate body. One achieves and
maintains individuality, acquiring subjectivity and conscious-
ness, only through the struggle to win the approval of one's
own being through the other's recognition and validation. Self
and other are mutually defining; one cannot exist without the-
other. Our language which distinguishes between self and soci-
ety obscures the.mutually necessary aspect of each. This
definition of the self constitutes the fundamental critique
of the utilitarian concept of the self as monad which defines
ind legitimizes alienation in liberal society. Yet the obverse
side of the struggle to be known is the fear of being known.
With the exception of love and community, all knowledge is
the struggle of a subject to' assert control or domination over
- 1,
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the other, whether the other be the natural. world .or a human
being. Thus wo/men's greatest need is also their greatest
fear. Human communication. oscillates between the terror of iso-
lation (schizophrenia) and the terror of engulfment (domination).
The struggle to be known is also the fear of being known: the
struggle to dominate is the fear of domination.
The reconciliation of the demands of individuality and
sociability (autonomy and community) take two basic forms -
domination/submission and love. Domination is a resolution of
the terror of nature and the other by holding power over it.
Yet, as the constant transformation of Western social forms
attests, the solution of class domination can never be stable
or satisfactory. What the dominating and dominated both require
of each other is recognition of their true humanity which can
only be denied in a coercive relationship. Further, this rela-
tionship is unstable because the dominated need to regain
their humanity, which necessarily implies overthrowing the
dominator by social revolution. Then for social orders based
on class domination, history is a succession of class conflicts
which are stages of wo/men's attempts to realize societies free
of domination. This permanent crisis of the self and social
instability will end only with the realization of the ideal
of 'the reconciliation of the demands of autonomy and community
in a non-dominating society. This reconciliation takes the
form of the ideal on the personal level of true (undominating)
love, and on the- social level of universalized community (as
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well as a socialized economy and democratic political form).
On the personal level, human beings are secure in their indivi-
;'duality yet accepted as whole people rather than as ful-
filling a partial role. On a societal level, universalized
.-community is a social order not structured through a division
of roles bound by abstract law, but as a community- of whole
human beings linked by shared values. In Buber's terms , the
I-it relation becomes the relation of an I to a Thou. The com-
munity is universal because only then could a total and undi-
vided community of shared values be realized.
The ideals of love and universalized community are the
synthesis of fact and value, since ideal and real are unified.
The ideals are also the synthesis of the double reference of
meaning; both subjective and.objective aspects are linked in
the unity of fact and value.
Self to history: The meaning and potential of the
individualized and collective self is defined by and manifest
through history. Yet only portions of the self's potential are
defined and developed within any historical order, as only por-
tions of any person's capacities can be manifest during a
lifetime. History is an unfolding of the forms and stages of
the development of the self. The ideal of the self in history
is universality, the full unfolding through times of its
powers. Yet the fate of the self is its necessary particular-
ity. Then the potential of the self is as much a reality as
its particular manifestation in history to date.2
Conclusion: The central problem and ideal of the self 42
is its reconciliation with history, other human beings, and
the natural world. History is the record of the successive
modes of that reconciliation, each form of social life being
based on modes of the self which are history's fundamental
"rammar. The two fundamental modes of that reconciliation
are the personal and the political. Love, art and religious
worship are personal modes which, if idealized, yield the
illusion that the individual can resolve the problem of the
self regardless of society. Architects and some planners
have to a great extent attempted a personal and aesthetic
reconciliation which, as the History will show, has failed.
Yet the hope of a solely political realization
of the unity of the self runs the risk of totalitarianism.
Personal autonomy is co llapsed into the collective, and with
that collapse the self is destroyed. For Unger, the moral
problem of the self is the reconciliation, yet the simultan-
eous maintaining the existence of the poles of existence-
facts and values, the personal and the political, intention.
and realization, autonomy and community. The reconciliation
must occur within the tension and limitation of the self being
only partially realized in sa lifetime, needing to maintain it's
separation from the world yet being united with it.
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THE PROBLEMS OF ORDER, METHOD, SELF, AND ARCHITECTURE AND
PLANNING
Introduction: The tribal/medieval, aristocratic, liberal,
and post-liberal social orders are the four major historical
contexts in which the self has taken form and architecture
and planning have functioned. Each form can be conceptualized,
for purposes of this thesis, in terms of four issues of which
each social form is a resolution: the problem of order, the
problem of method, the problem of the nature of the self, and
the problem of architecture and planning.
Far from being idealized concepts, the "four problems"
are categories which arise from the central crises of liberal
society itself. These crises, in their continued irresolution,
are the central descriptors of liberal reality. The use of
these categories in examining history is directly intended
towards understanding the origins and meanings of the present
crises in light of achieving a non-alienated communal social
order.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER
The problem of order is the problem of how society is
possible, and the nature of social bonding between individual
selves. The social order must resolve the contradiction of
the self's need for autonomy and community which is at once
the greatest source of and threat to social order. The social
and economic organizing principals which have operated through
history are discussed below.
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Tpology of social and economic ordering principles:
The principles of social ordering within the major periods
Western social orders are the principles of a) estate; b) class;
and c) role.
a) The principle of estate, describing- the order
of post-egalitarian primitive societies and medieval societies.
The entire society is ordered into social groupings between
which there is little or no mobility. The estates are not nec-
essarily hierarchically distinguished by power, but are distin-
guished by function. Social bonding is through the internaliza-
tion of shared values.
b) The principle of class, describing the order
of the aristocratic societies and with role, the ordering
principle of liberal society. Class societies are ordered by
a hierarchical control of power or of the means of producing
wealth. In contrast to the estates, there is more inter-class
mobility in which inherited or acquired wealth becomes an
important factor in determihing class position. Social bonding
is formalistically through law, and actually through class
domination.
c) The principle- df role, describing, with class,
the .order of liberal society. Work is accomplished through a
division of- labor which creates multiple roles. Society is
an association of role-occupants who achieve their position
through merit rather than through class. The social bonding
is the doctrine of self-interest which theoretically lead* to
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a harmony of interests.
Forms of social bondin:
a) Doctrine of legitimacy' describing the social
bonding of the primitive and medieval so.cieties.. The basis of
social bonding is the internalization of shared values which
are consensually validated. Individual ends are not random
but directed to maintaining the social whole. Likewise, con-
sciousness is that of community, the individual an organic part
of the whole social order. Every means to some extent an
end, so the means/ends and fact/value distinction are inter-
penetrating, inseparable. Rules are not an instrument of class
domination and an abstract device for the resolution of con-
flicting interests, but the expression of social consensus.
The limitation of the doctrine of legitimacy is its ina4
bility to accommodate change or to explain the necessity of
rules.
b) Doctrine of self-interest, the basis of liber-
al society in the representation o.f liberal social theory.
Social order is held to be the harmony of individuals pursuing
their own self-interests. Means are radically separated from
ends, human conduct determined not by consensus but by the
choice of means to secure given ends. Thus the organic relation
of fact and value is broken. Rules or law, rather than the
affinity of sentiment, are the links between human beings.
The limitation of the doctrine of self interest is its
inability to explain the basis of social cohere.nce. Indeed,
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coherence in liberal society derives and can be explained only
in terms of the domination of class and role. Domination as
the true source of liberal social Coherence is discussed in
Section II, The Liberal Social Order, the Problem of Order.
Typology of economic forms: The major economic
forms encountered in the History are those of a) reciprocity,
b) redistribution, and c) the iarket. These forms are corre-
lated with social relations of equality, estite/class structure,
and liberal instrumentalism.
a) Reciprocity is the form of exchange in socie-
ties where power is held roughly equally and the population
is sufficiently small that face-to-face encounter is possible.
The exchange, while one of material goods, is regulated by law,
ritual and custom which keeps such an economic act within the
framework of social relations. A gift of a portion of one's
crop is a form of exchange which is rewarded not by an equiva-
lent material value, but social credit and approbation neces-
sary to keep the giver in good standing in the community. The
meaning of the gift is not primarily as a material transfer
but as an interpersonal transaction which maintains and rein-
forces the social bond.
b) Redistribution is an extension of reciprocity
in which material production is exchanged through the mediation
of an administrative agent. Production is collected at a cen-
tral point and then redistributed in the form of gifts to the
producers on the' basis of need. The redistribution process is
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ceremonial, symbolizing and assuring the dominance of the so-
cial over the economic function.
Common to both reciprocity and redistribution is the
primacy of the social over the economic as well as the pro-
scription of economic gain as a motive of production and
exchange. Such economic systems are run on non-economic motives.
As long as social organization runs in its
ruts, no individual economic motives need come into
play: no shirking of personal effort need be feared;
division of labor will automatically be ensured;
e.conomic obligations will be duly discharged; and,
above all,.the material means for an exuberant dis-
play of abundance at all public festivals will be
provided. In such a community the idea of profit
is barred: higgling and haggling is decried;
giving freely is acclaimed as a virtue; the supposed
propensity to barter, truck, and exchange (the
notion of classical economist Adam Smith which justi-
fies the market as the basis of society) does not
appear.1
Paleolithic, feudal, medieval and to some extent aristo-
cratic societies have all been based on some form of recipro-
city and redistribution. The generality of these principles
and 'their seeming independence of the particular social form
may be ac.counted for by the social dominance over the economic
function. Only with the market principle does the flow of
influence reverse a market exchange system demands a market
society.
c) The market economy is the one economic form
which does create, and is dependent on,a specific societal
institution, the market system. In its logic as.the regulative
social mechanism, the market economy must dominate and trans-
form all other social institutions. The existence of the market
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economy is predicated on the creation of a new form of the
self, which produces and exchanges not because of intrinsic
human need or.the intrinsic value (use value) of the product.
Rather, the economic motive, which becoies the motive of
social existence, is that of economic gain. Market economies
thus exert a corrosive effect on the unity of social order as
will be shown in the history of the primitive and medieval
social orders in Section II.
Typology of dominant forms of consciousness: Every
form of social life is composed of dominant and subordinant-
forms of consciousness. No single individual can encompass
the total scope which this "ideal-type"- of consciousness de-
fines. The forms of consciousness are an interplay in history
between sociability and individualism, community and autonomy.
a) Communality is the dominant consciousness of
the primitive and medieval social orders in which the indivi-
dual is recognized as a whole person under the unity of an
encompassing model which is religious in origin.
Indeed, the concept of the "individual" in the modern
sense does not exist in primitive and medieval societies. While
the person is subordinate to the social place s/he holds,
this place is not seen as a coercive limitation but as a
function of a consensually-legitimated order. The soul or
spirituality is the ordering element of the personality,
defined by a religious mapping of reality as articulated in
the "divine model".
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b) Instrumentality is the.dominant conscious-
ness of the liberal social order. The- person, individuated
from the social whole, is the subject of history and society.
The relation between individuals,.and within consciousness,
is the instrumentality through which other wo/men and the na-
tural world are instruments (means) of the individual's pur-
pose (ends). As.the prime reality is that of the single in-
dividual, social relations are experienced as essentially
artificial and necessarily held together by the abstract form
of law. Social bonds are precarious because every communi-
cation with others is a threat to autonomy. Individuals are
organized in society through the principle of role, which em-
bodies only that part of the individual which serves as a
means to capitalist ends. The liberal self then cannot become
whole, the supposed autonomy created by role-organization con-
tradicted by the lack of social value given to the extra-role
dimensions of the person. The instrumental reason of capita-
list imperatives then becomes the ordering element in the so-
cial definition of the self, the self's consciousness and
self-definition.
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD
Introduction: The problem of method is the problem
of how self and society knows and defines itself. As the de-
finition of human beings is not fully genetically determined,
the consciousness deriving from the gap between the given and
50
the indeterminant is a necessary and constant human construc-
tion. The only basis for consciousness to operate is with the
knowledge of the subjective and external worlds. This know-
ledge is indistinguishable from the forms, constraints, and
way of knowing-in short, the method. Thereforea consciousness
and knowledge of the problem of method, of epistemology, is of
crucial importance in the transformation of self and society
through personal and professional practice.
In this thesis, the major epistemological concern
is the generation of a form of knowledge adequate- to comprehend -
the social relations, meaning and consciousness of a non-domi-
nating society. Unlike dominant Positivist rationalism, such
knowledge is not a causal derivation but a method of knowing
which sees the subjective and objective unified by meanings
rather than causal sequential relations. Causal relations im-
ply a means and an end. Unities of meanings implies the re-
lationship of self and consciousness with the world, the con-
tinued quest of the self for completion and unity, the elimi-
nation of the gap between means and ends. The unity of conscious-
ness with the world, the unity of the subjective and the ob-
jective, lies in the fact that everything social leads a divided
existence-at once an actual phenomena in the world and an
intention. Meaning is the relation between inner intention and
outer manifestation.1
The outer, "objective" world cannot be known without
understanding the meaning of the persons who intended it. Like-
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wise, we cannot understand the intention without understanding
the outside world with which the self wants unity. At the
core of existence there is no distinction between fact and
value. But realization is impossible without.a method capable
of simultaneously uniting the inner and outer, consciousness
and actuality, ideal and real, in a unity of meaning rather
than as a causal sequence.
Modes of knowledge: The general modes of knowledge
through Western history have been:
a) Knowledge derived deductively from a unified
immanent or transcendent cosmology. Truth is revealed by a
"divine model" rather than acquired from the study of concrete
reality; the dominant form of knowledge in the primitive/
medieval social order.
b) Knowledge derived from the study of the
natural world: Truth is reached through the analytic proce-
dures of natural science as applied to studying natural facts
and processes. Natural science becomes under liberalism the
dominant basis for studying human reality in the social sci-
ences.' Like the liberal society which it serves, social sci-
ence takes natural and human reality as meaningful only as
fragments of a whole, useful only as instrumental means- to the
ends of domination and profit.
c) Knowledge derived from the study of uniquely
human qualities of meaning, consciousness, and intentionality.
Termed dialectic materialism, this knowledge is not just anothEr
logical form. Its use implies the existence of a society in
which the human qualities it can comprehend become the domin-
ant concerns of the social order.
THE PROBLEM OF SELF
The problem of the nature of the self can be understood
as in the particular resolution in a given social order of the
self's location along the range of autonomy and community,
freedom and domination. Further, the meaning and potential
of the self is developed through history. The par'ticular bal-
ance of autonomy and community can be understood only in rela-
tion to the self-comprehension and perceived potentiality of
the self at a given time. For example, only with the Enlight-
enment did wo/men begin to perceive that the definition of the
self was not an eternal given, but a historical project of
self-determination.
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
The functions of the design and construction of environ-
ment as well as the allocation of resources have existed in all
societies. (The terms "architecture" and "planning", while in
themselves not existing throughout history, refer in this the-
sis, unless specified, to the general societal environmental-
"rationalization" and resource-allocation functions.) Archi-
tecture and planning will be shown in the History to have
three constant characteristics: 1) the project of environmental
"rationalizatiori", or the deliberate ordering of the environ-
ment, at any'scale; 2) the necessity for architectural and
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planning practice to be allied with the dominant social power
for the rationalizing project to be realized; and 3) the
meaning of architectural and planning products as objectifica-
tions of human relations, as distinguished from object rela-
tions.
As the meaning of architecture and planning practice and
products is in their relation to social meaning and social
relations, the problem of architecture and planning is not the
secondary issue of the success of architectural/pl'anning pro-
ducts in solving their technical or symbolic tasks. Rather,
the problem as defined in this thesis is the primary issue
of the adoption of the project of environmental "rationaliza-
tion" bydominant social power. The project, for example,
of present architecture and planning fails to the extent that
it is not adopted as a value by the ruling class.
In the central relation between architectural/planning
practice with social meaning and dominant power, it is crucial
to understand the mediations between architectural and plan-
ning products and the social whole. This understanding creates
a vocabulary and discourse.about these products which escapes
the discourse of object-relations which so dominates profes-
sional practice and scholarship.
The dominant liberal modes of understanding contemporary
and historical architectural and planning products parallels
the nature of liberal society: the products, like people, are
taken as self-contained objects or processes to be understood
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in terms of their formal properties. For example, buildings
are seen as solutions to functional or aesthetic problems,
as "built sociology" or as signs and symbols of cultural
meanings. Understanding buildings is a task of "object ana-
lysis" in which the building is seen to contain its own re-
ferences, and therefore can be understood substantially in-
dependently of its origin in the social totality. The em-
phasis in this kind of analysis is on the properties of the
architectural or planning product rather than the social
meanings it embodies.
But to understand architecture and planning as a social
practice, their products must be understood as a concretiza-
tion of human labor, consciousness, and social relations. The
truth of architecture and planning products then lies in their
embodiment of the social relations that produced them and not
in-their independent formal qualities. This is a dialectic
materialist position, which denies that architectural and
planning products have any reality independent of the human
meaning from which they derive-the product turns us back to
its constitution by wo/men. Formal qualities of the products
of course still exist, but the meaning of these qualities is
.transvalued and transformed when understood in their deriva-
tion from the meaning of the social totality. The products can
therefore not be seen as the fetishs which so much modern cri-
ticism takes them for--inanimate products which are as real
and alive, perhaps even more so, than the human beings who
produced them..
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THE HISTORY
summary chart of the social orders
THE TRIBAL/MEDIEVAL SOCIAL ORDER
- THE ARISTOCRATIC SOCIAL ORDER
THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
THE POST-LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
. The following
chart displays in a
summary fashion some
of the major char-
acteristics of the
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THE TRIBAL/MEDIEVAL SOCIAL ORDER 59
Introduction: The historical section begins with a discussion
of the first -and last major social orders in Western history
(non-Western primitive tribes are included) which placed
human development and interaction above the imperatives of
economic interests and class domination which characterizes
liberal society. The central intent in the discussions of the
tribal and medieval orders is the portrayal of the mutual
definitions of self and community as a non-dominating unity/
totality from which architecture and planning practice took
their meaning.
The tribal/medieval social orders share four fundamental
attributes:
a) THE PROBLEM OF ORDER: A fixed social structure was
either egalitarian or based on the principle of estate. While
the estates differed in function, social place and eventually in
power, the power differential was restrained so that it did
not become exploitative.
b) THE PROBLEM OF METHOD: Knowledge was deductively
derived from an eternal and divine cosmological model of the
world (called the 'divine model').While the content of the
model differed between societies, the source of that knowledge
was divine, inherent in the earth .('immanent') or located in
the heavens ('transcendent') . Rationality meant the cor-
respondence of human knowledge to the divine model (or map
of reality). The world, as defined by the model, was
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transparent to understanding.
c) THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF: The self was defined. in
relation to one's social place in the communal order which in
turn was subordinate to the authority of the immanent or
transcendent divine model. Self, society and cosmology were
then a mutually defining and mutually necessary unity.
d) THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING: Archi-
tecture and planning took its definition and meaning from its
participation in the social unity rather than from its current
position as an isolated social practice. Until the development
of the- Gothic cathedral in the later medieval period, archi-
tectural and planning practice were not distinct elements of
the division of labor and were subsumed under the authority,
communality and legitimation of the divine model.
THE TRIBAL SOCIAL ORDER
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AND SELF
The earliest human groups establishing patterned physi-
cal settlements on the land were the Neolithic tribal or
clan societies. Neolithic tribes, succeeding the nomadic
Paleolithic hunting and food gathering cultures, ceased their
dependence on hunting. They domesticated both themselves and
nature through the commitment to place, agriculture, and
family.
The village, in the midst of its garden plots
and fields, formed a new kind of settlement: a
permanent association of families and neighbors, of
birds and animals, of houses and storage pits and
barns, all'rooted in the ancestral soil, in which
each generation formed the compost for the next.1 .61
The material base of the early villages was a labor-
intensive agricultural production requiring a strong communal
organization. In the earliest village,' the land was the
source of all life and acquired an immanent sanctity -
village members seemed scarcely separated from nature itself.
The tribal consciousness was the continuity of self and
nature, the complete absorption of self to the social and na-
tural place it occupied. The principle of reality was in the
sanctity of the natural world itself. The order of society'
paralleled the observed order of the natural world. Wor'k,
partaking in this order, was an integrated and natural part
of life. There was no division of labor or dominance of
commodity production which would later fragment power, con-
sciousness and society. The content of consciousness, itself
a manifestation of men's separation from the natural world
and the world of others, was as close to being at one with the
natural world iy social order has achieved. As such,
arrangements of social life were seen not subject to human
will but in acc-ordance with the perceived natural order.
Reverence for nature, born both in its attribution as an
immanent divinity as well as in the primitive technology
precluded the modern consciousness of. nature as a resource
to be dominated or exploited for independent human purposes.
This consciousness would only occur after authority, whether
sacred or secular, became transcendent and did not inhere in
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the earth itself.
Members of the early villages did not have specialized
functions and hold roughly equal power; there was, for exam-
ple, no special priesthood. Each clan member underwent a
life that was itself a kind of ritual of identification, par-
ticipation, sacrifice and -sanctification. The social bonds
were communal, non-hierarchical. Legitimation was consensual.
There was thus no institutionalized domination of one by the
other, and as history barely existed and for millenia
there was little social change. Innovation came slowly, for
primitive societies. generally believe that the scope of human
knowledge is foreordained by supernatural power and that the
original stock of ideas could and should not be expanded,
questioned or altered.
The expansion of primitive societies brought about an
inevitable division of labor and goods exchange. But the
meaning of primitive and bourgeois goods exchange are oppo-
site: goods exchange in primitive societies took the form of
gifts which always were reciprocally given (beyond any utili-
tarian meaning). The exchange united separate individuals and
built social relationships. Exchange then.is an eminently
social-act compared to bourgeois transformation of goods into
commodities and their exchange for private gain. In the
totalistic correspondence of the consciousness, activity and
environment- of everyday life to the model of explanation and
meaning of the world, the actual was identified with the
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ideal. This identity was essentially religious. The primitive
immanence of sanctity in nature was for Durkheim the proto-
typical form of religion, rather than a particular form of it.
In the tribal order, fact and value, the real and ideal,
consciousness and actuality, the sacred and the earthly were
all essentially unified, a polar contrast to the antimonies
between the elements of existence in the liberal world. The
elements of existence were, in tribal societies, unities.
But such unity must be understood in relation to the every-
day experience of hardship, risks of hunger and death, and the
insecurity in the face of natural forces which a primitive
technology could not control. Thus nature may have embodied
as much terror as wholeness, only adding to the stress of
potential societal disintegration of any consensually-
legitimated society due to the loss of consensus or the
incursion of strangers.
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD
The epistemology, the' formalization of the social
unity and knowledge, embodied a form of reason and explana-
tion as vital and convincing as is the scientific epistemology
to liberal society. The diffeirences between tribal and
scientific knowledge were not the 'truth value' of each.
Rather, each epistemology was bas6d on two different, but not
unequal, logical systems. Explanation, for all societies, is
founded on the ability to create an ordered representation
of reality, a hypothetical picture of interrelated facts and
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perce'ptual experiences whose'nature and behaviour is commun-
ally accepted.
The material base of the tribal 'epistemology comprised
the qualities of nature and the human.body, the process of
reproduction, and the need for a knowledge both effective in
the world and to give meaning to the tribe as the social unit.
As the most central elements of the society's life, these
qualities were given a divine status and authority inherent
in the world itself. Tribal knowledge was then embodied in a
divine model which then became to a greater or lesser degree
the explicit basis for village design, as will be, shown in
the next section.
For the modern Positivist, tribal epistemology could
only be a myth, having perhaps efficacy but not truth value.
The Positivist demands a verification of truth not in common
meaning but dltimately through the conformance of truth
statements with empirical reality as tested through 'objec-
tive' scientific procedures. The tribal epistemology gained -
its verification through another but scientifically proscribed
truth test - the communal consensus of meaning in terms of a
conformance with the divine model. The structure of the divine
model was a communal patrimony, seen as given not by man (in
case of science) and therefore problematic and mutable, but
inherent in the nature of reality itself.
a
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THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
The design of primitive villages: If modern archi-
tecture and planning suffers as an alienated and fragmented
activity in a correspondingly alienated society, the design
of primitive villages stands as an historic instance of
the deep integration of design activity and environmental
meaning within the life of a relatively whole communal and
unalienated society.
While there was a great variety of primitive village
designs (due to the small population, limited mobility, and
isolation from outside influences of most primitive villages)
several common themes emerged:
a) Land was commonly held - a precondition to the pos-
sibility of the environment reflecting and serving a communal
consensus and meaning.-
-b) Social relations rather than the liberal imperatives
.1
of a formal physical ordering were the major determinants of
2
building form and placement. The meaning of such environments
was as an expression and mediator of the particular villages
social relations, and not through analysis of the environ-
ment's physical form in itself. 3
c) The primitive religious cosmology or divine model,
arid. not any modern form of functionalism, was oftdn the
basis for determining building shape and overall village
organization. The divine model was manifest through the use
of such symbolic devices as orientation, the circle, and the
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establishment of a building or void at the village center. But
the divine model can be understood only in terms of human
relations.
Looking closer at the use of the pre-rational
man-made environment we find a tight relationship
between the articulation of the human activities
and the creation of the discrete unities which make
.up the man-made environment. We observe not only
individual activities contained, schematized, but
also the manner with which an individual contacts
another individual. Thus, besides the eliminating
of conflict and the hindering of aggression, pre-
rational (primitive) products function positively,
they lead individuals to recognize a common element
behind each own separate experience; they reduce
the separateness of experiences, transforming them
into a collective conscience. Each expression of
divine model, the universal generator of pre-
rational products, is merely the abstract, condensed,
representation of permissible or prohibited inter-
actions between individuals. It is a code of possible
interactions determining ultimately the power
relationships between individuals. In other words,
it is society, cnceived in its broadest and deepest
definition.
d) As the primitive societies barely changed over time,
design* developed through protracted 'unselfconscious'
process 3 which was not differentiated as a distinct inten-
tional cultural enterprise assigned to the specific roles of
architect, planner or builder.
e) An overwhelming necessity of primitive societies was
survival in harmony. Social disputes thus had to .be constant-
ly mediated. While of course every society must maintain
an internal order, the essentially classless primitive
societies required a consensual unity rather than one born
of class domination of liberal society. The physical
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enirironment was made into an instrument of that consensual
unity, through being a communicator of signs and a signifier
of concepts and the world order. These environmental cues then
functioned to reinforce social cohesion. through educating
the collec'tive and individual consciousness to commonly-held
values and norms and social mappings.
"The taxonomic ordering of space was an important environ-
mental signifier which resolved the tens.ions between indivi-
dual realization and communal bonding. Each particular sub-
group had a determined portion of space assigned to it: in-
other words, it was necessary that space in general be-
divided, diffe, ntiated, arranged, and that these arrangements
be known to everybody."1 Unlike the class societies 2 the early
primitive taxonomic environment represented differentiation
of function, but not of power. 3
The agricultural cities: The agricnltural cities
took a physical form manifestly different from the tribal
villages, but contained essentially similar social relations.
Through the pro.cess of a quantative linking of clan to clan,
a colonization by social affinity of relatively self-suffi-
14
cient, socio-natural organisms, some dispersed primitive
villages combined into agricultural cities. The city's
hierarchical organization was a response to the increased
population, a scale of agricultural production, specialization
of labor, and a consequent centralizing religious and
administrative function which then transformed the early 68
tribal communities' egalitarian structure.
.Yet before the Spanish conquest, kinship ties did not
decompose into a class society based on the private owner-
ship of territory and social wealth. While administrative,
religious, military and trading functions in particular became
separated out from the total stream of work and social
heirarchies developed, the major clan characteristics of the
tribal village survived. The agricultural-city societies were
hierarchically structured federations of clans which owned
land -communally. The economic base was the cultivation of land
on a scale unprecidented in the village communities.
Where scarcity and survival were not major
pressures, there was little to harass the individual
intellectually or economically. Existence was subject
to divine favour, and a man fared much as did his
fellows. Large as some towns were...the sense of
community was strong. Freedom of thought, individual
liberty, personal fortunes, were nonexistent, but
people lived according to a code that had worked well
and continuously for centuries. An Aztec would have
been horrified at the marked isolation of an
individual's life in our Western world.
Tenochtitlan, the urban capital of the Aztec society,
resembled a modern urban center with major religious struc-
tures, spacious plazas, palaces and administrative buildings.
Its physical separation of the public religious and adminis-
trative structures from the dwellings appears to reflect a
modern class/stratified society of class domination. But in
fact, the city was "very likely a grossly oversized pueblo
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community."' The apparent physical similarity to twentieth
century cities belies the radically different social base.
Here, as with the primitive clan villages, social relations
rather than the formal physical design are the key to under-
standing the meaning of the society and its physical planning.
The discovery of the plow, new forms of hardy grains and
the use of domesticated animal labor reduced the material need
for labor-intensive clan organization. Yet the clan persisted
as a social form far beyond its technological justification. 2
The'clan form remains the most stable form of
human association thus far developed. Perhaps no
institution following it fostered as deep a sense
of solidarity, mutual aid, and supportive comfort
to the individual. Owing to their natural basis in
kinship ties, clans proved to be the most intimate
and perhaps satisfying social forms devised by hu-
manity. Accordingly, the clan tended to perpetuate
itself against compelling social forces that easily
overwhelmed or drastically alterad other forms of
human association. 3
THE MEDIEVAL SOCIAL ORDER -
Introduction: As with the primitive social order, the key fac-
tor in the following discussion is the unity of the various
elements of the medieval social order as an integrated totality
in which architecture and urban form participate and derive
their meaning. Contrasted with the medieval order, the unity
of the primitive societies does not pose as difficult a prob-
lem of explanation. Their characteristics remained stable over
a great period of. time. But the medieval order transformed at
a much more rapid rate and took at different periods different
forms which cannot correspond to common explanation in all re-
spects. Nonetheless, such a common explanation is used in
this thesis in order to illuminate by an assertion of the
unity of the medieval period the fragmentation and meaningless
of the liberal order and architectural and planning practice
within. The following discussion then takes the medieval
order as an "ideal-type" representing waht was common and
general in medieval societies. Two stages of medieval develop-
ment are chosen to best illuminate the meaning of architecture
and planning as' social functions: 1) The m.edieval town: As a
social context for a discussion of the medieval town, the
social order is portrayed at the point where the medieval town
had achieved its legal freedom from the feudal institutions and
religion .was an integrated part of communal practice (c. llth
to 13th centuries.). The "ideal-type" feudal town discussed is
not a trading town, nor a garrison town established for colon-
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ization, for these were established for specialized purposes.
Rather, the town is'portrayed as the more general case which
contained all social functions in a balance where the mainten-
rnce of unified social relations dominated the economy. This
town as an "ideal-type" is the very model of a communal society
(see definition) which cannot be reproduced today but serves as
an important historic instance of social institutions and
practices built on the dominance of human, rather than capital,
relations; 2) Medieval Architecture: The social context for
the discussion of medieval archit cture is the later period of
French national consolidation (12th to 16th centuries) in
which Gothic architecture first developed. Though convention-
ally taken as the quintessence of medieval architecture and
religious ethos, the Gothic cathedral will be shown to embody
a split between church and state power which eventually led to,
the dissolution of the medieval social order. Paradoxically,
the greatest development and perfection of the cathedral it-
self as a formal unity was simultaneous with the splitting of
the sacred and secular elements of the medieval social unity.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AND SELF
Introduction: Out of the decay of Rome, Christians
founded the invisible prototype of the medieval city, the new
capital of the heavenly city and the civic bonding of the com-
munion of saints. Christianity triumphed primarily because
.its expectation and embracing of radical evil could embrace
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the negativity of the disintegrating Rome and make- of it the
basis of a new social legitimation. Suffering and social
chaos had meaning; the poor would inherit the earth. But this
meaning could be achieved only by positing a coherent order
whose origin was above the chaos. Thus the primitive immanent
divinity was relocated to heaven; God resided transcendent in
2the heavenly city.
The medieval institutions: The new medieval society
as- a religious unity was embodied in the key medieval insti-
tutions of the Church, the city as a corporate body, the
-guild, and the .market.
1) The Church: "The immanent social boiding of
economy, production and political order were subsumed under
the universalized aegis of the Church. Remaining the one via-
ble unifying institution at the dissolution of the Roman em-
pire, the Church served as an organizational model for all
levels of life. These included the events and rituals of
everyday life, political contracts and land disposition, and
the universal cosmology from which personal meaning and social
legitimation were derived.
The Church then represented an ideal which suffused every-
day life in many respects. Church membership was practically
obligatory, and until the Sixteenth century excommunication was
the greatest of punishments,meaning the exclusion from society
as such. The fundamental political division underlying all
other allegiances were the parish and the diocese, the center
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of a village or neighborhood. The form and model for later
taxation was the Church tithe; Church officials comprised an
important segment of the population and absorbed much of the
tithe funds into the widespread construction of Romanesque
and Gothic cathedrals, churches, monasteries and such new
public institutions as hospitals, alrmhouses, and schools.
At the height of Christian influence, the Universal Church
gave all communities a common purpose; but the unity so
achieved fostered, rather than suppressed diversity and indi-
-viduality." The main business of (the) community was not trade,
however eagerly the merchants might, as individuals, be* con-
cerned in amassing a fortune. its main business was the wor
ship and glorification of God. At point of death, if not in
the midst of his proud, grasping, crafty, domineering life,
both merchant and lord would remember that obligation in dis-
posing of his property." The.tran-scendent theology of
Christianity impacted the vulgar everyday world in every as-
pect of life, but no more so than in its universalization of'
the values of the monastery. Abstention, prayerful with-
drawal, the practice of the awareness of inner self in rela-
tion to the transcendent spiritual source became an ethos
and for some a practice of everyday life.
2) The city as a corporate body: As the medieval
town was united spiritually as a- corporate body under the di-
vine authority of God, its citizens were united politically
and socially as a free corporate body responsible to itself.
Gradually the corporate/social entity of the town acquired
an identity and set of political, economic, and cultural
right.s and interests which sharply distinguished it from the
surrounding countryside. This was a new phenomenon in urban
history. In no previous; society had all members achieved po-
litical freedom without the support of a slave class. The ~
towns won this freedom from the feudal monarchs and monasteries
who found it to their political and economic advantage to fos-
ter town growth. For example, the town represented to the
feudal lords a free standing army and a new source of revenue
and town building became one of the major industrial enter-
prises of the early Midale Ages. The towns" initial political
authority came from a contract (the city charter) with the
feudal powerholders. Citizens eventually won rights to hold
regular markets, coin money, . have a local legal system,
bear arms and the like, endowing the towns with most
of the rights of what would become sovereign states.
To exist one had to belong to an association--a
household, manor, monastery, or guild. There was no
security except through group protection and no free-
dom that did not recognize the constant obligation of
corporate life. One lived and died in the identifiable
style on one's class and one's corporation. 1
3) The Guild: The'-secular corporate order was
institutionalized in the guild. Origintating as a religious
fraternity under the patronage of a saint, the guild never
lost the characteristics of brotherhood, service, and mutual
aid. With the growth of the medieval craft economy, the
guilds became both craft and merchant workshops and unions,
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while'still maintaining a high level. of public concern and
service. While there was a distinction between craft and
merchant guilds, membership in each was interchangeable, at
least in the early medieval period. In..the crafts guilds,
there was a formal hierarchy of master, journeyman, and ap-
prentice. Yet the hierarchy was more like that of teacher
to students who in early town development could reasonably
expect to become masters themselves.. Indeed, the univers-
ity at its inception was a craft guild aiming at vocational
education.
The guilds became essentially associations of equals,
free citizens who, whatever their specific function,(crafts-
man, merchant, journeyman) felt that labor was not servility
but an integral and meaningful part of life; "to labor is to
pray. 1
The medieval unity of labor and life was institutional-
ized in the workshops which were often integrated with the
dwelling.- an arrangement which remained the dominant pattern.
of production until the imposition of the factory system at
the beginning of the Nineteenth century. The open structure
of the medieval family itself embodied the social relatedness
of the guild and workshop b&y incorporating into the family
household such other groups as relatives, unrelated workeri,
domestics, apprentices and journeymen.
4) The market: Until the emergence of bourgeois
commodity production, the medieval economy functioned through
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a barter exchange of hand crafted goods.produced primarily
for use rather than as a means of capital accumulation (des-
bribed by Marx as use value as distinguished from capitalist
exchange value of products). The.goods exchange was through
the economic and spatial institution of the market which
served (along with the rituals of the Church, obligations of
citizenship and the guild) to bind the medieval city into a
social unity. But in its scope and barter form, goods ex-
change was deliberately restricted so as not to.overwhelm
interpersonal.communication as a cultural system 2
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD
The world, in the consciousness of the medieval wo/manwas
transparent to understanding. As a social order based on a
divine model, the world in its fundamental structure appeared
given and not subject to human will. One's place in the cos-
mos and in society was clear and forordained. The individual
group and communal consciousness predominated over the reality
of the individual, whose social position was clearly defined
within a structure of estates and the divinely-based social
map of reality. Knowledge was.deductively derived from the-
divine model.
In the 13th century, the bishop and the monk, the
knight and the craftsman believed firmly -- though each
to the measure of his capacity--that nothing exists in
the world -which does not come from God, and derive its
sense and sole interest from its divine meaning. The
medieval conception of truth was fundamentally differ-
ent from ours. Truth was not what can be proved, but
what conformed to an accepted revelation. Research was
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not conducted to find truth, but to penetrate more
deeply into preestablished truth. Neither origin-
ality nor the study of Nature counted for much. 1
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
Introduction: Consonant with the medieval resolu-
tions of the problems of order, method and self, the archi-
tectural and planning functions were vehicles of a substant-
ially unified social purpose and meaning. Such unity is in
strong contrast to the alienation and fragmentation of the
liberal social order. The'study of medieval architecture
and planning provides an example and a hope of a practice
which gains its meaning from its integration within a total-
ized society.
The city design: Co.mmon to most medieval cities were
the enclosing wall, the town center, the division of the town
into precincts, and the limitation of town growth. Together,
these almost institutionalized design elements constituted a
physical ordering integrally related to and supportive of the
social unity.
1) The Wall: The wall was the defensive container
of the medieval corporation. -While first an extension of the
monastery or fortress, the wall had particular psychic mean-
ings beyond being used to define the territory and political
order of -the medieval city.
The wall was valued as'a symbol as much as the
spires of the churches; not a mere military utility.
The medieval mind took comfort in a universe of sharp
definition, solid walls, and limited views: even
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- eaven and hell had their circular boundaries...De-
finition and classification (the taxonomy that char-
acterized both primitive and medieval expistemology
and dominated the method of city and architectural 1
design) were the very essence of medieval thinking.
The political, cultural and economic distinction between
outside and inside, country and town, were very great. Only
the new institutional power formation of the nation and'na-
tional and international-scale trade was able to dissolve the
distinctions so strongly symbolized and enforced by the wall.
2) The center: As the center of the primitive.
village was the symbolic locus of the community, the center of
the.area bounded by the medieval walls was reserved for the
major communal institutions, the church, market place, and
sometimos the town hall combined to give the center place an
intensive meaning as the locus for face-to-face human rela-
tionship. While contemporary ressurections of the medieval
plaza (e.g., the Boston City Hall plaza which is in part de-
rived from the Medieval plaza at Siena, Italy) may reproduce
the form of the original, the communal content of medieval
social relations cannot be reproduced in an alienated (liberal)
society.2
3) The division'of the town into precincts: As
'small as the medieval towns were (town sizes were generally
limited to no more than forty thousand, the size of Fifteenth
century London; Paris, Venice, Milan and Florence were rare
exceptions with populations over 100,000). the identity of the
territory enclosed by the wall was further defined by
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its being divided into quarters--the basis of modern parishes.
Each quarter had a degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency,
often containing its own church, provision market, and water
supply. The quarters represented a natural functional differen-
tiation achieved without deliberate planning. The merchant's
quarter, for example, naturally grew up around the city gate,
the clerical precinct around the church or monastery. The di-
vision into precincts was one means of breaking down the scale
of the whole city so that face-to-face social relations could
occur as a normal part of everyday life--the precondition of
the foundation of a communal society.
4 ) The limitation of town growth: The town's unity
as a communal social order was reinforced by limiting town
growth through several physical and material means. Natural
limits to growth were set by the limitation of water supply and
food.production as well' as distances of efficient transporta-
tion and communication. Socially-set limits were defined
through rules defining the use of land. As a communal steward-
ship and trust not subject to market forces, land disposition
was through communally-controlled political and legal mechan-
isms. City ordinances and guild practices controlled settle-
ment. When open space within the city was filled, the wall
would then be extended to incorporate more territory, or new
towns would bud off. Communal control of city scale and growth
is the assertion of social values over the environment. This
-control is, of course, in strong contrast to the generally un-
controlled development of liberal American urban areas deriving
from the free operation of c.pitalist imperatives which de-
stroy rather than encourage community.
5) The planning function: Some city development
occurred without deliberate planned decisions (as in the func-
tional differentiation of city quarters) and some decisions
reflected deliberate planning (such as the decision to start
a new town). But until the Baroque period the planning func-
tion was not assigned a specific social role. This lack of
role-differentiation indicates that urban decisions were made
within the context of a societal consensus which maintained
the primacy of the social and spiritual order in making urban-
related decisions.
Medieval architecture+-the Gothic cathedral: The
Gothic cathedral was the quintessence of the architectural
expression of the medieval ideal. Even more than the form of
the medieval city, the cathedral reflected both the taxonomy
of the divine model and a design and construction practice
guided more by a unified cultural ideal than by a specialized
professional ethic. 1
It is the meaning of the .Gothic cathedral as a social
product, rather than as a formal architecture construction,
which is of concern here. Indeed, the major formal Gothic
elements (the flying buttress, pointed arch, rib vaults, and
the basilica plan) had existed in the previous Early Christian
and/or Romanesque styles. The- particular use and recombina-
tion of these elements in the Gothic cathedral was motivated far
less by technical considerations than in being ,a vehicle for 81
erecting an image of the power that the Church had attained
over Medieval spiritual life.
The context of the meaning of the Gothic cathedral had
shifted from that of the medieval town' described earlier.
While the town as a whole represented a unity in which Church
was not radically separated from secular affairs, and the re-
ligious experience suffused everyday life as a communal ex-
perience. But in the particularly French origin of the Gothic
cathedral, religiQus experience had become an individual en-
tcounter with the diety. While religion still suffused the
everyday world, the Gothic cathedral developed into an expres-
sion of a purely transcendent relation of the sacred and the
secular. The cathedral became the city of God brought to
earth, existing within but separate from the everyday world.
The formal history of the Gothic cathedral was the progressive
etherialization of inert structure. The stone walls of earlier
Christian architecture became at the height of the Gothic al-
most entirely glass, through which the profane exterior light
was transmuted into the light of God within. Parallel to the
transformation o-f light, the progression
through the length of the complexly articulated Gothic basili-
can plan metaphorically brought the worshipper.from
the profane everyday world into the.body of Christ and the
Church. The cathedral became a visual equivalent to the Godly
presence-r-a compendium of the unity of all knowing under God
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as a visual encyclopedia for wo/men who cduld not read words
but only the meanings of carvings and stained glass. Then the
cathedral became a unity of intellect and belief, an "interior
all spirit and an exterior all intellect. For inside the ca-
thedral we cannot and are not meant to understand the law gov-.
erning the whole. Outside we are faced with a frank exposi-
tion of the complicated stru.ctural mechanism." The cathe-
drals embodied an extreme separation of the environment into
the- sacred and secular which reflected the growing political
separation between church and state.
The workshops: The technical and aesthetic sophisti-
cation of the cathedrals was achieved with skills which nei-
ther clerics or craftsmen alone, who had previously been re-
sponsible for church construction, could achieve. Master ma--
sons.emerged from the anonymous guild craftsmen to act as de-
signers and directors of workshops .responsible for cathedral
construction. As the designer gained an identity in history,
so did the workshops. They became detached from the town-
based guild structure to work at various locations, developing
recognizable regional architectural identity. With the work-
shops developed artistic individuality.
Artists would frequently ensure lasting fame for
themselves by carving their own portraits or inscribing
their own work. This positive recognition of the indi-
viduality-of the master is a marked.characteristic of
the later Middle Ages. It is symptomatic of the new
state of mind that was to replace the traditional idea
of works of architecture, sculpture and painting as spon-
taneous works of communal and almost anonymous crafts-
manship--an idea that was finally to produce the self-
conscious artist, recognized by himself and the world
for his personal achievement. This state of mind was
to inform the new era in the history of the West--the
Renaissance and modern times. 1
Conclusion--the dissolution of the medieval order: The me-
dieval town attained in its highest moments a balance between
churchly and secular power in which the Christian ideal suf-
fused the everyday life and consciousness of the population. The
balance and human freedom reached in medieval times was based
on the political freedom the medieval town's citizens, a rela-
tive balance of power between social estates differentiated
more by role than by power, a strict physical, political, and
economic separation of town from surrounding country, and a
balance between secular and Churchly power. The equilibrium
between these social elements was delicate. As power differ-
entials developed, the medieval community dissolved. Condi-
tions. were then laid for the centralized state power, a secu-
lar- rationalism, capitalist economics, and class domination
which characterized the Aristocratic and then liberal social
order.
The dissolution of the medieval order will be briefly
discussed in terms of two essential corrosive agents--the
growth of a trading economy, and the conflict of Church and
state. The meaning of the Gothic cathedral in terms of these
developments will then be presented.
1) The dissolution of the medieval economy: The main
medieval economic activity was handicraft production, the pro-
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duction of objects for use as opposed to the capitalist pro-
duction for profit. Medieval production was strictly regu-
lated against profit-making and competition, forming an inter-
nal economy which was largely severed 'from external trade and
acting as in primitive societies as a force of social unifica-
tion. But while the original medieval productive and social
relation made little distinction between merchant, master and
apprentice, the need for mutual cooperation in building a pio-
neering social order diminished. Production and trade expanded
-under a growing guild monopoly, generating capital beyond sus-
tance needs which accrued to the growing burgher (bourgeois)
class. The non-exploitative relations of medieval sbcial estates
(differing mainly in social role) was transformed into a class
system based on the hierarchical distribution of class power.
A growing exploitation of both town and country worker was
the origin of the working class of liberal society. External
production and trade monopolies overcame the traditional limits
on trade and production through bypassing the guild-controlle'd
monopolies. On a national and international scale, the grow-
ing capitalist enterprise demanded a large-scale political and
economic centralization which the sealed medieval urban con-
tainer resisted. The competition of external trade with
the internal medieval economy was a major element in the de-
struction of the medieval communal social order. Economic ac-
tivities which were within the walls a means towards social
unity became with the advent of the bourgeois a means towards
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individual privilege and class domination--the destruction of
community.
2) The dissolution of the harmony between Church and
state: The growth of the economic sector of course challenged
the dominance of the Church over medieval life, but the Church
itself worked to contradict the very premises of its spiritual
authority. The Church was founded on the radical postulates
of poverty, chastity, non-resistance, humility, and support of
the poor and downtrodden as equal to society's most highly-
placed in the eyes of God. Yet the Papacy denounced as heresy
St. Francis' dream ~of complete etherialization, emancipation
from permanent possessions which bound the spirit, and the be-
lief in communal sharing of possessions. The Papacy lost its
spiritual authority and universalism through nepotism, corrup-
tion and materialism.
3) The dissolution of medieval architecture as an
expression of the social unity: As a part of the Church's
material expansion, a heavy investment in cathedral building
was encouraged, representing the "power drive, wealth-
encrusted ego,...and ultimately, the walled city, that ego's
greatest collective expression'."1 Then while the cathedrals
were formally designed to express an'extreme etherialization
and spirituality, their social meaning was as an expression
of the destruction of the medieval unity--an increasingly
materialized Church set in competition with private bourgeois
and state power. In fact, the behavior and aspirations of
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both Church and secular interests were increasingly similar
and materialistic, contradicting the traditional medieval
ideals of secular and spiritual community. It could be justly
said that the degree of true Christianity achieved in the me-
dieval world was in inverse relation to its architectural
materiali zation.
The Gothic cathedral is the first of a number of in-
stances noted in this thesis of the incompatability of the
ideals expressed by architectural form and the social reality
which is its material base. The cathedral builders' claimed
to represent and promulgate through their work the kingdom
of God on earth. The Modern Movement would claim its forms
as the only architecture appropriate to the machine age.
These claims were severely contradicted by the class conflict
and domination which was the reality of the society from
which the architecture sprang. In this context, the idealiza-
tion represented by the cathedrals which could justify the
separation of churchly from secular values are severely sus-
pect as a mode of knowing and representation. 1
We must agree with Mumford that "when we admire the sur-
viving outward form, we must not forget the persistence of the
inner trauma--the trauma of civilization itself, the associa-
tion of mastery and slavery, of power and human sacrifice." 2
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THE ARISTOCRATIC SOCIAL ORDER
Introduction: The Renaissance and Baroque phases which com-
prised the aristocratic social order were transitional periods
between the relative personal and class' equality of the primi-
tive/medieval orders and the class domination of the liberal
era. In the Renaissance and Baroque, architecture and plan-
ning first emerged as separate practices and were first as-
signed distinct social roles (the head of the Medieval work-
shop remained master craftsman even though he designed) in
support not of communal values but of class power.
The dissolution of the Medieval unity left its constitu-
ent elements, the aristocrcats, bourgeoisie and the Church, in
a flux which consolidated into a social order markedly differ-
ent from the Medieval structuring of roughly co-equal estates.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER-
The central problem of the new social order was to find
solutions for the problems of order, method and the self in
a time when the dominance of the sacred model of the world
had lessened, and a new secularism was rising among the es-
tates.
The emergent social order was a strongly hierarchical-
ized class structure under the domination of sacred and secu-
lar centralized monarchs. Pope and king assumed divine le-
gitimation for their power over an increasingly secular
society which defined itself not through the divine model but
in the acquisition and expansion of wealth and power. As the.
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medieval barter economy turned into a capitalist money economy,
the idea of limit, balance and order was replaced by the imper-
ative .of the expansion of all social sectors:~ power, economy,
population, social control, territory. The means of expansion
and consolidation of power were largely war, economic expansion,
political and trade domination.
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD
Capitalist expansion and centralized control demanded a
new form of knowledge. The divine model was useless to a social
order which required not an explanation of meaning and world
order, but ways of controlling and exploiting natural and
social forces. Therefore the metaphysics which ordered a hea-
-venly world gave way to the ideology of power, mathematics,
accounting, science, engineering and the perspectival ordering
of space--all abstract forms of knowing which in their abstrac-
tion are very effective in ordering the material world for
efficient control.
THE PROBLEM OF SELF
The medieval self was absorbed into a social place within
a non-problematic system of estates which appeared as a natural
given order. The dissolution of this system upset the medieval
social mappings and made the structure of given social places
unstable. The problem was resolved by the organization of the
aristocratic power structure into dominant and dominated clas-
ses, destroying the previous medieval community. The communal
deification of Gcd was replaced by the deification of man, at
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first in general, but later in the person of the monarch.
Wo/men's selves and relation to the social whole became
mediated and defined through the abstract hierarchical
structure of class domination.
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
The problem of architecture and planning is both the es-
tablishment of a basis for making design decisions and the
legitimation of the design enterprise within the social order.
Within the consensually legitimated medieval society, design
took its place in the world.order. But in the aristocratic
society, the design function separated out into distinct pro-
fessions.- Architecture and planning then became problem-
atic, open questions to be resolved through theory and prac-
tice rather than through the derivation of form and legiti-
mation from pre-given models of tradition or cosmology. This
situation then was the origin of design theory and the con-
sciousness of design and planning as distinct activities.
Problematic was not only the basis of design decisions
but the relation of the design-activity to dominant power. It
will be shown that from the Renaissance on, a gulf opened
between the conditions of practice in relation to dominant
power and design ideals as articulated in a project of design
theory which increasingly took on a life of its own.
This is an early symptom of the more general
social separation of the actuality of alienation and domina-
tion from the self's ideal of the reconciliation of autonomy
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and' cmmunity. The increasing abstraction of design theory
and the designers' awareness of the nature of social domina-
tion was a form of alienation: the designer retreated into an
artificial and abstract world of histo.ricism, mathematics, and
perspective in avoidance of the domination of the new society
which was as untenable as necessary in order to practice archi--
tecture and planning.
Conclusion: The Aristocratic social order will be discussed
in terms of its two major periods in which architectural and
planning practice attained distinctive identities-the Fif-
teenth and Sixteenth Italian Renaissance and the Seventeenth
(and Eighteenth) century Baroque.
JA~
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THE RENAISSANCE
Introduction: The earliest major social formation of t'he
aristocratic age was the Italian Renaissance. In medieval
Florence, where the Church traditionally did not dominate the
culture as it did in other towns, commercial princes such
as the Medici first created in the Fifteenth century the
material basis for an essentially secular culture.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AND SELF
Politically, the early Italian Renaissance did not
represent a radical.break with the medieval order. The rela-
tively egalitarian medieval urban social relations were -
transformed into the Renaissance secular ideal of the poli-.
tical city, a -political democratic/representative organization,
and a set of citizen obligations.
"For the Italians -of the fifteenth century, every city
had in itself something of that supreme, absolute, ideologi-
cal-historical-political reality which was the (Roman)
Empire - it was more than a city,. it was a state tin nuce'."1
It is most truly said of the Renaissance that men's
internal (as opposed to exploitative) powers were deified.
Michaelangelo.was probably the first person to be called
divine, in recognition of his genius.
During the Renaissance, on the first wave of the
bourgeois'advance, social relationships were still
relatively transparent, the division of labor had not
yet taken the rigid and narrow forms it was to assume
later, and- the wealth of the new productive forces was
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'still stored up as a potential within the bourgeois
personality. The newly successful bourgeois and the
princes who collaborated with him were generous
' patrons. Whole new worlds were then open to a man
of creative gifts. Naturalist, discoverer, engineer,
architect, sculptor, painter, and writer were often
combined in one person, who passionately affirmed
the age in which he lived and whose fundamental
attitudewas summed up in: 'What joy it is to be
alive'.
The deification of man was embodied in the doctrine of
Humanism.
The basis of humanist culture was the convic-
tion that GQd was not so much the beginning as
the end of human power and knowledge. Power and
knowledge, although no longer attributed to revela-
tion but nevertheless aimed at a consciousness of
the divine, had their origin in man, that is to say
in reason and in history. This essentially secular,
middle-class urban culture lay gt the roots of the
humanist concept of the city.
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD
The natural and lIman world, emerging from the divine
metaphysics, lay open as a new field of knowledge and action,
a new reality. Man could then become the measure of all
things. The human and natural worlds were opened to study
through a new epistemology which, though developed in a
comparatively democratic culture, laid the methodological
basis for later absolutism and class domination of the baroque
and liberal eras. During the decline of the medieval institu-
-tions, the cosmological model was increasingly at odds with
the realities of a corrupted Church and the ascendent bour-
geois. The model could be a basis nei'her for the factual and
practical knowledge which the bourgeois required nor a source
- 4±
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of valuing..The Renaissance scientific epistemology responded
to this contradiction in several ways:
a) The analytic method of gaining knowledge from
natural and social reality replaced the medieval,. derivation
of knowledge from the eternal cosmological model. Truth was
not to be deduced from its location in the divine model, but
was to be induced through scientific methodology from the
facts of the real world itself.
b) To be true, the facts of the world and the method
used to determine them had to be universally applicable,
as was- the divine cosmology which the method replaced. Then
knowledge became abstracted from the specific situations in
which it arose and was universalized. The Renaissance social
order, for example, was seen to parallel the natural order,
and thus the particular social order was hypothesized as a
universal.
c) Knowledge then became dissociated from particular
interests. But as the principle of reality was in the world
itself if knowledge was universalized, then what was known
seemed to be a given, unproblematic and unquestionable with
no gap admissible between actuality and an ideal situation.
Thus fact and.value were separated. There was no provision
within the methodology for determining value or an ought.
This function was left to the increasingly discredited Church.
Consequently (and while the term'separation of fact from
value' implies that value is possible to determine in some
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non-scientific quarter) value became identified with fact.
In describing how Renaissance princes did operate, Machiavelli.
implied that they should so operate.
d) Inthe collapse of the ought to the is, what was
allowed as reality was reduced to the compass of the method
of knowing. 'Man was the measure of the world.' He could lit-
terally admit as knowledge only what could be measured through
the abstract and atomistic scientific method.
Experience was progressively reduced to just
those elements that V-er~e capable of being split off
from the whole and measured separately: convention
counters took the place of organism. What was real
was that part of experience which left no murky
residues; and anything that could not be expressed
in terms of visual sensations and mechanical order
was not worth expressing. In art, perspective and
anatomy; in morals, the systematic causality of
the Jesuits, in architecture, axial symmetry,
formalistic repetition, fixed proportions of the
Five Orders, and in city building, the elaborate
geometric plan. 1
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
.Introduction: The Renaissance designers were the first pro-
fessionals to face the post medieval problematic of architecture
and planning in a social order with no consensual legitimation.
The theory and practice and-social position of the designers
is discussed in terms of the position of the Renaissance de-
signer as a professional, design theory and practice, the ideal
city,.and a short critique which pits the professional self-
representation against the social.meaning of professional
production.
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The Renaissance designer as professional: The class
position of the Renaissance designer was a most important
mediation between the Renaissance epistemology and. its impact
on design and planning.
The designers' position resulted from a split in the
urban middle class between merchants and craftsmen. A new
merchant elite developed, assuming cultural and political
control of the Renaissance city-states. .In practice the .split
was reflected by a hierarchical distinction between the liber-
al and mechanical arts, in turn practiced by the designer
and worker. The designer was now triply abstracted-from any
basis for his work in a divine cosmology; from the unity of
thought and execution; and from the functional and class
unity of designer and builder. Correspondingly, the builder
lost his function as a designer to constitute a subordinate
social class. Here originated the distinction in design
between professional and working classes, and thus the basis
of all future professional identity.
The designer became an exemplar of the 'Renaissance uni-
versal man' answerable to his own genius. Yet paradoxically,
he was materially obligated to his sponsors, the dominant
princes of Church and state who held particularized power.
The paradox was reproduced on the epistemological level in
the contradiction between a universalized humanism and the
origin of' humanism in a particularistic society.
The contradiction was resolved only by ignoring the
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particular societal origins of thought. A universalized
theory, philosophy, mathematics, aesthetics, and personal
will became the basis for design theory and practice. The
preconditions were then set for the elevation of particular
design imperatives (aesthetic, historical, mathematical,
functional, intuitional) independent of their relation to the
social totality as the generalized foundation of design,
decision making and legitimation.
Renaissance design theory and practice: The central
problem for Renaissance designers was in finding a secular-
but authoritative basis for making design decisions. This
problem parallelled the central social problem of discovering
a secular legitimation and basis for the unity of society
and the unity of self. (These issues in their continued
irresolution constitute the contemporary crises of design
and social order.)
Design theory and the creation of theoretical designs
were important means in formulating a basis for design prac-
tice. Indeed, with the exceptibn of a few Greek and Latin
authors (notably Vitruvius), design theory as an activity
independent of practice originated in the .Renaissance.
The major Renaissance theoretical approaches which still
inform design theory and practice were historicism, perspec-
tive and proportion, the design of ideal cities, and the
postulating of the visual as the basis of design.
1). Historicism: The Renaissance is commonly
characterized as a rediscovery of man through the
interpretation of the classical past. The authority of the
past 'was arrogated through aesthetic reinterpretation and some
scholarly research to the validation of the authority of
the Renaissance city-state as the legitimate agent of power.
Designers also sought valid authority for their work on the
basis of the imputed authority of the "Justness of Noble"
classical architecture which did not run 'after the Whims of
the Moderns' . The classical world appears as 'a realm of
beauty and perfection,2  which no contemporary design product
could achieve. Historicism. then is an admission of the separ-
ation of the ideal from the actual which Alberti realized as
emerging as the dominant consciousness of his time. The
ideal for historicism is then sought in the design product,
not the historic totality in which the product originated.
2) The visual as the basis of design: As the
design product was abstracted from its historic context, the
Renaissance designers abstracted from the product itself cer-
tain formal elements independent of their symbolic meanings.
"The vocabulary of antiquity was employed in the service of
"3an entirely original style of spatial organization" in
which space, volume and concern with the purely .visual
abstracted from other meaning reference became the subject of
design. Visual patterns, Alberti maintained, could be 'very
noble in themselves'. Their significance was in 'their
composition, their putting together'.tIn other words, the formal
internal organization of the design product without refer-
ence to a wider system of meaning constituted its validity,
judge'd by an 'innate mechanism' in the mind of each designer
or user of buildings.. Yet forms cannot have an innate
meaning, since form is derived from human meaning and prac-
tice. Renaissance design could be perceived as 'pleasing
objects' only in their lack of connection to a critically-
understood social totality.
For example, an important part of the Renaissance archi-
tect's production was the design of patrician palaces. For
Alberti, the aim of the palace's design, its harmonious pro-
portion and fineness of proportion, was to express the social
prestige of the family - prestige understood as being based
on the family's 'cultural values' rather than the force
used to attain the family's position. Alberti expresses the
naivete of the Renaissance architects' relation to power which
was to typify the architects' consciousness and action to the
present. It is precisely the relation of 'cultural values'
to domination which is a leitmotif of all aesthetic practice,
far more honestly recognized by Machiavelli than by the
designers themselves.
Design products, as pleasing objects, express
the form of the new society of individual concen-
trations of power. Design products are not any
more means of communication of a cohesive community.
They are signifiers of power grasped. (Consequently,
beautiful products are not valuable in what they
are, but in what they represent. When man possesses
them he grips neither the object nor the beauty of
it. What is delicious for him is not the ornaments,
the proportions, the materials. It is the power he
holds to dominate other men.) 2
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3) Perspective and mathematical proportion as
the basis of design: Major Renaissance disciplines for order-
ing space were perspective and mathematical proportion. Both
significantly related to the newly-individualized Renaissance
man who, with perspective, became the subject on which the
physical world focussed. Proportion mathematically related
that world to human physical dimensions. The architectural
ideal of the Renaissance was the Church in which all is
balance, delicacy and order. Its mathematized spatial geometry
allows the human being to understand the entire church from
one position through his perspectival eye - a house of man
rather than the medieval house of God.
Yet, in two senses, the balance of the Renaissance
architectural ideal was an artificially-constructed reality.
First, the sensation of an ordered, timeless and universalized--
world belied the dynamic, particularistic and increasingly
hierarchical Renaissance society. Secondly, the universalized
unity which the Renaissance ideal church represented was not
the product of a consensual ethos, but the creation of design-
ers who held their own particularistic class position as the
servants of dominant societal power.
4) The ideal city: The disjunction between
power and form in the consciousness and actions of the Renais-
sance designers is nowhere more marked than in Renaissance
city design. In terms of urban design, there was no Renais-
sance city, only the minor renewal of certain portions of
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the medieval city. The major force shaping the Renaissance
city was the need to construct defensive fortifications. As
the Renaissance developed, towns started preying on each
other with local and mercenary armies in the effort to in-
crease the flow of wealth, trade and political power. With
the introduction of explosives, towns had to construct new
walls as a matter of survival, at great expense and social
effort. The engineering function became predominant in town
design.
While developing fortifications, engineers also designed
'ideal' cities. Far from serving the critical function of
some later utopian plans, the ideal cities were largely geo-
metri.cal formalizations of the city as a military machine, an
" armored coffer full of precious objects".. 2 Yet for their
designers, the ideal cities and fortification plans were
perceived as primarily design problems. The delicate 'human-
istic'~ architecture was contained by massive defensive and
offensive city walls - instruments of the aggrandizement of
power and wealth. The ideal city, "always originated at the
behest of an absolute ruler - a sovereign. It was founded on
the desire for power, and the- desire for power inevitably
translates itself into the potential of war."3
.Conclusion: At least in the popular image, the
Renaissance represents a short state of historical innocence,
a period in which scientific and humanistic knowledge, self-
realized individuality, and the values of the city as a proud
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political entity were developed in a climate of patrician
generosity. The designers flourished through the development
of their individuality, in support of high cultural values
of the enlightened nobility. Yet this.view mystifies the -
domination which created the material basis for such culture,
as well as the real meaning of the environment in symbolizing
and reinforcing power.
Renaissance design theory (historicism, the meaning of
the visual, perspective and proportion, the ideal city)
looked everywhere except at the social origin of its own
practice for the meaning of architectural and city form.-The
universalistic methodological base of the theory avoided
confronting the particularistic and historic domination which
underlay the class position, consciousness and work of the
designers.-
fr
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THE BAROQUE-
Introduction: The Baroque, dating from app. 1600 to 1750,
was the period of triumph of centralized absolute political
and economic power. The medieval. estates had represented no
great disparity in privilege, while classes of the Baroque
were widely separated in power and wealth--the origin of
the 'upper, middle and lower classes' in the modern sense.
Above the society was the absolute monarch, who personified
the emergence of the state as an organ of social bonding above
the body of society. The Church became secularized and the
secular power took on the divine mantle. Pope and prince
shared a preeminent concern with aggrandizing. power and
wealth through war and mercantile capitalism.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER AND SELF
A key to understanding the Baroque social order is its
relation to capital accumulation. Capital is inherently expan-
sive and can be accumulated in two ways. Essentially pre-
existing wealth can be exploited through 'favorable balance
of trade', taxation, interest, land rent and the like. Alter-
nately, wealth can be created through the exploitation of
labor and commodity profits. The Baroque state used both
means through its monopoly of rent, the booty from foreign
conquest, domestic and foreign colonialization, the monopoly
of special pro'duction privileges, and taxation. Yet emphasis
was on the exploitation of pre-existing' wealth. This practice
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was reversed in the liberal era, for while such exploitation
appeared limitless and expansive, sufficient wealth could not
be produced to flow to the whole society and must therefore
be restricted to the few - the upper classes and the monarch.
What.resulted was an extreme disproportion of social wealth
and the seeds of the destruction of the Baroque society in
the resentment of the lower classes. Indeed, "there was only
one desirable station in (the) despotism; it was that of
the rich." The rich were the only class which could live
the courtly life, the consnmation of existence and the Baroque
cultural ideal.
Further, 'the appropriation of wealth by the state
required unprecidented military, legal, administrative and
economic social control. "The two arms of this'new system are
the army and the bureaucracy: they are the temporal and
spiritual support of a centralized despotism. " 2 Control was
effected through discipline, the universalized expression of
particularized interests, 'predictability, order, uniformity,
and hierarchy. These qualities characterized the major social
systems of the Baroque, (having common interests and great
interdependence in the production and acquisition of wealth
and power).
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
Introduction: Architecture and planning were
important instruments of control for the absolute papal and
political monarchs; absolute political and economic control
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deman'ded the absolute control of space itself.
City building was no longer, for a rising class
of small craftsmen and merchants,- a means of achiev-
ing freedom and security. It was rather a means of
consolidating political power in a single national
center directly under the royal eye and preventing
such .a challenge to the central authority from
arising elsewhere.... Other towns either stultified
or subordinated. 1
Principles of Baroque desiSn: A central princi-
ple of the Baroque was the unity of an inherently limitless
expansive economy with a highly-controlled hierarchical so-
cial order. This imperative was reproduced in four inter-
related principles of Baroque design: perspective, the -dia"-
lectic of dynamism and stasis, space as a reflection of the
Church's decline, and space as military control.
1) Perspective: While first atilized in
the Renaissance, the full potential of perspective was
applied to ordering entire cities only in the service of
the comprehensive power of the Baroque monarchs. Perspective
has the dual quality of focusing on the individual while
extending from the individual into space along infinite
linear lines of. sight. Perspective was thus a powerful tool
of the Baroque planners' attempt to make comprehensive
physical unities. The Baroque use of perspective placed
centrality and infinity into a spcial unity, controllable
at the center yet infinitely expandable. The medieval center
of church' market and/or town hall became the Baroque monu-
ment, palace or star-shaped plaza,with lines of sight
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embodied in grand avenues leading to and radiating from the
center. Space was reduced to measure and order, embracing
the extremely distant and the immediate, traversed through
time and motion. In Rome, avenues were cut between religious
monuments, while in Paris, avenues were cut between palaces,
plazas, and the new institutions of the aristocracy. In both
cases the intention was the same. The web of power engulfed
the redieval/Renaissance socialorders. Likewise, the web of
streets and stars was literally overlaid on the medieval/
Renaissance town.
Besides rebuilding existing medieval and Renaissance
cities, Baroque authorities established entirely new towns
to garrison armies or house royal residences. For example,
Versailles was established outside Paris by Louis XIV, the
sun king, to house his court and residence. Versailles was
both -the terminous of major perspectival avenues (analogous
to the individual to which the perspectival lines converged)
and the point from which a system of spatial domination and
control of the landscape issued. The control of infinite
space symbolized infinte power. Similarly, Bernini's col-
lonade at St. Peters would symb.olically embrace the popula-
tion of Rome with the power of the Church.
2) The unity of dynamism and stasis: The
Baroque unity was also the unity of dynamism and stasis,
freedom and control. The apparent dynamism of movement along
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the avenue was terminated by an expression of centralized
power. "All movement is around fixed points. It is a union
of the opposites of order and freedom. The order is absolute-
ly firm, but against it an illusion of freedom is played."
This.order is clearly manifest in the design of the Baroque
church. The typical ideal and static centralized church of
the Renaissance became in the Baroque a dynamic oval, a unity
of centrality and directionality in plan and experience.
3) Sace as a reflection of the Church's
decline:
Whereas all through the Renaissance spacial
clarity had been the governing idea, and the eye
of the spectator had been able to run unimpeded
from one part to another and read the meaning of
the whole and the parts without effort, nobody,
standing (in such an oval church) can understand
of what elements it is 'made, and how they are
intertwined to produce such a rolling, rocking
effect. Why did architects and artists so fervently
strive to deceive and create such intense illusion
of reality? What reality was the Church concerned
.*iith? Surely that of the Divine Presence. It is
the zeal of an age in which Roman Catholic dogmas,
mysteries, and miracles were no longer, as they
had been in the Middle Ages accepted as truth by
all. There were heretics, and there were sceptics.
To restore the first to the fold, to convince the
others, religious architecture had to both inflame
and to mesmerize.2
The interiors of these churches attempted to create a
comprehensive sensual unity of architecture, painting, sculp-
ture, and motion, the illusion of the infinite. The goal of
sensation, beyond legitimating the church power, was a leit-
motif of Baroque upper-class culture as a whole. Sensation is
of the given moment, and the princes of state and church*
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wanted to eternalize the .present. This is an existential
impossibility, yet at.the same time an attempt at the legiti-
mization of the given order. Such an historicism, ironically
co-existing with the Renaissance/Baroque concern with antiqui-
ty, presages the essentially unhistoric liberal conception of
time and history. The legitimation of particularistic domin-
ance is to rnke it appear infinite, universal, and eternal.
4) Space as military.control: Spatial con-
trol meant military control. The forces which conquered the
Baroque colonial possessions in order to appropriate economic
and political power also kept the lower classes in their
'place'. Broad new avenues were so well-suited for efficient
mass movement, the display of royal power and upper-class
pomp. But the avenues also were designed to assure easy ob-
servation and firearms control of dissidents; cannonballs
have straight trajectories and therefore can't be shot down
twisting medieval streets. The confluence of social, spatial
and military order was no accident but a simultaneous set of
necessities.
Conclusion: the.abstraction of power: The legacy of the Bar-
oque for the liberal era is presented in terms of the abstract
Baroque resolutions of the problems of order, method, self
and architecture and planning used to.establish and legitimate
Baroque class domination.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER
1) The abstraction of personal power: Personal
108
power was maintained through impersonal institutions. The
Baroque bureaucracy, the law, and the military were abstract
devices to exercise domination through the appearance of
neutral function and efficiency. These institutions, when the
monarchy was deposed as a form of power, remained as central
to the liberal exercise of domination.
2) The abstraction of money: In the Baroque, the
medieval barter economy was supplanted by a money economy.
This development involved the beginnings of a major trans-
formation in social relations. Barter economy involved a
daily, face-to-face 'encounter which proved an important means
of medieval social bonding on the level of everyday life.
But the replacement of barter by money as a means of exchange
meant the beginning of the substitutions of the more abstract
process of money exchange for human relations.
*THIE PROBLEM OF METHOD
3) The abstraction of thought: Starting with the
aristocratic era, scientific analysis began to replace reli-
gious truths as the legitimated mode of knowledge in secular
society. The validation of science was based on the power of
science as an instrument to explain and dominate nature and
man, producing' wealth, power and social control.1
4) The abstraction of the legitimation of power:
Validated knowledge became increasingly abstracted from its
origins in the concrete world. Reality was determined to
originate in some abstract, ideal world of the mind. This is
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idealism, in which the origin of knowledge is not in material
reality but in concepts. Beyond the realm of personal verifi-
cation, idealism was then used as an instrument of power to
validate its own authority. Idealised concepts such as the
'Divine Right of kings', 'Absolute Rule', and the 'State',
were presented as actual. Yet the real lives of human beings
as individuals and societal members were treated abstractly.
THE PROBLEM OF SELF
5) The abstraction of the self, bound by a class
structure,from wholeness: 'Individuals in a class society
live not within the social whole but within a distinct
social grouping differentiated in wealth, power and opportun-
ity. Relations between classes became conflicts. The self
became a problem because it could not within its class, become
whole. While perhaps able to lead concrete inter-subjective
lives within a class, membership in the whole society is
denied to wo/mer whether in dominating or dominated class.
Both classes suffer, for the master and slave define each
other. The lives of the Baroque upper classes in Baroque
courtly society show the impossibility of leading a meaningful
existence on the basis of powe'r and wealth alone, isolated
from a social whole. Being an aristocrat in a narrow social
class may have been more a condemnation than a blessing.
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
6) The abstraction of Barogue city desig;n: The
forms of Baroque city design were abstract, conceptual and
110generalized - their content the result of the imperative of
control and display rather than a response to the diverse
needs of diverse classes. "The institutions of the city no
longer generate the plan; the function o.f the plan is rather
to bring about conformity to the prince's will .in the institu-
tions. Typically, such Baroque devices as the square, the
star, radiating avenues, and deliberate visual containments
and releases were imposed regardless of (and'abstracted from)
the natural topography or existing social structures. Appro-
priately, many Baroque city planners were primarily bureaucrats
serving the monarch, or military engineers (who also wrote the
chief Baroque town planning treatises).
The imposition of the abstract Baroque schemes of visual
order were possible only.through the highly centralized monar-
chical authority, who in their power could abstract themselves
and the design they authorized from the rest of life.
The palace; the exchequer; the prison; the
madhouse - what four buildings could more completely
sum-up the new order or better symbolize the-main
features of its political life. These were the
dominants. Between them stretched the blandly
repetitive facades; and behind those facades the 2
forgotten and denied parts of life somehow went on.
7) The abstraction of the Baroque designer: The
Baroque city was "an essay in formal scenic design: a back-
drop for absolute power" 3 and the social/military drama that
was the aristocrats' daily life. Indeed, some planners and
architects were also scenic designers. Baroque buildings and
cities were created as purely abstract visual unities: never
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was the visual given so much autonomy in governing a wholly-
designed world. This totalistic design is paradoxically the
most aesthetically and professionally liberated from all but
formalistic internal concerns, in a sense the dream of many
Twentieth-century designers. Yet this liberation was achieved
only through its sponsorship by a centralized despotism.
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THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
Introduction: The central intent of this section is to show
the elements of the liberal social order (its community,
economy, polity, forms of knowledge, the self, environment,
architectural and planning theory and practice) as.fundamen-
tally alienated and fragmented - a condition which is the
normal consequence of the operation of the capitalist insti-
tutions.
The concept of alienation is a major 'unit-idea' of
Western thought and descriptor of liberal reality.2 The idea
is inherently critical, because an alienated reality can only
be known in relation to a presumed ideal unified reality.
The idea of alienation has had a critical func-
tion in presupposing a conception of the essential
unity which must be res-tored...For both Plato and
Hegel,failure to maintain the necessary harmony
between Psyche, Polis and Cosmos results in an ali-
enation of the natural unity of knowing and doing.
...The idea of alienation has always been an assess-
ment of the contradictions between given states of
human ex erience and an Ideal or more fundamental
reality.5
The essence of alienation that the ideal "whole has bro-
ken up into numerous parts whose interrelation in the whole
cannot be ascertained..., whether the part under examination
is man, his activity, his product, or his ideas. The same
'4
separation. is evident in each."? Alienation then is not a
psychological malaise, although alienation is certainly felt
personally. Rather, it is a consequence of the structural
separation of self and society, wo/man and environment, the
inower and the known, the.liberal institutions and the people
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they govern. Each term of the relationship is mutually
necessary, for alienation is a relationship: self can be
alienated only if society is.
A more concrete understanding of'alienation comes from
examining its operation in the relation between the ruling
and dominated classes. Capitalist class domination was
secured through the institutionalization of certain property
and social relations as the basis of capitalist decision-
making mechanisms.. These mechanisms operate to maintain
class domination through necessarily denying the realization
of human needs and potentials.
"Alienation occurs when the implicit or explicit insti-
tutional decision-mechanisms do not reflect the needs...
criteria of the individuals whom the outcome affects. Insofar
as this is true...individuals are 'alienated' from the social
object (be it physical object; a social role as worker;
citizen, soldier, etc.; another individual; an element of
culture, or himself) which is the outcome of the institution-
al decision."2
To the extent that the liberal order is the domination
of the capitalist (or ruling) class, that order is a total
alienation.
The central experiences of the self in the liberal order
describe.the nature of that order itself: the extreme
separation of the ideal from the actual, the experience of
the arbitrariness and transitoriness of values and moral
0
belief, instrumentalism, alienation, and the meaiinglessness
of everyday life.
Liberal society as a total alienation is the polar
opposite of the medieval unity. While the medieval moral
unity and social authority was legitimated under a divine
cosmology, class dominatio.n is the only basis for liberal
social bonding. While medieval knowledge and truth was de-
rived from a divine model, the liberal scientific epistemolo-
gy allows no valid knowledge other than derived from analytic
scientific procedures; while the medieval social map of
reality was transparent, the liberal reality appears obscure.
and meaningless; the medieval self as defined in relation to
a human community became in liberal society, radically
alienated from even the potential of communal relations,
Architecture and planning, once an organic part of the
medieval consensually legitimated social whole, are consigned
in liberal society to rationalize fragmentary parts of a
fragmented whole.
These extraordinary characteristics of the liberal
society were achieved through revolutions of social order,
method, and the constitution of the self which totally trans-
formed the Western world. The liberal order was a resolution
to.the crises of the post-medieval societies. In the most
general terms, these crises were the problems of finding
basis for a social legitimation in terms of value, morality
and knowledge, in the absense of the transcendent divine
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model. The Aristocratic order substituted the divinity of the
earthly monarch for the authority of God..Theoretically, the
monarch was legitimated as the only person in the society
with access to divine knowledge, and therefore access to the
means. of resolving social crises. Such knowledge was trans-
mitted by the monarch to the society below. This ideal con-
struct, as a basis for social and moral order, fell apart
through the increased involvement of the bourgeois and aris-
tocratic class in capitalist economics. The divine authority
of the monarch was further'eroded by the growing success of
science in explaining and controlling the natural order. This
success lent weight to the scientific claim that valid know-
ledge came only from the methodological study of the natural-
order, rather than from the deductive receiving of divine
knowledge.
Capitalism and science became then the forms in which
the post-medieval crises of social order, and moral legiti-
mation (the problem of order), and knowledge (the problem
of method) were resolved in the liberal social order.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER
Introduction: Two interlocked revolutions initiated
the liberal social order: the political and military ascen-
dency of the bourgeois class over the aristocracy and the
transformation of state-controlled mercantile capitalism
into a privately-controlled capitalism whose imperatives were
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the b'asis for the bourgeois sociai order.
While the nature.of the aristocratic class determined
the tone and .economy of the aristocratic order, .the structure
of laissez-faire capitalism itself becaine the most powerful
influence on the liberal social order.' This can be seen in
the relation of each class to its economic form.
Aristocratic wealth poured in to the Baroque capitals
from colonial and local conquest, taxation, trade, and some
commodity production. These sources fed a mercantile economy
.which operated under strong social and economic restrictions.
But while the state controlled the economy, the potential of
capitalism was barely exploited. A relatively narrow economic
flow was absorbed by the aristocrats, leaving a great dis-
proportion between the wealth of a very few and the relative
poverty of the masses. The wealth accumulated through
mercantial capitalism was squandered by the aristocrats on
courtly life and on the construction of cities
as a background for the courtly drama. Capital was not invest--
ed or accumulated in a way that it could grow and reproduce
itself. Strong s.ocial hierarchies therefore had to be main-
tained in order to channel and restrict the available wealth
to the few at the top.
' The liberal era, on the contrary, was the triumph of
the more populous bourgeois class.which adopted the rhetoric
of the universality of man' s rights to life, liberty and
property as a weapon against the aristocratic particularity
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of power. A more populous.class required a more productive
material base. This was achieved by withdrawing the tradi-
tional political restrictions on capitalism. Liberal society
has become largely derivitive of the internal logic and
imperatives of capitalism.
The capitalist ipn.eratives: The capitalist system has'
two major imperatives: the generation of profit and the
capitalist control of all social elements.
1) The generation of profit: Liberal capital-
ism is a tool for the infinite expansion of wealth. As
discussed previously, aristocratic wealth was strongly limit-
ed by its investment in non-productive objects. Liberal
capitalism overcame this limit through continually reinvest-
ing wealth so that it could reproduce and enlarge itself;
profit became the only basis on which new production could
be initiated to create new profit and new wealth in a theore-
tically, never-ending cycle. Every element of the natural
and social world was then a potential source of profit.
The traditional integrity of nature, human lives, community,
and wealth itself (as in the Baroque hoarding of precious
objects) was fragmented. Only those elements and qualities
of social and natural reality which were useful in the pro-
ductive/profit cycle were defined as values. Therefore nature
was valuable only as a source of land rent and raw materials
human beings were redefined as useful only as labor and com-
modity markets; wealth was valuable as a means to create more
wealth through interest and reinvestment.
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The abstract value of money became more real than the
material base of nature, self and society from which money
derived. The enduring meaning of the natural and social
world, the springs of previous human stability, became lit-
erally dematerialized as impediments to the constant capital-
ist process of perpetually converting all social elements
into profit, which in turn is reinvested. When production is
not for the sake of serving human need but for profit, what
is produced is immaterial.
Further, the traditio1al meaning of work and the
exchange of goods and services was transformed. While in
the tribal/medieval barter economies work and goods exchange
was an instrument of social bonding, the only rewards and
meanings of work under capitalism were money and commodities-
both abstract transformations of the concrete processes of
work and social relations.
Beyond the alienated nature of the capitalist work
process, money and commodity-acquisition as the major
meaning of work was an important element in the destruction
of society as a community of social relations. The value of
money and consumption can only be individual and not communal.
The meanings of concrete social relations and the-concrete
qualities of the human and natural world was then replaced
by the abstract value of money.
2) The capitalist c'ontrol of all social eleme-
ments: In order for all aspects of life to be made
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instruments of commodity .production, all aspects of the
liberal social relationships had to come under capitalist
contro which functioned to both force' people into the
capitalist system and to quell the natural resistence to'
dominatiori.
In face of continual resistence (as seen in such diverse
phenomenon as the couter culture, urban riots, individual
pathologies such as drugs, crime and mental disease, deliber-
ate work slowdowns or sabotage, vandalism, etc.) capitalism
.must exert a continual effort to maintain its control,- -
these efforts become an institutionalized part of everyday
life. The following paragraphs discuss -some important means
for social control, finishing with a discussion on the liber-
al efforts at a social legitimation of class domination.
Some important imperatives of capitalist social control
are:
a) The flow of wealth to the dominating
class: -The greatly increased wealth of laissez-faire cap-
italism did not equalize the general level of wealth in
liberal society., but was channeled to the bourgeois who
either owned or controlled the means of production. This
is one form of class domination, in which -wo/men are
alienated from control over the value of what they produce.
b) The market in labor: Class domination
was assured only if control over the generation and distribu-
tion of wealth could be restricted to the dominating class.
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Thus all members of the society must be subject to a market
in labor which restricts them to being an_ instrument and not
an owner of the means of capitalist production. The market
in labor further tends to lower wages and therefore maximize
profit. Wages are determined through the market, not by a
social rationality based on need but through creating a
competitive pressure which often makes the mere holding of
a job, rather than its reward, the basic achievement.
c) Hierarchicalization and stratification
as instruments of social control: The natural human resis-
tance to domination constitutes the class conflict basic to
liberal and other class societies. The resolution of class
conflict had to be in favor of the ruling class, so fragmen-
tation of the working classes became an important instrument
of social control.
-The working forces were hierarchicalized and segmented
into many fragmented groups distinguished by status, reward,
opportunity, education, race and sex. Among the functions of
this fragmentation were: to create the illusion that human
rewards are possible within the system by climbing up the
hierarchy; to create a secondary industry and labor force
which could absorb the fluctuations of the business cycle
through periodically entering and leaving the economy (busi-
nesses succeed and then fail, workers are employed and then
unemployed) while leaving the dominant industries and labor
force relatively stable; to create intergroup competition
and antagonism which prevents consciousness and action 121
against the ruling class only possible through a unified
movement. Wo/men were alienated from the potential of a
unified community.
d) Commodity fetishism as an instrument of
social control: In order to survive, capitalism had to jus-
tify its structural, social and human domination. This
justification could only be in terms of the output of capi-
talist production. Commodities and money were instituted as
the prime life-values of liberalism, able to satisfy human
needs in the absence of the primary need-satisfaction which
only human relations could provide. Given this meaning,
objects and the money to pay for them therefore became
fetishized, in the sense of assuming human qualities and
having a magical power to satisfy human needs.2
The desire and valuing of commodities was inculcated
through education, socialization, and the capitalist reward
structure. Commodity fetishism then became a dominant con-
sciousness which represses the realisation that primary need
satisfaction can only come through in a society which values
and institutionally maintains -the primacy of hum'an autonomy
and community over the imperatives of the productive system.
To the extent that wo/men are possessed by commodity fetish-
ism,-they are alienated from the potential of becoming whole
human beings. Relation to commodities cannot substitute for
human relations..
122
the capitalist institutions: The imperatives of capi-
talism have become determinant in the liberal social order
in the form of the capitalist institutions:
1) Private ownership of the factors of production
(land, lab'or and capital) as well as private control over
the productive processes. This control is necessary in order
that the proceeds of production will accrue disproportionally
to the owners.
2) A market in labor, by which a) the worker is
prevented from owning his own means of production which would
compete with the profit of the capitalist, and b) the worker
is forced to sell his labor on the competitive labor market.
The wage is determined by supply and demand rather than by
need. The worker is forced to relinquish control over what
and how he produces, in exchange for money.
3) Markets in land and essential commodities.
Use and distribution again are determined essentially by
the highest bidder, rather than by a social determination.
These institutions yield the maximum production and
profit only when they totally dominate the entire productive
process and social relations. Then a description of capital-
ism is to a great extent a description of the nature of
liberal society itself. Capitalism then cannot be understood
only as an economic system within the large liberal society,
for it is'a productive organization which makes nature,
human activity, and wealth itself into marketable commodities
in the' service of class domination. Social relations, the
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formation of the self and -consciousness are all elements of
a totalized organization of productive and social relations.
As the capitalist institutions are alienated, capitalism is
an alienated totality.
"The operation of its basic institutions reduces all
aspects of social life - equality, justice, work, technology,
commodities, community and environment - to their instrumen-
tal role in maximizing commodity circulation and reproducing
the social division of labor and control."1,2
The legitimation of liberalism as a moral order: The-
claim that capitalism is an alienated class domination has -
been justified in terms of the structural imperatives of
the capitalist system. This domination can be understood also
in terms of the concept of legitimacy. Each social order
must be organized on the basis of a power distribution and
assumptions about the nature of the human and natural order
which are legitimated, or affirmed and seen as good or -
right, by most members of the society. Legitimation does not
necessarily imply a classless society, but only that all
social groups affirm common meanings which unite the
social order. For example, the tribal/medieval and aristocra-
tic eras possessed in the ascendent stages of their develop-
ment a framework of coherent social relations d meanings,
though this framework was not uniformly democratic. Power in
these societies was legitimated as a moral order. As legi-
timation has oc.curred throughout history, it seems to be a
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human necessity-as an ideal to which the society collectively
aspires, a justification for the distribution of power,
wealth, and role, and as a map of the world which gives mean-
ing to individual lives. Even with the collapse of the medieval
divin.e model, the despotic monarchs of the Baroque.era took
on the trappings of divinity because the social order
required a moral order which naked domination could not
provide.
But the secular liberal order could not legitimate
itself on the- basis of a revealed authority or plan. The
Church and the aristocracy which claimed such legitimation were
corrupt and defeated. The secular substitutes of the Enlight-
enment - the notions of universalized rights to life, liberty-
and property - were idealisms which could not have the force,
let alone the political reality, of a society organized
under the divine model. The problem of legitimation for a
secular liberal society spurred a great deal of theoretical
activity among liberal social thinkers. Four general schemes
of legitimation were proposed:
1) The theory of the state held the state as the
agent of public interest for a society otherwise lacking an
agent. The state would be the source of authority. and commun-
ity in social order of conflicting private interests. The
contradiction in this theory is that private interests can-
not generate the basis for a public interest.
2) The theory of the harmony of interests (the
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basis of Utilitarianism and classical political theory) held
that competing individual interests would reach social harmony
through the normal operations of self interest. The accre-
tion of private advantage became the public good. This
legitimation clearly was refuted by liberal history. The
continuing lack of sufficient and adequate housing and.
transportation for all citizens is a function of the domina-
tion of private and particularistic interests in America.
3) The theory of shared moral values was an attempt
-by Durkheim and other social theorists to create a basis for
shared values and the public good in a moral discipline.
This was a purely idealist hope to create values in the vacuum
of the structural absence of shared values in capitalist
society.
4) The theory of democratic pluralism is a recent
effort to legitimate capitalism and liberalism which underlay
the advocacy planning and some social programs of the 196 0's.
The failure of these attempts reflects the failure of the
capacity of the theory to comprehend the meaning of the
many apparent interests in America. These fragmented interests
are less the manifestation of individual and diverse origins
of the American population than the result of the structural
fragmentation which derives from the underlying class dom-
ination. In terms of power distribution, American society
does not oonsist of a plurality of interests.
"These solutions are all mystical responses to a mystical
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problem. One cannot answer the problem (of legitimation)
because it is wr ngly defined." There cannot be a social and
consensual legitimation of liberal society, for the social
structure emerged not through social consensus, but through
domination.2
Legitimacy, inherently a social act, cannot be achieved
in a society in which conduct is determined by individual
ends ('individual' is used here in the sense of single persons
as well as fragmented class interests). Yet every social order
must justify its existence as moral. Therefore, the capital-
ist imperative of commodity production and consumption became
liberalism's legitimation, the evidence of the goodness of
the liberal order.
The 'virtue' of capitalism is that it 'delivers
the goods' in terms of individual commodities.
Hence the cultural system of corporate capitalism
must, and does, in.duce the (true or false but
essentially verifiable) that nearly any subjectively
felt need can be met by some form of goods-and-
services consumption. If your life is empty, earn
more money and experience 'the good life'. ... If you
feel you are nothing, at least you can live through
your' belongings.3,4
The moral value of liberalism and capitalism is therefore
experienced only in the purely individual.act of consumption.
The contradictions of bureaucracy and role allocation:
Legitimation of capitalism as a moral order is inherently
contradictory and therefore an artificial and unstable resolu-
tion. This artificiality characterizes the liberal form of
the distribution of power (bureaucracy) and social tasks (the
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conflict between role and class) as well. Bureaucracy was
instituted as a form of administering power which evaded the
centralized despotism of the aristocratic monarchy. Therefore
the bureaucracy was constructed to serve 'general' public in-
terests, as a neutral agent with no interests of its own. The
guide to bureaucratic action was law, a formalized and deper-
sonalized expression of social relations which again replaced
the despotic personal rule. But while the bureaucracy was
formally committed to act as a neutral agent of abstract law
the members of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucratic organiza-
tion itself have particularized interests. Thus the bureaucracy
is in contradiction and appears as an artificial form of
power distribution and administration.
The liberal process of the allocation of societal tasks
had a similar origin and suffers similar contradictions. The
principle of role was a reaction to the strong aristocratic
class 'distinctions whereby one's place and work was determined
largely by birth. Liberal -role allocation on the contrary was
through meritocracy - one's ability determined what one did.
The principles of role has not overtaken class allocation -
rather, the two are in confliet. While a person has a certain
freedom in moving within the available roles of the division
of labor, .strong constraints are exerted by the class-based
limitations to autonomy. Thus the ideal of the capitalist
legitimation of personal autonomy is in contradiction to the
experience of class domination. The liberal social construct
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of-po'wer and role-allocation are experienced as artificial and
contradictory. Social.life is structured through a power whose
moral authority is unrecognized, for the authority is one of
domination. "The fundamental moral experience is that of the
arbitrariness and transitoriness of moral beliefs."' Every
communal bond is seen as a threat. "The nature of modernity
has disintegrated into a series of unrelated forms of social
life. All communal bonds are seen as oppressive, and therefore
have no legitimacy."2 Human interdependence in liberal society
is very great, mediated through a complex division of labor
and role structure. Yet simultaneously, the human being- is
most isolated from the possibility of a soci.al whole in
community. Self, power, morality and community are alienated
in capitalism.
Utility as a source of value: As the interests of capi-
tal are dominant, usefulness or the utility to these interests
became the prime source of value in liberal society. Utility
took on a particular form: a commonsense definition of utility
is the usefulness of some means to a given and determined
end; for instance, a person is useful in producing an object,
and the object is useful in serving some function or end. But
capitalist interests are primarily in the -continuing and
unending expansion of production for profit. The end of pro-
duction, the object produced, waq made subordinant to the
production process.
£4
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As attention turns to the use and function of
things, it is withdrawn from their stable and struc-
tural aspects, from their object-ness. The social.
world as a world of objects thus tends to sink into
subsidiary awareness. Objects then become interpretable
as mediators of consequences. ...One effect of a
utilitarian culture is that the established cultural
mapping of objects, as a socially shared order of
reality and value, tends to be attenuated, with the
result being that traditional definitions of objects
have less power to impose themselves on person. There
is diminished certainty about either their reality
or value.1 ,2
In the utilitarian world, there was a severe attenuation
of the moral sphere. The dominant concern became rationality.
As a dominant cultural trait, evaluating actions and objects'
in terms of their use shifted attention away from their in-
trinsic worth, making cognitive calculation rather than moral
judgerment the dominant standard of evaluation.
Utilitarianism's focus on consequences engen-
ders an increased -concern with the sheer potency
of objects as a way of achieving desired outcomes
independent of the moral dimension. It is thus not.
simply that utilitarianism fosters a concern with
cognitive judgements as distinct from moral evalu-
ations, but that cognitive judgements themselves
come to center on judgements of potency.... To know
what is, is to know what is powerful; knowledge is 3power, when knowledge becomes a knowledge of power.
The liberal world represents a shift. from the traditional
moral dimension of the object world (good-bad) to the dimen-
slon of power (strong-weak, effective-ineffective). The
potency of means replaces the valuation of ends as prime
"This radical loss of values...occurs almostconcern.,
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automatically as soon as wo/man defines himself not as the
maker of objects...but a maker of tools to make tools who
only incidentally also produces things." In Durkheim's
terms, the utilitarian culture is disposed to a moral norm-
lessness or anomie. Wo/men are alienated from the uniquely
human practice of determining the ends of their actions in
terms of a determination of-the good.
The separation of fact from value: The separation of
instrumental thought and rationality from morality is also
the separation between fact and value. The dominant mode of
instrumental rationality (positivism)2 has made this separa-
tion the hallmark of its methodological rigour. The liberal
social and epistemological systems thus feed each others'
incomprehension of any but liberal premises. Liberal society
and the dominant mode of knowledge and valuing then become
a totalized system which, like the architectural and planning
professions, does not possess the critical ability to realize
its nature and limits.3  The fundamental values and struc-
ture of liberal society are then not open to public discourse,
leaving only the given and unquestionable social fact. Fact
is separated from value under capitalism not only because of
the nature of production, but because the public democratic
evaluation of liberal facts would pose a severe threat to cap-
4
italist rule, and therefore could not be tolerated. In the
absence of public discourse (a collective process of determin-
ing how society is to realize human needs as the social prior-.
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ity--by definition a political act) the given society, the
fact, appears as the only possible reality and therefore
the only possible value. Liberal society is thus experienced
as fundamentally unquestionable; wo/men-are alienated from
the potential of a collective dete :mination of the social
order.
THE PROBLEM OF SELF
The definition of the self under capitalism is the re-
ciprocal of the artificiality, fragmentation and alienation
of the liberal social order. As the imperatives of profit
and social control define the structure of liberal society,
so they define as valuable only those portions of the self
which are of utility in fulfilling these imperatives. The
. sole meaning and value of human beings was defined in their
usefulness as workers and consumers. As the form of value in
society is commodity and capital, as defined in the market
place, the form of value of the self became utility. What wo/
men had in common was not a participation in a social whole,
but their labor and purchasing power whose value itself is de-
fined on the market, rather than through a societal consensus.
Participation in this market was made compulsory. Wo/men, not
.owning their own means of production, were thrown on the labor
and commodity markets to sell and buy their only socially-
legitimated values. The major socializing agents (including
family, school, media, the reward structure) became oriented
toward.s developing only those individual qualities which are
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.socially defined as.useful. Increasingly,'more and more of
the self became defined in terms of capitalist market iiper-
atives until the critical capacity, that reserve of the self
which exists apart from the socially and psychologically val-
ued and given is almost extinguished.
For Marcuse:
"Under new forms of domination, the human object
has changed. Men now come to consciousness in
a milieu which has profoundly changed the social-
ization process: there is now a pre-formation of
the ego, a decline of critical powers and an im-
mediate identification of the individual with his
society and its collective ideals. Social con-
trol has penetrated to a new 'depth' level of con-
sciousness and symbolic communication is univer-
sally reified." 1
The self.in capitalism parallels the fragmentation and
artificiality of the society--in short a deep alienation from
potential and wholeness. The dominant consciousness of self
is instrumentalism, individualism, and work as a distortion of
2
self. Role, which fully defines the self in terms of the
public world, can only be a partial realization of the self,
which is however condemned to function within the socially-
legitimated constraint of role--a partial definition whose in-
trinsic meaning is obscure and'reward is largely through the
abstraction of money and commodity. But the human need for
commodities is limited in relation to the nature of the self,
while the capitalist need to produce is limitless. It is then
inherently irrational to posit commodity production as the
goal of society. The dominant social purpose has then but
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limited reason. The purpose is not the intention of a con-
sensual or democratic reasoning of human beings, but the
imperative of a dominating class which becomes socialized
-as the dominant consciousness of all classes.
Caught in a web of imperatives not of his/her own
making, the individual must exist in capitalist terms but for
obscure reasons not legitimated by their being responses to
fundamental human needs of both autonomy and community.
1
Everyday life thus is experienced as a kind of madness --
an activity for purposes obscure but yet compelling and ne-
cessary for survival. The partial self becomes defined as
the real self, since the needs of the whole self cannot be
met. The quality of human and indeed the content of human
interaction is subordinated to the sphere of instrumental
2
problem-solving action. Symbolic interaction collapses
in the- loss of consensual meaning, making an intersubjective
construction of a coherent map of social reality impossible.
Society is then experienced as essentially
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meaningless.
Uo/man has literally been recreated in social and psychic
function as an instrumental means to serve capitalist ends.
This redefinition of human meaning is perhaps. the most revolu-
tionary outcome of the bourgeois revolution.
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD
Introduction: The problem of method was resolved in the
liberal social order in the form of the epistemology and me-
thodology of natural and social science. The following section
will show how science, in its formal structure and as an in-
strument of capitalist domination, had profound connections to
the structure of alienated liberal society. The understanding
of these connections forms the basis for the understanding of
the instrumental rationality of twentieth-century architec-
tural and planning practice.
The development of natural science since the bourgeois
revolution will be traced in light of the connections of sci-*
ence to the larger society. A short discussion of the separa-
tion of fact and value in instrumental rationality follows.
Finally, the origin of social theory and the theoretical con-
consciousness as well as the epistemological conditions for
the rise of distinct professional practices will be presented.
The development of natural science: While there was some
scientific work accomplished in the Renaissance, science did
not become a major cultural force until the Enlightenment
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of the later aristocratic period (c. 1700 to 1789). Indeed,
from approximately 1450 to 1650, the fear of witches in' Europe
was at its height. But science then developed as a major fac-
tor in the ascent of the liberal order. The following dis-
cussion treats central aspects of natural science which had
the greatest impact of modern consciousness and social order.
1) The connection of scientific knowledge and
social power: Bacon, at the dawn of scientific development,
saw that through the inductive method a Great Renewal would
occur, a comp.lete new start in science and civilization. He
posited a scientific utopia, the New Atlantis, in which men
created a perfect society through their knowledge and command
of nature. Bacon made no sharp distinction between pure and
applied science. The practical usefulness, or utility, of
science became the proof that it was true knowledge.
The military, economic and political utility of science
was quickly proved. The usefulness of science was first rea-
lieed in navigational aides, cartography, artillery and the
steam engine which had the initial impact of strengthening
the sovereignty of the state through military advantage.
Science was then used to create the instruments of industrial-
ization which multiplied the power of bourgeois capital. Po-
litically, the universalized nature of scientific truth implied
a universalized community, independent of the limitations of
natural boundaries. This characteristic of the new science
was adopted by the emergent bourgeois class as a tool in their
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challenge of the particularized power of the absolute monarchs.
Then the military, economic and political power of science
was recognized at its inception. One of the earliest liberal
ideologies was the doctrine of future history as unimpeded
social 'progress' through the development of science and indus-
try. The practice of science was quickly institutionalized in
periodicals and scientific associations, to which both scien-
tists and the bourgeois belonged. The bourgeois' absorption
of science became the core of what would later become the gen-
eralized form of- liberal consciousness and practice affecting
all people.
2) The alienation of men from certain knowledge of
the world: Galileo's invention of the telescope demonstrated
to all 'with the certainty of sense perception' that there were
natural realities which the senses could not touch without the
fabrication of instruments, an instrumentalism. "Instead of
objective qualities...we find instruments, and instead of na-
ture or the universe--in the words of Heisenberg--man encoun-
ters only himself."2 This separation of appearance from real-
ity led to Cartesian doubt as the basis of modern science.
Given doubt, no previous knowledge on the basis of any form
of certainty, whether metaphysical (as with the divine model)
or from the senses could any longer be absolute. The only cer-
tainty was doubt itself and the knowledge that all knowing
comes not through revelation but through man' s own making,
through the use of instruments. The Cartesian method of se-
curing certainty against .doubt was preeminently exercised
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through mathematics, the most purely human instrument. Through
its abstraction from.everyday 'common-sense' experience, math-
ematics was the tool by which man whil' earth-bound was able to
reach the objective Archemedian Point .outside of the earth. The
laws of the motion of earth and the universe were mathematical-
ly stated as universal truths. Contrary to revelation,. the evi-
dence of the senses and even human rationality, the most. funda-
mental scientific universal truth had been established through
the most abstract and man-made instrument.
Reason (the eyes of the mind) as well as the sensual vis-
ion of the eyes had proved inadequate to a reality which only
the interference with and searching behind appearances, could
reach. Previously men had assumed that humans were capable of
receiving the truth and that what is true will appear of its
own accord (revelation). Now two nightmares would haunt the
modern age: that the reality of the world and human life is
doubted, and that wo/men could not trust their senses and reason.
The.Cartesian solutions to the problem of the basis of
certain knowledge was "to choose as the ultimate point of ref-
erence the pattern of the human mind itself which assures it-
self of reality and certainty within a framework of mathemat-
ical formulas which are its own products..-.All real relation-
ships are dissolved into logical relations between man-made
symbols." 1 Wo men then were alienated from certain knowledge
of the rea-1 world and from knowledge of themselves. The autho-
rity of past civilizations of antiquity dissolved. The physi-
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cal universe not only did not present itself to the senses,
but was literally inconceivable in terms of pure reasoning.
Then, paradoxically, science vacated the public world into a
"two fold flight from the earth to the universe and from the
world into the self".' Knowledge of the external world could
only be with reference to an absolute Archemedian position out-
side of the earth (for example, absolute space or absolute
time). Knowledge of the internal world could be of the mind
processes themselves, but not of the sense impressions. As a
reflection of.the scientific consequences of Cartesian doubt,
philosophy became concerned with either the epistemological
basis of scientific knowledge (philosophy of science) or a
radical subjectivity (e.g., Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, the pheno-
menologists) in which philosophers became the scientists of
the mind. In both philosophical positions, the everyday pub-
lic world was abandoned as unreal. These positions were the
epistemological reflection of the two forms of abstraction
from the social totality which are the only alternatives open
to the self in liberal society: the retreat to the self and in-
dividualism (privatism, individualism, the family, psychology,
behaviourism, mystical subjectivity) or idealistic abstraction
from everyday social relations (liberal law, the ideology of
'democracy,' and the 'welfare state', professionalism, bour-
geois education and scholarship, the bureaucracy, etc.) Such
abstractions were posited as the legitimated social reality,
in order to obscure the particularistic interests of class
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domination. All forms of abstraction abandoned the communal
and public realm of human relations -hose existence is the pre-
condition to an unalienated life.
3.) The dominance of means over ends: As wo/men
could only know what they made themselves, the paradigmatic.
method of acquiring scientific knowledge became the experiment
--an attempt to reproduce the processes through which objects
come into being in the hope of being able to 'make' nature
itself. The object of science, and then of history, became
not the static fact but the developmental processes of reality.
The concept of being was replaced by the concept of process.
Human beings themselves were discovered as the product of his.
tory rather than of an eternal plan or idea. The dominance
of process in scientific and historic thought was a reversal
of the traditional dominance of ends over means, the episte-
mological parallel of the capitalist valuing of the expansion
of the productive process rather than the objects created by
that process.
The dominance of means over ends became the separation
of the given fact from the possibility of valuing. Positivism,
2
the current dominant scientific instrumental epistemology
adopted this separation as a methodological principle and as
such is the rationality of capitalism.
Instrumental rationality: Positivism became the instru-
mental rationality of liberalism as distinguished from the
value rationality of earlier social forms. Once the deducing
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of revealed truth, rationality now was severely restricted
to the calculation of the effective means to achieve limited
ends in the service of infinite production. The ultimate
expression of instrumental rationality became present techno-
cratic thought, in which every problem of choice is presented
as if it were only an issue of finding the means to an end
which itself is unquestioned. In the absence df a consensual
community and therefore a social basis for valuing, instrumen-
tal rationality w-as the only form in which thought and choice
could appear rational.
The restriction of rationality to an instrumental form
parallels the scientific rejection of human sense and even
reason as a means to truth. This, I hold, is not a limi.tation of
"reality" or human capacity to know, but a limitation of
method. Scientific epistemology, because it does not incor-
porate the unique nature of human existence in its methodology,
cannot be the basis of a society in which not class domination
but human beings determine the conditions under which people
live.
Social thebry and the theoretical consciousness: The
radical separation in liberalism of fact and value, means and
ends, the real and the ideal, has been the spur to a theore-
tical and class consciousness substantially unprecedented in
previous.history. Only theoretidal consciousness will be dis-
cussed here, because it is the general form of the specific
project of liberative architectural and planning theory in the
liberal era,
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The collapse of the divine model and the bourgeois revo-
lution launched a crisis of legitimation which stimulated a
great variety of theoretical activity, including modern poli-
tical and economic theory, sociology, 'aesthetics, architectural
and planning theory. This thought emerged in a transitional
period where the most advanced minds were aware of the collapse
of the consensual social map and the gulf between fact and
value which accompanied the rise of capitalism. Reality was
seen as problematic and fragmented--a situation intolerable to
*the self which can be realized only in a non-fragmented enVir-
onment. In the separation of self and world, consciousness
arose in the form of theoretical activity to attempt to fabri-
cate a coherent map of social reality. The theoretical at-
tempts were both practical and psychic necessities as well as
a necessary element of the legitimation of liberal power.
As scientific knowledge yielded power to act on the natu-
ral environment, the theoretical construction of the social
world (in the largest sense representing all specifically hu-
man reality) was a basis for finding or acting to create
meaning out of 'a fragmented and problematic environment.
The theories' relation to the liberal social order para-
lleled the reaction of the self to liberalism--alienation or
resignation.
1) Alienation: Marxist dialectical materialism was
the most profound and comprehensive social theory which de-
rived from a conscious alienation and revulsion at the emer-
gence .of capitaiism.
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2) Resignation: In the West, the dominant social
theorists resigned themselves to the capitalist institutions.
The characteristics of the liberal order were then reproduced
in the subject, content and methodology of liberal theory.
Liberal fragmentation reflected in theory became the parcel-
ling out of the social totality into theoretically and pro-
fessionally distinct fields of study (economics to the econo-
mists, social relations to the sociologists, the self to the
psychologists, the nature of the city to urbanists and plan-
ners, architecture to the architects, etc.).
Liberal fragmentation was further made into a methodolo-
gical principle of research and experimentation. Truth was to
be gained through the fragmentation of social wholes into
their constituent parts which then could be examined indivi-
dually and in interconnection. This examination could only
-be within the fragmented division of subjects and labor which
each research field represented.
Each field developed its own picture of the world and held
its particular subject as a "prime cause"--economics saw the.
world as economically motivated; architecture and planning
theory and practice maintained the traditional. belief in the
moral efficacy of design, and so on. Such fragmentation was
epistemologically justified in that the breaking of wholes
into parts was seen as the only means to "objective" truth.
But the social meaning of this fragmentation was that it both
served the practice of the ends of instrumental rationality and
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prevented the discovery that the liberal totality is a class
dornation.
Conclusion: The problem of method is intimately linked to,
if not identical with, the problem of social order--a linkage
which constitutes a closed circle in which method legitimates
the liberal social order which in turn is the client of the
practitioners of method. To break through this closed circle
a method and practice is necessary which can comprehend the
truth of liberal society through a knowledge of the totality.
The ability to change a society (and the practice of architec-
ture and planning within it) is predicated on a synoptic un-
derstanding of the society which only a totalizing method can,
provide (The basis of this method is discussed in Section III).
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
The following section is the history of the successive
forms of liberal professional practice generated in the contin-
ual fa-ilure of the professions to close the gap between their
intention of creating a coherent environment, from the fragmen-
tation which capitalist imperatives continually spawned.
The architecture and planning of pre-WW I lassiez-faire
capitalism will first be presented. Then the rise of the Modern
Movement in architecture and planning, as well as its contem-
porary successors, will be discussed. Following is a history and
critique of American planning. The'discussion of planning in the
modern period is restricted to America, for planning practice
there took forms which are not generalizable
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to other nations due to the particular development of American
politics and economics.
ARCHITECTURE IN THE EARLY LIBERAL SOCTAL ORDER
Introduction: The development of architecture under
early capitalism shared in the crises of the legitimation of
the society as a whole. As liberal society did not possess an
authoritative basis for social bonding and knowledge, archi-
tects had to create a basis for making design decisions by re-
conciling the authority of ancient architectural models with
the new capitalist imperatives. What resulted was a many-
faceted attempt to close gap with the new social reality
through theory and practice.
The conditions and constraints of architectural practice
in early liberalism will be presented as a series of crises
which led to the neo-classic style as well as the theoretical
attempt to find a meaningful and "rational" basis for design.
These developments will be shown to merely perpetuate the fun-
damental crisis of architecture as a meaningful and effective
practice in liberal society.
The crises of architectural meaning and prac-
tice: To understand the meaning of architectural practice
under capitalism, the distinction in theory and practice be-
tween means and ends is reintroduced. Capitalist production
process (means) grew to dominate the products (ends) of the
process. The ends or values in capitalist society were essen-
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tially impossible to establish, since they only served to gen-
erate profits which continued and expanded the process of capi-
tal generation.
As far as homo faber was concerned, this modern
shift of emphasis :rom the 'what' to the 'how', from
the thing itself to its fabrication process was by no
means an unmixed blessing. It deprived man as maker
and builder of those fixed and permanent standards and
measurements which prior to the modern age have always
served as his guides for his doing and criteria for his
judgements...Man began to consider himself part and par-
cel of the two superhuman, all encompassing processes
of nature and history, both of which seemed doomed to.
an infinite progress without ever reaching any inherent
telos or' approaching any preordained idea. 1
The liberal order'then posed two major tasks for building
activity: the provision of utilitarian structures to serve the
production and consumption process, and the creation of an
architecture as a symbolic expression of bourgeois values and*
power, an element in the fabrication of the bourgeois culture.
These tasks could not be accomplished by.either the received
architectural heritage of classical design, or by the neo-
classical architectural theory and practice which was developed
in the Nineteenth century. The failures of the received and
developed architecture of the -qarly liberal period were the
result of a series of interlocked crises of the meaning and
existence of the professions which, since the building tasks
and the success of the professional responses have not essen-
tially changed, continues until the present. These crises are
1) the crisis of the separation of architecture and engineering;
2) the crisis of architecture as an instant bourgeois culture.
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1) The crisis of the separation of architecture
and engineering: In 1747, the distinction between- utilitarian
building and symbolic edifice was formally institutionalized.
With .the establishment of the first engineering school dis-
tinct from the architectural academies, "engineering became
liberated in 1747 from the socio-cultural imperatives of sym-
bolic built form. From now on, it could develop its full
utilitarian potential, untrammeled by symbolization. This
split from architecture only increased the distance between
architecture and construction which was initiated in the me-
dieval workshops and the Renaissance. For uample, the Re-
naissance architect and theorist Alberti took "built fabric
as primarily an immaterial signifier."2 Design was seen as
an ideal form (such as in the Renaissance ideal city or the
system of ideal proportions governing particular buildings),
divorced from its realization in particular materials. The
engineers, on the contrary, embraced the potential of the new
nineteenth century materials (iron, steel, glass, and concrete)
and used them in utilitarian structures on an unprecedented
scale required by capitalist production and consumption.
(Engineering's) triumphant technique not only out-
stripped the performance of traditional materials and
methods, but also afforded a more explicit form of struc-
tural expression, a form in which appearance was pene-
trated to reveal process. In a metaphorical sense, this
may be seen as stasis being permeated by process, for
while the traditional object of architecture was to re-
main static, that of engineering had begun to exert it-
self as a dynamic force. From now on, architecture.looks
to engineering for'much of the substance of its symbol-
ization. 3
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The Crystal Palace of the 1851 Great Exhibition in Eng-
land embodied the contradictions and meanings of engineering
construction as a cultural object. The. building, of the em-
inently in.dustrial materials of steel and glass, was far more
related to railroad and greenhouse construction than to the
traditional building types. Notably, its designer was not an
architect, but a gardener and designer of conservatories.
The essence of the Crystal Palace resided in its
fabric as a -process, its combination of pane, sash bar,
louvre, gutter, beam, truss and column to be endlessly
repeated and rearranged just like the components of the
railway system to which it was directly related. Pax-
ton's Palace was infinitely extendable and capable of
limitless permutation. 1
The building represented a reversal of the traditional
order of ends and means, in which the "how" of its construction
took precedence over the dematerialized "what" of its steel and
glass framework. Yet, this materialization of the production
process in a "dematerialized" structure contained the fruits
of the essential end product of production, the instant culture
of consumption--wholesale kitch.
2) The crisis of architecture as instant bour-
geois culture: Divorced from engineering, architecture's role
was the servicing and symbolization of bourgeois culture as
an end, as distinguished from engineering's direct utility to
the production process as a means.
The crisis had three aspects: a) the struggle to find a
stylistic accommodation to bourgeois cultural imperatives;
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b) the weakening of the architectural project due to the in-
crease of domesticity and the loss of the public sphere; and
c) the theoretical struggle to find a basis for design deci-
sions in the absence of a unified social order.
a) The struggle to find a stylistic accommo-
dation to bourgeois cultural imperatives: As a stylistic en-
terprise, Nineteenth century architects had to evolve a theory
and practice which would distinguish bourgeois architecture
from that of the ancien regeme. Consonant with the liberal
ethic, the profligacy, corruption and tyranny of the courtly'
life was rejected by abandoning the Baroque and Rococo style of
the aristocracy.
The Louis XV or rococo style mirrored the spirit
of the age with pat truth, through using the same forms
that had served to evoke a spiritual response in churches.
The playful elegance of rocaille ornament--the lightness
and sensuous abandon with which it curls and froths over
- walls and ceilings, glittering and sparkling like a fire-
works display--was taken to be a flagrant symbol of the
gay abandon and unbridled voluptuousness of the lives of
the aristocracy. 1
but
the bourgeoisie, so recently risen to power, were
intellectually incapable of fostering a new philosophy
which (like Christianity in the Middle Ages) could find
expression in an original architectural style. The first
and essentially materialistic preoccupation of the bour-
geosie was with the reorientation of society. Men no
-longer sought in art a unique symbol of their own society
or felt bound by one accepted rule of taste. The associ-
ational values of the individual were the only remaining
guides by which to judge architecture, and styles were
borrowed from the past whenever they seemed to correspond
to the ideals of the revolutionary- age, hence the eclect-
icism of the nineteenth century. 2
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The liberal architects of the Enlightenment inherited an
architectural vocabulary and syntax which was regarded as uni-
versal and unchanging, based on the authority and legitima-
tion .of ancient and ideal models. Architects using these
models were not confined to a canon of rules but were free to
interpret and select within the bounds of then-existing his-
torical knowledge. But the "natural and inimitable laws of
architecture" deduced from Roman monuments, Vitruvius or con-
temporary works, were not inherent in nature but were attri-
butes of culture and history. The Enlightenment 'Reason'
denied this universality through historical and archaeolo-
gical study, upsetting the classicist premises and thereby
ending the movement. "From .the moment that it was scientifi-
cally defined, classicism became an arbitrary convention and
was transformed into neo-classicism." Neo-classic historicism
was an architectural parallel to the scientific shift from re-
vealed to analytically-based knowledge. Historical and arch-
eological research, rather than the .classicists' idealized
reconstruction, determined what the classic models were. The
pre'trious paradigm of architectural practice, the' freedom of
interpretation of the individual artist within a.unity of
style,collapsed. The architects' freedom became limited to
choice of styles to be reproduced with historic/scholarly
faithfulness.
Neo-classical historicist architecture provided "through
its pluralism of style that range of necessary fantasy for
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those emerging classes-who would have otherwise been bereft
of style and who, in any event, irrespective of their status,
lacked a fulfilling socio-cultural arena within which to reify
and exercise their status and imminent power."1 ' 2
The function of historicist archit cture then was pri-
marily as bourgeois fashion which need not have a structural
basis. Architecture as historicism made its peace with in-
creasingly utilitarian building requirements by becoming a
.decorative applicee, a veneer applied to a basic utilitarian
building shell. This accommodation between utility and- fas-
hion was a constructed metaphor of the professional relations
between engineer and architect in early liberalism.
b) The weakening of the architectural project
due to the increase in domesticity and the loss of the public
sphere:
In the last analysis the overall crisis suffered by
architecture after its mid-18th century divorce from en-
gineering turned as much on the initiation of comfort
and domesticity and on the flowering of social intercourse,
as it did on those transformations progressively effected
after 1750 in the basic means of production. 3
As Hanna Arendt has written, "The astonishing flowering
of poetry and music from the middle of the eighteenth century
until the last third of the nineteeth century, accompanied by
the rise of the novel, the only entirely social art form, co-
incided with a no less striking decline of all the more public
arts, especially architecture, is sufficient testimony to a
close relationship between the social and the intimate." The
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disintegration of the public realm and the loss of community
was a powerful force in the rise of the theoretical conscious-
ness-, social theory and Utopian thought under liberalism.
c) The theoretical struggle to find a basis
for design decisions in the absence of a unified social order:
Paralleling the rise of liberal social theory, a body of
architectural theory developed in early liberalism from a con-
scious recognition of the great gulf between architecture and
liberal society. This theory was on one level an implicit-
critique of neo-classical architecture as inadequate to the
liberal era. But the neo-classical appropriation of ancient
and classicist forms was an essential precondition to later
theory and practice, for- the appropriation of multiple styles
isolated (perhaps even more so than classicism) their form from
its original cultural meaning. The classic signifiers of social
cohesion and communality had been transformed by architects
and their bourgeois clients into an entirely different meaning:
the expression of accumulated individual wealth and power as
objects to be hoarded. While the forms of the historical
styles were appropriated, their social meaning and content
as deriving from a particular historic context was eviscer-
ated.:.2
The meanings of visual forms, in precapitalist societies
an expression of communal and metaphysical values, became lo-
cated in privat-ely owned objects whose publicontent and
meaning derived to a great extent from their values as signi--
t
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fiers 'of individual power. The liberal architectural obses-
sion with the "pleasing object" (or forms in themselves) de-
rived from the prattice and consciousness of the makers and
owners of form, who refused to recognize the individual power
these forms were created to embody.
But whatever the meaning of the architectural object
dressed in classical forms, the early liberal theorists per-
ceived that a bourgeois architecture could not be a purely
stylistic resolution, but had to be relevant to bourgeois
needs which on a functional level engineering had so well ful-
filled. Architectural theorists then appropriated the capit-
alist imperatives of "reason," "utility," and "efficiency"
as the criteria of a new architecture. The major early liberal
architectural theories will be presented and critiqued below.
i) Perrault's distinction between culture
and utility: The isolation of cultural meaning from physical
form. in the liberal era was. recognized in the early distinc-
tioh made by the French architect Perrault (1613-1688) between
cultural meaning and the utilitarian/scientific parameters of
design. In this recognition, Perrault posed the possibility
that architects might in their own practice hope to reverse
the liberal evisceration of the cultural meaning of forms.
Architects might define their task as designing by rules gov-
erning visual appearance or "Beauty" which derives, not from
a divine model or the imitation of nature (the two theories
which underlay, in Tzonis' term, primitive/medieval "pre-
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rational" design in contrast to the Englightenment' s "rational"
design) but from a system of rules of -"Custom" which are the
exclusive product of society. In other. words, Perrault dis-
tinguished architecture as a uniquely cultural production whose
meaning must be determined within the meaning;--system and power
distribution of the culture as a whole.
Perrault's approach aimed at a* rational, socio-
logically oriented theory of visual order. He suggested
that architecture belonged to the category of the man-
made world as fashion and manners. All three, to him,
formed networks of social communication, or as we would
say today, they belonged to a semiological system. Per-
rault showed that architectural forms have no innate
value, but that their value is determined in terms of
the social use, like currency, in terms of their poten-
tial effects. Therefore, the function of visual forms
is to attach artificial value to design products, where
no value existed before, by rendering them into a shape
dictated by the power structure of society...(Aesthetic
judgements are then) possible only by referring the
subject to a 'use' system, with the use system in its
turn depending on a larger system, the 'way of living'
given the fact that at every period a different organiza-
tion of social structure exists, 'an entirely different
game is played' by society. 1
Perrault's fundamental distinction between cultural
("Arbitrary objectives") and utilitarian/scientific ("Positive
objectives") was not adopted.2 Rather, the guiding theory
for. most architectural theoreticians became based on the
ancient Vitruvian formulation of architecture as "Accommoda-
tion, Handsomeness, and Lastingness". Translated into modern
terms, the building must resolve aesthetic/visual qualities
with technical, structural and functional efficiency. Vitru-
vius was reformulated into the idealized notion of "form
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follows function". This became the basis of the new design
theory which would by the twentieth century be the ideological
basis of avant-garde architectural practice. "Form follows
function" both confused the "arbitrary" for the "positive" va-
lues and vice versa, while collapsing one into the other. The
notion could have no other epistemological base except either
an idealism shorn of all cultural meaning ("the pleasing ob-
ject") or instrumental rationality ("structuralism" and "func-
tionalism") which in its scientific or pseudo-scientific spe-
cificity of means-ends priorities again had no concrete cul-
tural meaning. When a-design is shorn of its specific cultural
meaning, it becomes an excellent vehicle for the univeralized
mystification of particularized class power and domination.
Thus design at this point was prevented from becoming a criti--
cal practice which engehdered personal and class consciousness.
The notion of "form follows function" could have no basis other
than in a universalized or particularized metaphysic essen-
tially unrelated to the culture which gave rise to it. "Form
follows function" was a mystification of the domination which
it served and symbolized.
ii) Structural efficiency: Rejecting a
cultural interpretation of architectural meaning, architectural
theorists and designers were in crisis, having twice lost the
theoretical basis for their practice. First, the cultural
-meaning of the divine model as grounding for social and archi-
tectural order was destroyed through the advance of science
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and the bourgeois. A succeeding model of Alberti's--form as
primarily an "immaterial signifier" of an ideal form--lost
meaning with the institution of scientific epistemology (which
rejected such idealism) as a model of cognition and as a ma-
terial force. "Reason", as an almost metaphysical category,
became the ideal of Enlightenment revolutionary culture. This
"Reason" was manifest in scientific, economic, political and
architectural theory and practice.
The impact of the ideal of "Reason" in architecture was
first in the theory of structural efficiency, or "Mechanicks".
For Eighteenth-century theorists, this "rational" efficiency
became not only an optimizing of the use of materials and la-
bor, but the standard of "beauty" and "utility", a universally
accepted panacea for building design. Perrault's Arbitrary
Value, which he considered the essence of architecture, was
overthrown and "Positive Value" made the definition of "ra-
tional" architecture. -
Structural efficiency being the essence, all extraneous
was to be eliminated. "The small peasant hut" of Rousseau's
natural man became the "justif-ication, the abstract model,
and often even the physical prototype of national architecture.1
This notion was not a new form of historicism but an a-his-
torical ideal to thinkers for whom the past was a "history of
crimes",2 an obstacle which could not be a prototype for the
future. The oppression of the current age was to be lifted
by "returning to the a priori premises of human nature."3
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where man is "noble," ."simple," "gentle." His humble hut,
which is "strong," "solid," "beautiful'," with "unity," "sym-
metry," and "simplicity" should serve.as the model for archi-
tecture. -
Tzonis makes several observations on the meaning of
structural efficiency.
a) The position was paradoxical in terms of actual Eight-
eenth and Nineteenth century practice which it defined. The
aim of the rationalists was not a true structural efficiency
in the engineering sense of the term, but rather the erection
of the ideology of structural efficiency as a means for achiev-
ing visual harmony. Further, a great number of architects ig-
nored such scientization and were obsessed with ornament.
"This paradoxical situation is very useful in revealing the
actual forces guiding the development of Twentieth-century
architecture, the real forces behind the apparent ones."
b) The value of efficiency is a saving of material goods.
and labor, increasing the material utilities in the univer-
salized Enlightenment sense available for men. But in fact
capitalism basically increases channeled material utilities
to capitalists, and thus architectural efficiency could not be
to the generalized benefit. Rationality employed for univer-
salized ends became irrational in the context of the benefits
of rationality accruing to the few. 2
c) The value of efficiency and the -critique of ornament
reflected a shift in the holding of wealth from the land and
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mercantile returns of the aristocratic class to the accumula-
tion and multiplication of wealth of the more dynamic bour-
geois. Ornament signified concentrated power in the body of
the neo-classic design object, a power which itself could not
be multiplied for accumulated. But capital was a means for*
multiplication, accumulated through saving, of which the archi-
tectural ideology of structural efficiency was one form.
d) Finally, structural efficiency in its ideological
sense gave the architect the feeling he was working for the
general benefit, for the powerful and the oppressed. As an
ideology, it linked the architect to the rest of the societal
processes and served as a good conscience.
In summary, structural efficiency was essentially an
ideology, a symbolic rather than a material intent without a
method of effecting functional issues in design. The crisis
of bourgeois design was not resolved and the practice of arch-
itecture was not reconciled with the building tasks of liberal
society which engineering was so effective in handling. In
response, an ideology of functional efficiency, the rationality
of use, was then developed.
iii) Functional efficiency: Like the struc-
turalists, the functionalists were concerned with a metaphor-
ical utility in contrast to the literal instrumental utility
of the engineers. But functionalism (perhaps because the ideo-
logy emerged after the consolidation of the bourgeois/indus-
trial revolution) did not incorporate the structuralists' im-
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plicit critique of bourgeois culture in a desired return to
"natural" pre-capitalist man. While the structural theorists
reacted to liberalism with alienation, the functionalists
reacted with acceptance/resignation. "Contemporary.culture
not only made sense to the functionalists, it was taken for
granted. For this reason the question of a priori human
principles seemed irrelevant to them...The nature of man was
to be found in the deformed human product of the nineteenth
century market economy."l Society was taken as unproblematic
and the alienation of the human subject of that society went
unquestioned. The self defined in alienation from others
became the subject of functional design. The functionalists
referred to what they considered the individual's social needs
but did not see those needs as imposed by society. 2
.Functional efficiency was identified with "utility,"
"beauty," and "morality," which in turn was identified with
"wealth," "benefit," "pleasure," "goodness," and "happiness."
Two applications of these virtues were developed which were
significant for modern architecture and planning and still per-
vade its practice: the metaphor of the building a's machine,
and the belief that architecture had a moral effect.
iv) The building as machine:
Design is not some curious contortion of form, or
some superadded atrocity, but it should rather be con-
ceived as the fitting of means to ends in the production
of works which are good each in their own order. 3
Design decisions should thus be based on the ends the
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building is to fulfill, as defined by a building program. The
model of the perfect fit of means and ends towards a programmed
purpose was the most direct producer of.utilities, the machine
which in turn was modelled on nature itself.
Look around the world...you will find it to be
nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an in-
finite number of lesser machines...All these various
machines, and even their most minute parts, are ad-
justed to each other with an accuracy which ravishes
into admiration all men, who have evern contemplated
them. The curious adaption of means to ends,. through-
out all natuire resembles exactly though it much ex-
ceeds, the productions of human...intelligence. 1
Having reconceptualized nature as a machine, there was
no need to search for an ideal "natural man" and his "peasant
hut" in mythologized history. Neither historical knowledge
nor a model of man was of utility.
v) Ar(7hitecture as a morality: Architec-
ture (and planning) had always reinforced the power of the dom-
inant class. But Enlightenment thought declared the univer-
sal rights of all men. In truth, this doctrine represented
only the rights of the bourgeois class, but it did serve as a
critical ideology, which animated a considerable amount of re-
volutionary and reformatory activity opposing both monarchical
.absolutism and the human and environmental destruction'of the
industrial cities.
"The new Rationalism permitted (architects and planners).
to pick up the compass which had fallen from the divine hand
and to proceed in the search for private schemes for the per-
fection of humanity."2 The historicist architecture of the
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Nineteenth century was imputed with moral qualities which
could inculcate democracy (Thomas Jefferson's Greek style),
restore Catholic values (Pugin's Gothic revival), or exem-
plify the Protestant Ethic (Ruskin, Gothic revival). The
sponsors of such schemes were wealthy bourgeois of a gener--
ation still possessing a social. responsibility while living
in a new age which had no institutional or structural basis
for social concern. The benefactors acted on their own to
build asylums, hospitals, worker housing and the like for
the urban poor who would otherwise have posed a social threat.
Architecture and therapy conjoined as an element of social
control which still animates, on many levels, architectural
ideology. An early publication of the Boston Prison Society
stated:
there are principles in architecture, by the
observance of which great moral changes can be more
easily produced among the most abandoned of our race
...there is such a thing as architecture adapted to
morals; that other things being equal, the prospect
of improvement in morals depends, in some degree, upon
the construction of buildings. 1
Conclusion: Both structural and functional effi-
ciency became identified with -a particular interpretation of
"utility," "bdauty," and "morality," in which the visual ap-
pearance of efficiency rather than its actual presence was
stressed. This apparent contradiction is resolved with the
understanding that:
the aim of both the structural and functional
efficiency approaches is not material but social. Both
express efforts to create the smallest and densest con-
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centration of power in society, the latent objective
for the rationalization of architecture. 1
The structural/functional doctrines impacted Nineteenth
century neo-classical architecture in their rejection of Ba-
roque excesses for a more restrained academic historicism,
imputed with structural, functional or moral qualities. These
ideals of course reflected the utilitarian and more impera-
tives of bourgeois society. But they could not be fully rea-
lized through a neo-classic veneer or an architecture of past
styles.
The Nineteenth century architects, who did seriously at-
tempt a structural/functional approach were still caught in
the past. "Ornamentation," for Ruskin, "is the principle
part of architecture." Sullivan tried to make of the skyscra-
per an empathetic image of the standing man. Perret, who
pioneered in the use of reinforced concrete structural cage,
felt constrained to apply traditional decoration to his inno-
vative buildings. The great architectural works of such men
were attempts to find some aesthetic logic and coherence in
the requirements of the new commercial building types. But
the form of such characteristically Nineteenth century buil-
ding types as the skyscraper, the warehouse, the department
store, and the railroad station was predominantly dictated
by a functional and economic utility which the architects
could only clothe with a decorative veneer. Classicism was
inadequate to the inherent limitlessness of capitalist pro-
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duction. In coming to terms with capitalism, architects 
-had
to come to terms with the meaning of their work being the
production of utilities-a task for which the moralism and his-
toricism of the neo-classical architectural theory and practice
could be no basis. Neo-classicism held that there is a dis-
tinction between architecture and building, beauty and utility.
Yet architectural culture did not embody a method or intention
which would actualize the distinction in the social worldl
Architecture was then cut adrift from the important
problems of its time: the artists, who should have been con-
cerned with the aims of architectural production, instead.
elaborated on imaginary problems in prudent isolation; the engin-
eers, concentrating on the means of realizing their productions,
became the means to capitalist ends. 2
Some observers of the time summed up the architects'
situation well:
Flaubert: "Architects--all imbeciles--always forget
the ladders"
Viollet-le-Duc:"In our time, the budding architect
is a boy of fifteen to eighteen...who for six or
eight years is made to make plans of buildings
which usually have only distant connections with
the needs and habits of our own times, and which
never have to be made practicable."
An anxious academia in 1866: (by giving-too large
a part to scientific and technical culture)"the
whole body of architects would finally be supressed,
since it appeared simply to duplicate that of
civil engineers. "3
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PLANIING IN THE EARLY LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
Introduction: The origin of modern town planning Was.
in the response of first the paternalistic bourgeois, the
Utopians, and then state bureaucrats to the chaos and squalor
of the early industrial city. Bourgeois planning then was dis-
tinguished from the planning of the Renaissance and Baroque
in three ways: i) While the Renaissance and Baroque client
of planning was the aristocracy, the liberal clients were
private capitalists and the state; ii) While the Renaissance
and Baroque planning subject was the aristocratic city, the
liberal planning subject was the industrial city; iii) While
the Renaissance and Baroque planning intent was primarily
either military or the spatial symbolization of power, liberal
non-Utopian planning dealt with making the industrial city
into an efficient capitalist utility while correcting its
worst excesses.
Early history of capitalism: Early liberal planning must
be nderstood in relation to the early history of capitalist
development which initially produced not the industrial city
and industrial technology, but a revolution in traditional
agriculturalsocial and productive relations. This revolution
and its transformation into the growth of the industrial city
will first be discussed. Then, the Utopian and bureaucratic
planning responses to the problems of the industrial cities
will be presented.
1) The revolution of medieval agricultural social
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relations: It is a commonplace that the growth of the cities
was a consequence of or was simultaneous with the industrial
revolution. But urbanization and new technology was only a
later stage of capitalism; the earlier history of capitalist
development was based on a revolutionary transformation of the
social relations and technology of nedieval agricultural and
crafts production, which resulted in the putting-out system
and the related enclosure movement.
a) The putting-out system: Much as the United
States now uses foreign labor, medieval peasants became a means
for capitalists to escape the urban guild restrictions and
merchant monopolies. Peasants were organized into a decentral-
ized family manufacturing system which produced cloth at home'
from raw materials supplied by the bourgeois,who then picked
up the finished cloth and sold it at a price which undercut
the prices of the medieval towns. The putting out system then
contributed to the dissolution of the medieval order.
b) The enclosure movement: It was found that
agricultural production was less profitable than the sale of
wool. Thus massive quantities of agricultural acreage tradi-
tionally held in common under the feudal land system was
appropriated and enclosed by the bourgeois as grazing fields
for sheep. This enclosure precipitated a major restructuring
of medieval social relations, as peasants were dispossessed
from their traditional communal life-forms and property. The
brutal upheaval of the peasants was the precondition of the
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industrial revolution and. the formation of cities which
required a mass laboring class and commodity markets.
The agricultural revolution preceeded the industrial
revolution. The content of both is mis-represented if understood
as the restilt of new technologies. The revolutions were rather
the reorganization of medieval social relations to facilitate
capitalist class domination. Capitalism is defined then,. not
by technology or by the existence of urbanization, but by its
social relations.
The industrial cities were established only when greater
markets, production efficiencies and social controls were*
necessary which the social and productive relations of the
agricultural revolution could not provide. Once starte, urban
growth was phenomenal. In 1800 the population of London was
less than a million people. By 1850 population had doubled,
and by the turn of the century, it quadrupled. In 1750, one
fifth of England's population was urban, but at present the
ratio is -reversed.1
2) The industrial city: The first population of
the industrial cities were the masses of dispossessed agricul-
tural villagers and tenant farmers who worked and were housed
'2
under intolerable conditions.
A moral blight, with its rampant debasement
of family ties, sexuality, human solidarity and
dignity, followed doggedly ih the wake of urban
bligh.t. ...population began to soar at a dizzying
tempo despite pervasive malnourishment, appalling
working conditions, and incomparably bad and unhy-
gienic living conditions in the congested hovels. 3
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This situation was the normal result of the operation of
the capitalist imperatives of class domination and economic
expansion.
The industrial city then was the physical embodiment
and instrument of the revolutionary new capitalist social
relations. As human beings- became defined as their utility
to the production/consumption process, the city became primar-
ily a production and consumption utility. The laissez-faire
capitalism of the first industrial period was. reflected in the
anarchy of uncontrolled city development and growth which
existing governmental institutions had no means to control.
Several imperatives moulded the early spatial development
of the industrial city:
a) The absorption of unprecidented population
and production facilities - a task which destroyed all previous
social structure and urban physical boundaries.
b) The need for great quantities of housing -
which was met by speculative builders who produced cheap,
shoddy, cramped and unsanitary housing at very high densities.
c) The construction of industrial facilities -
which were located with no regard for func.tional separation,
pollution, and the like - thus disrupting the medieval pattern
of -natural functional zoning.
d) The spatial expression and differentiation
of liberal social classes through the rise of new, sharply
differentiated central and periferal slums, expensive
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residential districts, suburbs, and industrial zones spatially
separated out urban functions and social classes which had
previously been interweaved within a defined spatial limit
and social whole. This differentiation was the spatial equiva-
-.lent of the imperatives of a complex class structure and divi-
sion of labor, coupled with the need for social control.
Yet the industrial city reflected also a certain decline
in the importance of spatial symbolization. The Baroque city
was a physical embodiment of upper-class wealth and power, as
a stage set for-display of aristocratic power and the exertion
of military control. Capitalists, on the other hand, gained
their power from a wealth which was created through constant
accumulation and reinvestment. Thus money was not to be spent.
on the 'nonproductive' public realm and public symbolization
of wealth. Communication channels (the railroad,'motor roads,
canals, the press, telegraph, telephone, etc.) supplanted
space. in its traditional role of the bearer and symbolization
of culture information and -social control.1
The two responses of city planning: The anarchy and blight
of the industrial city stimulated the birth, about 1830, of
2
the first town planning in the-modern sense.
The economic and social changes which produced
the inequalities of the first decades of the nineteenth
century and the changes in political theory and
public opinion meant that these disparities were
no longer accepted as inevitable but were regarded
as obstacles that could and should be removed. 3
The two planning responses, Utopian Socialism and
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bureaucratic city planning, corresponded to the reaction of
the self to the liberal order .- alienation or resignation.
The Utopian Socialists in their alienation from the new order
posited and built totalistic ideal communities in which human
relations could be made whole again. The bureaucratic planners,
resigned to the capitalist order, worked to 'rationalize' the
urban excesses and dysfunctions through incremental forms.
The Utopians and bureaucratic planners shared several charac-
teristics: Both movements were strictly remedial in character,
reflecting a time lag between the event and the planning
action by which it was supposedly controlled. Both movements
started as a critique of the given and believed in the use of
Enlightenment Reason. But the Utopians ended up as failures,
prisoners of their own method, while the bureaucratic reformers
became institutionalized through their absorption in to the
state planning process.
1) The Utopian Socialists: Engels portrays the
task as the Utopians saw it:
Society presented nothing but wrongs: to
remove these was the task of reason, It was neces-
sary, then 'to discover a new and more perfect
system of social order and to impose this upon
society from without by propaganda, and wherever
it was possible, by the example of model experiments.
These new social systems were foredoomed as utopian.
- The more completely they were worked in detail, the
more they could not avoid drifting off into pure
fantasies.1
An op.timistic Enlightenment rationalism was at the base
of Utopian Socialism. For Robert Owen,
- J+
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A new era must commen.ce; the human intellect, through
the whole extent of the earth, hitherto enveloped
by the grossest ignorance and superstition, must
begin to be released from its state of darkness...-
For the time is come when the means may be prepared
to train all the nations of the world - men of every
color and climate, of the most diversified habits
- in that knowledge. 1
The Utopians believed in 'progress' and the process of.
historical change. Theory animated reality, Man was reasoning
animal, using reason as an instrument to break down the obsta-
cle of social inequality and to scientifically determine a
priori the proper environment for human behaviour. Faulty
Reason and not class domination was seen as the source of
social inequality and urban blight.
This Enlightenment notion is at the core of much contem-
porary architectural and planning thought.
Consider man, his needs, tastes, and active
inclinations in order to determine the conditions
for the system of construction best adapted to his
nature. Man can be defined as the sum of a series
of psycho-sociological constancies admitted and
inventoried by competent people.2
These 'competent people' were the paternalistic Utopian
Socialists themselves, who postulated ideal societies based
on.what they saw as the universalized qualities of man. This
in itself had been done in other societies (such as the
Christian ideal of the city of God). But the Utopians united
their theory and practice in the project of realizing an
Enlightenment 'City of Man' by building their utopias. These
were seen as universalized prototypes of social organization,
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efficient production, and standardized housing. Yet whatever
their internal social structure, the origin of these
utopian community designs was not democratic but paternalis-
tic, giving the lie to the Enlightenment claim of the univer-
sality of man and hence his democratic equality. In a sense
each Utopian designer became his own god.
The physical form of these communities which was de-
signed as an integral part of the Utopian schemes was yet
subord.inant as a formal organization with its own impera-
tives to the'social purpose of the plan. A caption on a
presentation drawing of Robert Owen's New Harmony community
read: "An association of two thousand persons formed upon
the principles advocated by Robert Owen" with the name of the'
architect below Owen's in much smaller type.
While making sometimes acute critiques of the Capitalist
social relations, the Utopians used an idealist Enlightenment
epistemology which was methodologically incapable of reveal-
ing that social relations were not dictated by the degree of
Rationality, but by the power of class domination. Only a
materialist epistemology and critique could uncover the
Capitalist reality.
The Utopians condemned themselves to misconstruing the
motive forces behind the phenomena of capitalist society
they intended to reform. The more elaborated the Utopians
made their plans, the more fantasy-like they became.
The Utopian planners were the first to develop such'.
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planning concepts as the spatial continuity of voids, the
importance of air, light and greenery, and the functional
organization and differentiation of the city which were
absorbed as basic principles of standard- planning practice.
But the utopian communities and their social relations for
the most part neither survived nor made an impact on Capital-
ist society except as a brief historic episode and ideal.
In order to be able to effectively act. on a society to real-
ize human freedom and equality, the Utopians required a mode
of knowledge and analysis adequate to the Capitalist reality
and to the intent of critical action. This realization was
a basis of the virulent critique of the Utopian Socialists
by Marx and Engels, who realized the futility of idealistic
efforts at creating a priori a new total society as a response
to Qapitalist domination. The Marxian epistemology (dialec-
tical - materialism) is appropriate as a basis for
comprehending capitalist reality because it can reveal
history as a developmental process of social forms and the
self. This development is not a realization of a static and
eternal Enlightenment Rationality, but the interplay and
conflict of class interests. (History, for Marx, is a suc-
cession of class conflicts). Fundamental resolutions of the
symbols of capitalist domination of which the Utopians so
despaired could come not through the application of Rational-
ity, for the implication is that the society is irrational.
In fact, the industrial society was highly
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rational from the capitalists' point of view - the city's
physical and social chaos was a structural result of the free
operation of capitalist institutions. This 'rationality'
capitalism will not give up with out conflict, or, for
the Marxists, revolution.
Despite their generous and imaginative liberative
visions, the Utopians failed in their analysis of liberal
society and lived up to their worst caricature. The word
'utopia' literally means 'no-place', which was virtually the
only location in space and time where Utopian communities
could be founded.
The Marxist critique of the Utopian Socialists did not
lead to a planning movement. Though the Marxists possessed
the most trenchant critique and analytic tools of all students
of capitalism, they abdicated the critique of speci-
fically urban issues after discrediting the Utopian Social-
ists, for a political/economic critique of the capitalist
system as such. This was done in the belief that only through
a general class revolution could specifically urban problems
be dealt with.
From that time onwards, political theory almost
always tended to disparage specialist research and
experiment, and attempted to assimilate proposals
for partial reform within the reform of society
generally. Town planning on the other hand, cut
adrift from political discussion, tended to become
increasingly a purely technical matter at the
service of the established powers. This did not mean,
however that it became politically neutral; on the
contrary, it fell within the sphere of influence of
the new conservative ideology (in France, England 173
and Germany). This was the explanation for the un-
committed and dependent nature of the main exper-
iments in town-planning after 1848, behind which
loomed the political paternalism of the new right.
The Garden City movement, founded by Ebenezer Howard in
1898 was the final major realization in 19th century city
planning of the Utopian and reformist ideals. The rationally
planned physical environment was to be strongly distinguished
in form from existing industrial cities in the interests of
health and social harmony. The physical means of realizing
the Utopian intents were primarily an abundance of open space,
low density and the limitation of physical expansion in order
to maintain the' purity of the isolated and self contained
optimal community. Given these limits, the natural population-
growth of the Garden City was contained by the budding off of
excess population and the establishment of further new
communities. Like the Utopian Socialists, Howard's movement
was a response to the squalor of working class slums. However,
Howard, unlike the Utopians, was also concerned with main-
taining existing social relations. He thus appropriated the
Utopian ideal of new physical community to the interests of
the established order and social management rather than co-
operative liberation. From the Garden City onward, the ideal
of a physically manifest critical social utopia became reduced
to the physical utopia of an agrarian ideal with Capitalist
social content.
From the New Tovm of Letchworth in 1903 to Radburn,
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New Jersey in 1928, the greenbelt towns of the New Deal to
their vulgarization in the numberless post-war suburbs, as
well as the latest manifestation in the contemporary new
towns, the Garden City ideal remains a powerful force .in
city planning. It combines the liberal ideology of indivi-
dualism and private property, .the American agrarian ideal,
and the hierarchical segmentation of the labor force - the
creation of segregated communities of homogeneous soci-econo-
mic groupings which implicitly reinforce racial and ethnic
segregation as well as the fragmentation of class conscious-
ness.
2) Nineteenth century bureaucraticplanng:
a) The constraints on state planning: The
failure of conservative political consolidation of the Euro-
pean revolutions left the city planning function largely in
the hands of state bureaucrats. This development was one aspect
of the linking of state and planning functions which became
fully developed after World War II. 1 The state both established
the legal, economic and political foundations of urban plan-'
ning, and then assumed urban planning Lesponsibility for such
pulic issues as sanitation and transportation.
But city planning becarie at best a partial rationalization
of isolated elements of the urban system. To understand why
this continues to remain the case involves seeing the con-
straint to. any form of planning and government intervention.
olassical liberal economic and political theory held that
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capitalist economics functioned best with no controls other
than the totally free operation of the market itself. The
market constituted the "hidden hand" which automatically re-
conciled the inherent capitalist contradictions of requiring
security, stability, and continuity in the socio/economic
climate on the one hand, and a risk-taking competitiveness
on the other. Normative social patterns then arise which
legitimize the standard that each individual and class of
individuals has the absolute right to self-aggrandizement,.
profit-maximi-zation, and individual initiative. Government
interference with this theoretically self-regulating system
was seen as a dangerous intervention with the economy and
individual rights.
"Government competition with private enterprise and in-
stitutionalized planning (was ) considered the most danger-
ous interventions in individual freedom and'a strong violation
of the normative patterns." But a minimal level of planning
was necessary to "help to conceal the contradictions between
stability and adaptive dynamics" (the simultaneous needs for
capitalist security and growth).1 Planning was therefore
tolerated in the following decentralized forms:-
. i) Private planning action to maintain one's own social
and economic security in the.accumulation of property and
capital.
ii) Public planning action within a democratic process
of decision-making: environmental, administrative and security
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concerns.
iii) Free investment planning action to increase profits
and control over labor power.
But these forms of planning were restricted to isolated
elements of the society. The state itself was basically pas-
sive, reacting to capitalist imperatives and mediating class
conflicts when necessary.
b) Early state planning: Urban legislation which
the state passed was concerned with such public issues as san-
itation and housing. These areas were not dealt with ade-
quately by private interests and, if unresolved, to undermine
capitalist stability and growth.
The origin of modern bureaucratic city planning was then
coincident with the establishment of state authority over
urban issues and the definition of the city as a legal poli-
tical entity. But even at this early stage, the incremental-
ism.of the planning effort.and government control contrasted
with the growing power and centralization of state economic
and political planning. This is indicated in the state's early
participation in labor and-wel.fare legislation which served
capitalist interests by institutionalizing the labor market.
The English Reform Act of 1832 reapportioned the Parliament
seats to increase urban representation relative to the rural
areas, thus putting political representation in line with eco-
nomic and social realities. The first effective law limiting
the working hours of children was instituted in 1833. The
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old Poor Law (Speenhamland) which guaranteed all citizens a
certain level of sustenance was abolished, forcing all poten-
tial workers onto the wage market and consolidating.the ex-
. propriation of workers which started with the enclosure move-
ment. In 1835,elective municipal administrations were estab-
*lished to be responsible for all state intervention in housing,
roads, drainage, sewage, and later, planning. This state
* action was part of what was termed the city reform
m6vement. But in fact, the reforms did not deal with the
forces which caused the urban blight and only brought the
medieval-based.industrial city into line with economic and
social realities.
The first wave of towm planning reform was spurred by
problems of sanitation, disease, refuse disposal, congestion,
and transportation, which required a centralized administra-
tion.since they effected the city as a whole. In spite of its
individualistic ideology, .liberalism generated the state
as an instrument of centralized administration in a society
which had no inherent principle of social cohesion except in-
strumentalism. The planning administration's "point of depar-
ture was sanitary problems, but the point of arrival was a
complete programme of town planning," since sanitation reform
involved control over drains, housing, road and park design,
sewer and paving standards, etc.. In 1875 and 1890, the Eng-
lish Housing of the Working Classes Act consolidated sanita-
tion and popular housing laws into a municipal instrument for
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controlling minimum housing.
A second wave of reform was promoted by the immense popu-
lar pressure for improving unacceptable living conditions.
Reform was seen as the only alternative to even more intense
social conflict. For example, the lack of public open spaces
is regretted because,
if the lower orders have not places where they
can engage in sport and keep their mind engaged in.
matters of that kind, it is the very thing to drive
them to Chartism (socialism). 1
Subsidized housing laws resulted from this state concern.
In addition, a number of private "morally"-motivated benefac-
tors erected workers' housing.
The convenience and cleanliness of a man's lodging
have a greater influence than might be thought on the
morality and well-being of the family...If we can offer
...men clean, attractive houses...he can learn to value
that feeling for ownership which Providence has instilled
in us all, shall we not have solved one of the most im-
portant problems of social economy? Shall we not have
contributed towards strengthening the sacred bonds of
the family and rendered a true service to this class so
worthy of concern to our workers and to all society? 2-
The largest of the housing settlements erected in response
to this sentiment were modeled on the designs of the Utopian
communities. Their geometric and technical town-planning as-
pects were adopted, but the social, political and economic
content eliminated. The designs were "utilized by the pater-
nalistic reformists precisely to.conserve the social balance
threatened by the Revolution.'!3
City planning then originated as a collection of special-
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ized private and bureaucratic efforts to respond to specific
urban problems. Gradually the nature of the problems and the
rise of the state as an institution of societal planning stim-
. ulated a coordinated effort in dealing with the city. Planning
became the affair of bureaucratic technicians, a new class com-
posed primarily of civil servants distributed through various
city departments and committed to instrumental and incremental
practice.
A
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MODERN ARCHITECTURE
Introduction: The relations of city planning and architec-
ture to liberal society are similar. Both architects and plan-
ners operated at a great distance from the central socio/eco-
nomic processes of the evolving bourgeois society;-architects
split from the socially effective practice of the engineers by
the mid-eighteenth century, and city planning a part of a weak
state system attempting to regulate the industrial towns. By
.the Twentieth century, the professions furthered their aliena-
tion from the social whole through an increasingly internalized
theory and practice in the crisis of attempting to close the
professionals' gap with a constantly transforming capitalist
society. As the professionals have shown little critical under-
standing of their situation, this crisis has been perpetuated
until the present.
This section will first describe the transition in archi-
tecture from the neo-classical to "modernist" model. This
will in turn be presented and critiqued, as will be several
forms of theory and practice which followed modernism's de-
cline.
THE MODERN MOVEMENT
The transition to Modernism: The political and eco-
nomic conditions for a massive and institutionalized commodity
manufacturing were set by 1870.
Two men have been supreme in creating the modern
world: Rockefeller and Bismark. One in economics, the
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other in politics, refuted the liberal dream of
universal happiness through individual competition,
substituting monopoly and the corporate state. 1
The available architectural response, historicism, had
by 1890 become a complete failure in light of the emerging
building-tasks and technologies of corporate capitalism. In
city planning, the existing stock of legal and spatial con-
trols were inadequate to the burgeoning cities which existing
Baroque compositional methods could not order. The growth of
suburbs, transportation and communications networks made the
potential of physically orderning a city increasingly problem-
atic.
The first response to. these crises was an architectural/
aesthetic/city planning avant garde (Art Nouveau, Jugend-
stijl, Garnier, Howard , Soria , Berlage, the Italian Fu-
turists) which either glorified crafts technology or idealized
industrial values. In either case, the avant garde failed to
either appreciate or significantly affect the problems and po-
tentials of their time. The romantic and individualistic
"proud but fragile tower of the 19th century bourgeois culture
collapsed"2 with Lenin's seizure of the Winter Palace in 1917
and with it the belief in the total goodness of industrial
production and consumption. The mass production and consump-
tion of commodities before the First World War became the mass
production of death and consumption of men.
It is the German and Russian experience this
time to arrive at 'an architecture degree zero' (a
cultural break in which the traditional cultural sys-
tem is totally vitiated, resulting in a black whole
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so to speak within which an unforseen sociocultural
complex begins to accrete).and the difference of their
respective attitudes to this experience is of signi-
ficance in itself. Industrial production, now dis-
rupted and in many instances totally destroyed by the
war, creates an austere objectless world, a cultural
hiatus wherein men hitherto overwhelmed by the night-
mare of industrialization, may briefly speculate on
an alternative condition. Bourgeois professionalism
...momentarily loses its cultural hold...Art now
arises into the ascendant as the potential embodiment
of unalienated value. 1
Then, in Russia, immediately after the Revolution, a cul-
tural-"degree zero" was achieved---a genuine break in history
coming with the sudden end of the bourgeois. The Russian
workers' Soviets promised a genuine disalienation of all men.
Production, which had hitherto been determined by the impera-
tives of capital, could now become the instrument of the whole
society. This meant that all objects could now be resemanti-
cized--new meanings corresponding to the democratic/unaliena-
ting social ends could now be attached to objects. Objects
were to be the servants of a new order of social relations.
Artists abandoned their previously specialized callings and
participated towards the ideal.of a totality of design (the
unity of theatre, cinema, art, architecture, the design of
everyday objects) as servants and creators of a unified and un-
alienated society. Culture became itself a space of public
appearance, in partnership with the political and economic
formative elements of Soviet life.
(Art) advocated the social determination of the
environment as the very substance and meaning of human
culture. It implied a continuum of objects reduced-to
their non-fantasized significance, to their intrinsic
meaning in relation to society as a whole. 2
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This integration of art and life through a resemanti-
cization of physical form (imbuing form with new definitions
of meaning) and the creation of a proletarian unalienated
culture was a central ideal which was assimilated and trans-
formed into the Modern Movement in architecture and planning.
But in the transformation, the totalizing and de-alienating
intent- of Revolutionary design was lost. What remained will
be described and critiqued in the following section.
The nature of the Modern Movement: The Modern Move-
meht succeeded the late Nineteenth century avant-garde as a
response to the crisis of neo-classicism in meeting the demands
of an industrialized bourgeois society. The avant-garde was
the last product of an optimistic age when the virtues of pro-
ductivity and Rationality were seen as unbounded, a movement
which attempted through verbal and visual manifestos to uni-
versalize an essentially individualistic viewpoint. This was
anlaesthetic response to a deep ambivalence about industrial-
imation and liberal society whose impact outstripped the mean-
ing and potential of aesthetic-solutions in attempting to link
the environment to new economic and political situations.
The Modern Movement appropriated the aesthetic prejudice,
the isolated social position and the sometimes polemical stance
of the earlier avant garde. But through its-less equivocal
acceptance of technology and emphasis on the method of prob-
lem solving, the Movement attempted a more real relation to
liberal social and economic forces; initially
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it was an operative choice which became a theory only
later and then only partially. Polemical statements of the
early period would be contradicted as the Modernist archi-
tects confronted political realities. Thus it is difficult
to characterize the Movement in a concise manner, but some
characteristics are common to its several periods and ma.ny
personalities.
1) The professional position of the Modern Move-
ment designers: The Modernist architects had to legitimate
their own existence through finding a basis for making design
decisions which would accomplish several purposes: establish
Modernist social utility vis-a-vis the obvious import of en-
gineers and city planning bureaucrats; insulate the designers
from the vicissitudes of unstable political and economic cir-
cumstances; and bridge the widening gap between aesthetic
consciousness and an increasingly commodity-oriented bourgeois
society. The strategy was to first dramatize the crisis of
environment and society, and then to show that the crisis could
be solved only through the designers' methods:
Society is filled with violent desire for some-
thing which it may obtain or it may not. Everything
lies in that: everything depends on the effort made
and the attention paid to these alarming symptoms...
it is a question of building which is at the root-of
social unrest today...architecture or revolution. 1
What was in fact a crisis of architects and planners in a
"para-professional parasitical role,2 was transformed through
Modernist rhetoric into a societal crisis which could be re-
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solved only through- the participation of Modernist designers.
Yet their position as builders was at the periphery
of the profession which itself was secondary to the builders
and engineers in impacting the built environment. Early
Modernist work then was largely experimental, theoretical and
speculative, linked to society through manifestos, exhibitions,
polemic and few actual projects. The Modernists constituted
a second avant garde movement. Only in the mid-thirties did
the Modernist design paradigm come to dominate "high archi-
tecture".
2) The Modernist reading of social reality:
The Modernists' generally characterized the moving force of
society as a technological determinism. Social reality took
on for them the attributes of capitalist production and tech-
nology, based on the participation of universalized masses
with basically the same needs in mass production and consump-
tion. Thus universalized and rationalized design solutions
could be achieved through design research and development
parallel to industrial and scientific enterprise. That class.
or cultural differences were fundamental to capitalist society
was barely realized.
3) The professional task: The task of the de-
sign professionals was seen as ordering the fragmentation of
the physical world through a new design process appropriate
to industrialized society. Inherent in this view is the old
Utopian/Enlightenment notion of the capacity of designed en-
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vironment to affect human welfare and create a healthy and
moral social order. The Modernist avant garde combined Utop-
ian ideals with an implementation strategy more realistic than
that of the previous avant garde. But both movements felt
their own philosophical positions to be the complete answer
to the relation of man and society. The original avant garde
fell apart after the revelation of World War One that the
boundless Enlightenment Reason could produce death and des-
truction as well as the hopes of an idealized and totalized
future. The Modernists then appropriated Enlightenment ra-
tionality) but on a far more limited scale.
In 1926, for the first time, Le Corbusier no
longer said that the new architecture should be sub-
jective or objective, immanent or transcendent, but
that it must be such and such a thing: it must have
'pilotis, a free plan, free facade, and even roof
terraces and lengthwise windows. Future experience
was to decide whether or not these standards wer-
appropriate ones. The basic fact remained that
architects were coming to the heart of the matter,
-that is, they were recognizing that there existed
an autonomous and limited field, within which precise
choices must be made. Only in this way could the new
architecture find its correct cultural position; its
task was not to provide a general backdrop but to
carry out one of the practical actions--that described
by Morris, i.e. the modification of the physical scene--
necessary to the organization of modern society. The
relation of between the partial responsibility and
general responsibility was still to be defined (and
never was); but the discussion on architecture became 1
less tense, judgment gave way to judgments of degree.
Society then was seen as unproblematic if not vastly pro-
mising. Modernist designers had. enough difficulty in trying
to survive and in determining a proper physical order without
being concerned with the nature of the order it was serving.
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Le Corbusier:'let us keep abreast, personally,
of the forms of current development, but I beg of
you, do not let us concern ourselves here with poli-
tics and sociology. These two phenomena are too in-
finitely complex; there is also the economic aspect,
and we are not qualified to discuss these daunting
problems before a public gathering. I repeat, we
must remain architects and town-planners, and on
this professional terrain must make known to those
concerned the possibilities and needs of an archi-
tectural and urbanistic order. 1
Mies Van der Rohe: 'Our age is a fact: it exists
completely independently of our yea or nay, but it is
neither better nor worse than any other. It is just
a fact, which has no value in itself. For this reason,
I shall not persist in attempting to explain this new
epoch, to point out its proportions or to lay bare. its
supporting structure. But let us not underestimate
the matter of mechanization, typification and standard-
ization. And let us accept the changed economic and
social relationships as an accomplished fact. 2
Fact is separate from value, critique is irrelevant. Mod-
ernism abdicated the Utopian critique to rationalize design
according to the"accomplished facts of the liberal age." In-
strumental rationality would be its own authority. When the
best solution was to be found independent of political consid-
erations, the professional then would bring the solution to
the appropriate' political authorities, whoever they may be.
(Mies van der Rohe remained in Nazi Germany until 1937.)
Before the incontestable, incontrovertible claims
of the modern schemes, appropriate authorities will
emerge. But let us repeat the chronology of events:
when the technicians formulate what they must, then
the~authorities will appear. 3
4) The Modernist method: For the Modernists, ra-
tionality was, perhaps the one constant among all the political.
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and economic vicissitudes of the industrial era--the one value
which remained after the First World War. While the optimis-
tic Enlightenment rationality had died, a more limited and
controlled version still appeared as the best basis for modern
design. The scientific experimental method then was appropri-
ated as the necessary paradigm of the Modernist method in that
the modern age posed complex and ever-changing design problems
which could not be resolved through the pregiven stylistic
formulas and aesthetic approach of the neo-classic and avant
garde movements. Such ideology was to be renounced in favor
of a close attention to the particular problem and its best
solution, the resolution of ends and means. In short, this was
the traditional utilitarian functionalism. Complex design is-
sues were dealt with by breaking down complex wholes into dis-
crete problems which were individually studied and then recom-
bined. The problem of the city became defined not in broad
ideological terms but as the investigation of its "four func-
tions" (living, working, recreation and circulation); the ele-
ments of modern design were listed by Le Corbusier not in
stylistic terms but as the concrete elements of the pilotis,
roof garden, etc.
But while the "research" was on particular and (as the
Modernists saw it) de-ideologized issues, the problems of the
industrial age' were common to all people and nations. The
solutions to particular problems should be, at least as an
ideal type, universally applicable in modern nations. The Mod-
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ernist's particularistic method was universalizing. Urban re-
search became defined in terms of such generalized issues as
the minimum adequate dwelling, the nature of collective form
and city districts, the fitting of object design to universa-
lized idustrial processes, and the like. Each particular pro-
ject was not only a design in itself, but a part of a larger
urban totality which circumstances did not allow to be immed-
iately constructed. In this totality, the Modernist method
attempted to unify art and.life, the hand and industrial pro-
cesses, the house and the city. The entire built world was a
continuum subject to a control and rationality through design,
in which each particular element was only a part. A number of
Le Corbusier's projects (including the Marseilles Block and
the Pavillion of the L'Esprit Nouveau) were only built frag-
ments of a projected continuous urban fabric.
.The Modernists saw themselves as connected with the seri-
ous- and deep problems and potentials of the industrial age. The
rewards of their efforts would be in the future. Creation is
a patient search (Le Corbusier) by many designers/urbanists
who, cooperating under the Modernist paradigm, would collec-
tively evolve the best solutions.
5) The Modernist visual vocabulary: A corollary
of the problem of method was the problem of generating a new
visual grammar and syntax. One of the failures of neo-classi-
cism was its classical visual vocabularyinadequate to the in-
dustrial age which for the Modernists (as well as- the earlier
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avant-garde) demanded its own appropriate visual expression.
An architectural "degree zero" point was reached which the ana-
lytic method was used to surpass.
Previous to Modernism, art existed as a world of a priori
rules to which art owed its dignity and substance as a separate
representational activity in opposition to productive processes.
The new Modernist vocabulary represented an integration of art
with production. The key to the integration was, in the artist
Kandinsky's termsa, the inner eye which penetrates behind the
hard shell of appearance to the very heart of things. The ana-
lytic method was used to reach behind the sharp boundary be-
tween appearance and reality (so characteristic of liberal so-
ciety) to separate the pure essence of visual appearance from
its manifest form. Through analysis, the fundamental forms of
which all manifest form is composed was to be reached.
The purified and abstract forms spoke of the universalized
and abstract bourgeois power, as the particularized classical
ornament represented the personification and individualization
of aristocratic power in the monarch. Similarly, the aristo-
cratic perspective which focussed vision on and from the indi-
vidual was transformed by the Modernists to the abstract Cu-
bist simultaneity of vision, in which space and form was ab-
stracted and perceived through time and movement. Wo/men
the subject of vision and form were eclipsed.
Modernism then felt itself equipped to deal with the
problems of liberalism through a rational methodology and
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a visual vocabulary appropriate to the machine age. These
tools.could overcome the failures of the environment, since it
was a lack of methodology, rationality and imagery which caused
the environmental crises which Modernism addressed. Design
then substitutes for political action. Totalizing design so-
lutions could integrate the disparate and fragmented cities,
through unifying the arts with industry, the hand with the mind,
social dissidents, with social order, the functions of the city,
wo/man with bhe potential of the industrial age.
6) Modernism Illustrated--the Voisin Plan: Per-
haps the most powerful.illustr-ation of the Modernist premises
was the 1925 Voisin Plan of Le Corbusier for Paris. In the
plan, the heart of Medieval Paris was to be ripped out and re-
placed by an enormous abstract organization of sixty-story
cruciform towers, set in a rigidly geometric rectilinear grid
of elevated expressways traversing a vast green space. The
tower in the park was Corbusier's attempt to reconcile the pro-
ductive demands of the city with the Utopian ideal of resi-
dence in the country, previously articulated in the physical
form of the Garden City and now brought to the metropolis and
made vertical. But while Le Corbusier appropriated the ideals
of .the Garden City, he inverted the essentially romantic con-
tent of that movement in his audaciously rationalist vision of
the new industrial city which concretized in a strong visual
formal organization the as-yet un-objectified organization of
corporate capitalism (as distinguished from the earlier indus-
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trial-city based on a laissez-faire capitalism). The Voisin
plan was a realization of Le Corbusier's general program of
rational planning and synoptic organization of the city as a
racro-unity of production, modeled on the organization and
social relations dictated by the giant corporations. The city
was a means of organizing society as an efficiently programmed
productive unity, an instrumant for controlling and reproduc-
ing the labor force. Architecture and planning would be the
means 'for adapting the masses, disinherited from their tradi-
tional social relations and the specificity and human scale of
the precapitalist environment, to the "new spirit" of the
"healthy" human and social organism of corporate capitalism.
But Corbusier's dream of the renaturalized man, existing in re-
lation to the sun and the wind and the trees in his-bureaucra-
tic tower pigeon hole contradicted the very human product which
capitalism demanded. The human subject of Corbusier's plan was
in fact the alienated and bureaucratized twentieth century wor-
ker.
Corbusier consistently ignored or misread the socio-
economic forces which creat.ed the problems he tried to address
and in doing so participated in the very reproduction of the
socio-economic organization which is responsible for the human
suffering which it was his intent to eradicate. This mis-
reading allowed him to promulgate totalistic solutions, the
image of the new modern city, which were then overlaid in toto
on the previous medieval-based city. He chose to "demolish
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the existing chaos or start afresh on a new site"' as Capital-
ism overlaid with equal radicalness the previous social order.
Parallel to the bureaucratic planners' adoption of Utop-
ian planning ideas, the Voisin plan adopted Garden City ideals
but did not and could not incorporate the Utopian critique of
liberal domination. The Utopian formal ideals were.adopted
while their content was denied. The Voisin plan was then per-
fect expression of advanced capitalist tendencies towards order
and centralized social control. It becnae the prototype in de-
sign and implementation for the urban redevelopment, central
city design and high-rise structures that particularly charac-
terized post-World War II design. Towers for the rich built
on urban renewal land as well as high-rise- ghettos derive from
the same model.
7) Modernist planning: The planning ideas of the
Modernists followed from their general intents and methodolo-
gies which took the problem of environmental design as a con-
tinuity from the scale of the chair to that of the city; the
smallest apartment was in some senses an exercise in urban de-
sign. Corbusier's Voisin plan represented one end of the Mod-
ernist spectrum: the ideal of the totally rationalized and in-
.tegrated city. The plan was of whole cloth, a radical alterna-
tive to the given apparent urban confusion and the early cap-
italist city. But the plan's strength as a coherent image was
also its weakness. Such a total scheme could only be imposed
by a centralized authority which controlled if not owned most
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urban land. This was clearly not the case even with growing
monopoly capitalism, so any planning schemes would have to
be implemented as phased, incremental projects within the
city. Hence the Modernists (particularly Gropius) defined a
taxonomic methodology of designing elements of the whole city,
and implementing the results as conditions permitted. Yet
this incrementalist approach was based on a primarily visual
culture, and the greatest urban whole which the modernists
could deal with was the district. As a sub-part of the whole
city, the district was to contain, as did the medieval quar-.
ters at a much smaller scale, institutions and facilities for
a limited number of people. The multiplication of districts
would comprise the city. This notion is also the essence of
many forms of neighborhood planning to date and is the physi-
cal designers' contribution to finding an intermediate physi-
cal unit between the city as a whole and the individual dwel-
ling. But the incrementalist planning was severely limited
in two senses: it required coordinated planning in a liberal
society which can accept such planning mechanisms only with
difficulty, and it assumed a givenness of place which later
city developments (e.g., transportation as a determinant of
city form, Melvin Webber's notion of the spaceless city, etc.)
would vitiate. Further, as the Modernists recognized, large
scale public ownership of land and effective planning legis-
lation is necessary for any large scale' planned physical re-
construction. Thus, the Modernists contributed little except
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a simplistic physical ideal to city planning.- Paradoxically,
the need they recognized for public land ownership and plan-
ning law is possible only in a society which is committed to
at least limiting capitalist domination. The Modernist archi-
tectural and planning principles were then most extensively
used in Britain and the Scandinavian countries, where some de-
gree of socialism and class equality had taken hold.
A critique of the Modern Movement: If
seen in the most generous (-and perhaps least historically spe-
cific) light, several aspects of the Modernist movement seemed
to hold some hope of resolving the professional crises the
Movement faced. Stated principles involved: at least a verbal
commitment to a rational functionalism; the derivation of
building form from the use it was to serve; the commitment to.
unifying the environment through a method which broke through
the stylistic paralysis of neo-classicism; the commitment to
collaborative and cumulative research on building problems;
the limitation of the designers' task to concrete problems
dealt with free of a pre-given ideology; the unification of
man, society and environment in a non-fragmented'whole environ-
ment; the claim (at least by Gropius) that architecture is
essentially built sociology,and some emphasis on social pro-
cesses; the attempt to find an architecture for all wo/men Inde-
pendent of class; and the identification of building and ob-
ject production.with the industrial processes which might yield
less expensive and more adequate facilities for everyman.
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Yet another reading of the Modernist text yields an en-
tirely different picture: the prime intent of the Modernists
was the creation of another architectural style which could
both save the architectural/planning profession from its neo-
classic impotence and provide a proper image for the machine
age.1  Corbusier made the connection between the engineering
efficiency of ships and locomotives and the visual efficiency
of the primary forms which he made the elements of the new
style (termed the "International Style"). For Modernism as a
style, the visual qualities of the newly-made "elementalist"
plastic vocabulary comprised a visual efficiency. This func-
tionalism was realized through the "arbitrary postulate that
there is an intuittye visual comprehension of' any- functional
or structural efficiency."2 Thus the functionalism and ra-
tionality of the International Style were only the appearance
of function rather than function itself. Well before the be-
ginning of the Modern Movement, Nineteenth century engineers
and the American Indians and colonists even earlier had been
truly functional builders.
For the American designer functionalism meant,
and still means, building as economically and as
technologically as possible, with minimum considera-
tion of personal or esthetic principles. To the dias-
' pora architects (the European architects who came to
America after Hitler overtook.Germany) functionalism
meant pure ideology, visualizing self-evident truths
of ethical, esthetic and social Weltanschauung. What
Germany admired most during the 1920's was pure
Kantian non-empirical idealism. 3
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That the Modernists? did not make any significant use
of new technology undermined their claim to functionalism.-
At the very moment of the early triumphant examples of Inter-
national Style architecture (e.g. Le Corbusier's house at
Garches, 1927) Buckminsoer Fuller designed an early pre-fab-
ricated demountable totally industrialized mast house which
made .the fullest use of the advanced technology of the day,
making the International Style architecture functionally and
technologically primitive by comparison.
Then a central part of the modernist practice was the
creation of the traditional architectural product: architec-
tural style which gave visual expression to the dominant ethos,
power and social relations of the society.
The legitimate achievements of Modernism, its increased
freedom of design response to: functional problems and the com-
mittment to analysis and research, were eclipsed by the.social
roles which Modernist architecture and planning were con-
strained to play. By the mid-1930's in Europe, Modernism be-
came the dominant htylistic influence in "high" architecture
and developed some basic building prototypes (notably the sky-
scraper). But Modernism failed to accomplish its central in-
tent of rationalizing the environment through planning and de-
sign. This failure was not the defect of style or method.
Rather, the failure was in Modernism's epiphenomenal relation-
ship to the central imperatives of capitalism, which created
the very fragmentation the Modernists attempted to rationalize.
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The Modernist legacy: The following elements of the :heory
and practice of the Modern Movement are among those which
strongly influence the internal professional organization -nd
self-representation of contemporary architectural and plarzing
practice.
1) The perpetuation of the neo-classicist crisis of :he
meaning and social role of architectural and planning prac:ice,
through the failure of the Modernists to comprehend through
their ideals, -programs, methodology, style, and practice their
true relation and meaning in society as servants of capitalist
interests.
2) The perpetuation of the separation of architecture--
and planning from construction and engineering, leaving the
designers at the edges of the societal processes, as irrele-
vant -as were the neo-classicists.
3) The belief that the architectural and planning pr--
fessions, within their own terms of practice and knowledge,
(though the professions may incorporate sociology, psycholzgy,
etc.) are capable of generating total solutions to the prob-
lems of built environments at all scales--the professional-
alone being able to make the essential determinations of stan-
dards and design. This notion was a severe misrepresentation
of the reality of sources of environmental decision-making and
as such simply perpetuated the pr'ofessions' marginal status.
4) The Modernist collapse of the critical and reflective
base of the Utopian movement into the domination of the given.
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The Utopians had, to some extent, provided an alternative
to architecture's traditional societal role in concretizing
dominant power interests but with the collapse of the impli-
cit Utopian critique architecture was confirmed as a herme-.
tic and self-defining practice of a visual culture.
5) The origin of the notion that with technology and
iethodology a new architectural or planning practice could be
a solution to the crisis of built environment and social re-
lations.
6) The decline of the Utopian tradition of comprehensive
social/physical solutions. This occurred after the Modernists
twholistic projects, such as the Voisin plan, were made impos-
sible to realize in encounter with political reality. The
subsequent adoption of a strategy of incrementalist reform
militated against any conception of ends in the presence of
incrementalist/instrumentalist means.
7) Art, in its alienation as a meaningful activity in
bourgeois society, remained one of the few arenas in which a
resolution of societal fragmentation and meaningless could be
achieved. The Modernists' attempt to unify art and production
(institutionalized in the Bauhaus, the first design school
teaching modernist principles and the prototype of contemp-
orary architectural/design education) collapsed the critical
potential of art into an alliance with industry. The tradi-
tional critical and expressive "use value" of art was totally
transformed in the service of commodity produdtion. A beau-
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tiful teapot or a beautiful building in.capitalist society
inevitably became "resemanticized".l Style no longer hd .a
primarily symbolic or aesthetic meaning, but became a major
visual utility in encouraging consumption.2
8) The establishment of the scientific epistemology
as a method of research and design. The Modernists estab-
lished the taxonomic process of separation of elements from
a whole as the basis for a rationality which could operate
only in the connection of means to given ends. Thus the
"minimum dwelling" was exhaustively researched through "ra-
tional" methods without questioning why such a dwelling is
necessary.
Conclusion: Modernism was the first major architectural/
planning movement which existed outside the traditional inte-
gral relationship between design and societal'power. Itself
a product of the capitalist social fragmentation, Modernism
attempted through its internal resources alone to create a
total reconstruction and de-alienation of its practice and the
environment. This project was based on the severe mystifica-
tion that confuses symptom for cause. It is not lack of ra-
tionality, technology or appropriate symbolism, but rather the
capitalist institutions which cause environmental fragmenta-
tion which a formally unified environment could not affect.
The failure of' the Modernist program shows that design cannot
be a substitute for political actions in reforming environmen-
tal or social relations.
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The Modernists, and to a great extent the designers who
followed them, -:re prisoners of their method, of their con-
ception of the real world. They were blinded to the source
of real utility in design, to the meaning of the environment as
an actor in social relations, to the meaning of art,. and to
the means of effective action in the world in relation to
power.
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POST-MODERNIST ARCHITECTURE
Introduction: On the collapse of.the International Style,
the practices of architecture and planning as a formal sym-
bolic project (as distinguished from the utilitarian engineer-
ing and planning which had been a continuous practice since
the origin of the industrial.towns) separated into more spe-
cialized and modest disciplines. Architects restricted them-
selves to building design independent of a larger conceptual
and urban context. The attempt to physically order the frag-
mented environment as a whole was given up, as was the criti-
cal Utopian project of creating an environment embodying new
more humanized social relations.
Architectural Mannerism: The hermetic visual and sym-
bolic content of the Modernists was absorbed by an elite
group of architects who, given the failure of utopian social
visions and a unitary architectural style, could only work
to develop individual architectural languages. Hence, the
leaders of this architectural culture (Mies, Saarinen, Kahn,
Rudolph, etc.) were mannerists working within the Modernists'
legitimation of the visual and symbolic as the architectural
project without retaining the Modernists' practice of relating
.design to some social vision. The elite architects worked
(and continue to work) within the small social space left in
each liberal generation to evolve ever-new fashions, non-
critical styles of architectural high culture from which the
rest of the body of architects pattern their own work. Man-
0
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nerist practice was legitimated by such architectural histor-
ians as Giedion and the early Scully. They portrayed architec-
ture as the working out of various idealized "spirits of the
age" (technology, space/time, architecture as the embodiment
of.the existential human act, etc.) rather than as a concrete
expression and servant of the interests of domination. The
architectural mystifications were then perpetuated through the
reification of architecture as an art form somehow independent
of, and commenting on the very forces which it served.
Architecture as an art form in a commodity culture
becomes. itself a commodity, not an independent critical sphere
of reflection and symbolization. The mannerists' hypostatiza-
tion of the architectural product as an individual object and
withdrawal from reflection on the social conditions of that
object's existence is analogous to the human beings in capital--
ist society. Made an object whose wholeness is fragmented, they
inhabit (like architectural and planning practice) the consum-
erist world of advanced capitalism, alienated from and largely
ignorant of the socio-economic imperatives which condition
them. The consumerism and object fetishism which mannerist
design represents are phenomenon of advanced capitalism which
both create markets for industrial growth and provide hypnotic
substitute gratifications for the lost community and self
implicit in capitalist organization.
Technological Utopianism: Parallel to the new mannerism
was the amalgamation of the nineteenth-century functionalist
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engineering tradition with a sort of utopian futurism. A
technological utopianism resulted--an attitude (held by Fuller,
Soleri, the metabolists, Archigram and others in various
forms) that serious urban and international-scale problems
-(resource scarcity, unequal resource distribution, growth,
overpopulation and even war) could be resolved through design
and the use of new technologies as well. as
in Fuller's case, the " comprehensive rational allocation of
physical resources. Technological utopians perpetuate the
fallacy of the belief in th'e primary power of design (in the
forms of fetishized object and technique) to solve serious
problems which, while defined as technical and functional, are
in fact consequences of the capitalist socio-economic system
itself. To be sure, some of the technological utopians hold
encompassing social visions, but these visions are individually-
developed constructions, reflecting with the Mannerists
the fragmentation of consensual meaning and practice. The
influence of these "new utopians" has been mainly ideological
and periferal to the dominant mannerist architectural
practice.
Contemporary approaches: -By the early 'sixties, the
Utopian claims that design had significant moral and cultural
relevance to the larger society was reduced to a mannerist
sectarianism whose practice was the production of consumption
commodities. A number of architects realized that architectural
as a cultural force and belief system had lost its meaning.
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A serious and self-conscious rethinking of the premises of
architectural practice.and theory was then undertaken from
a variety of viewpoints which will be briefly described and
critiqued in the following section. Such attention is impor-
tant, because while no particular approach has become a domi-
nant paradigm, each holds the attention of some of the "leading
edge" professionals, forming some part of present and future
professional consciousness and practice..While diverse in
content, the directions have in common a rea.ction to both the
failure of the Modernists and mannerists as well as thle
search for a new basis for valid design. The failures are the
taking of the social totality as unproblematic, and the belief
that the proper design and design rationality can unify envi-
ronmental fragmentation and create meaning out of the meaning-
lessness of the liberal social order.
Like those they supplant, these approaches fail because
of their misreading of social reality originating in the
professionals' separation from power in the early industrial
age.
The efforts. to find a new basis for design took two
general directions: 1) the project of recognizing existing
environmental meanings and creating new meanings in order
to reinstate architecture as a legitimated cultural system;
and 2) the attempt to create a non-visual functionality
through the rationalization of design.
1) The project of'recopnizing existing environmental
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meanings and creating new meanings:1 This project has been
explored in the a) effort to constitute a consciously urder-
stood- language of architectural meaning, and b) the effort
to make the meanings of everyday life the basis of a valid
architecture. The work of P'eter Eisenman and Robert Venturi'
will be examined as prime examples of these approaches.
a) The archi.tectural sem2.ntics and syntax of
Peter Eisenman: A few architects have become concerned with
reconstituting a meaning for architecture by understanding the
way that architectural forms in themselves participate in
creating meanings. This is accomplished through trying to
create a semantics and syntax of form through the use of
formal geometric schemes, the use of themes from architectural
history, and the making of architectural form analogue to
language structure through the use of semiotics, Chomskian and'
post-Chomskian linguistics, and structuralism. As a leading
example of the use of these approaches, some work of Peter
Eisenman will be presented and critiqued.
Eisenman creates a purely formal language with no meaning
referent other than the organization of the architectural
elements themselves and rationalized by his appropriation of
extra-architectural concepts. His efforts attempt to go to the
roots of pure architectural meaning, assuming that meaning in
a general sense can be reinstated and rediscovered for archi-
tecture solely through the internal relations of architectural
elements. It is paradoxical that Eisenman responds to the loss
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in .architectural meaning which arises from a growing aliena-
tion from and power in the world by becoming resolutely hermetic
in the attempt to find sources for meaning within the field
which has already failed him. Eisenman's work is another form
of the belief that loss of meaning in architecture can be
rectified through a (now consciously investigated) language
of design. Formal models such as Structuralism are only analo-
gies and not the reality from which all analogies derive.
Eisenman repeats the common contemporary assertion of modes of
thought as reality which already failed the Utopians, Tech-
nological Utopians and the Modernists. Eisenman looks for new
ways of percept-ion, of seeing the world, assuming that the
solution to the problem of meaning lies in seeing the world
in terms of new homologous structures, an analogical system.
This project is a form of reification--the~ concrete
content of the world, its reality as lived and the socio-
economic relations through which men and women perceive and
define their everyday life -and its meaning are reduced to
non-specific and a-historical abstractions. Analogical concep-
tual models are developed as ways of mapping the world inde-
pendently of its specific socio-historic context and of the
class and power relations among people which determine that
content. Practice is then defined as a mode of thought. The
locus of action is discovered in a universalized abstraction
which is then realized as a commodity of consumption. Habita-
tion in some of Eisenman's work is secondary. The architectural
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project no longer has use value as a home. It is not even a
"machine for living" but an objectified abstraction, a concre-
tized mode of thought.
b) Robert Venturi's Las Vegas: If Eisenman takes
architecture as a hermetic text to be decoded and interpreted
in built form, Robert Venturi reads the architecture of .every-
day life as a cultural document exhibiting the manifest pre-
ferences of consumers in a democratic society. Meaningful
architecture for Venturi is not to be discovered in the realm
of aesthetic abstractions but in the commercial vernacular
of the roadside strip. Venturi implicitly suggest that the
crisis in architecture is merely a consequence of its elitist
separation from the ordinary environment and its illegitimate
and aristocratic assumption of the mantle of high art. The
solution then, the source of meaning in architecture, is what
Venturi reads as the unitary or consensual meaning of pluralist
democracy as manifested in the "undesigned" environment.
"Main street is almost allright". Meaning is not to be found
separate from what we perceive. Essence and appearance coin-
cide in the objective manifestation of built form. The ideal
is collapsed to the real. Value judgements have no reference
in the contest of the given. Venturi, like -Mies, presumes not
to pass judgement on his era. Rather, he points to what he
finds in the built environment and states that it is neither
good no bad, but that it exists - by definition, what he finds
is our contemporary meaning. Yet ironically, Venturi's concern
209
with "pop" culture is another version of high art - a highly
self-conscious and mannerist contortion of vernacular architec-
ture.. His concern is in fact the revitalization of meaning
in high architecture through appropriating the content of
contemporary popular culture - his definition of our present
ethos - as the "new industrial age" was the contemporary
ethos for Corbu and the International Style. Corbusier and
Venturi differ in that the earlier capital accumulation phase
of capitalism which was Corbu's content has by Venturi's time
become a commodity-consumption economy. The severity of the
classic Modernist forms, refllecting the scarcity mentality
of capitalist accumulation, is succeeded by the Las Vegas for-
mal flamboyance of commodity waste.
In effect, Venturi participates in the reproduction of the
commodity culture through his fetishization of market relations
of exchange within an architectural program. He ignores the
mediation of capitalist social relations and institutional
constraints which determine the consumer preferences which he
implicitly takes as innate or as exogenous to the contemporary
capitalist mode of production. That is, Venturi suggests that
the people do want the world we see. He neglects the funda--
mental social relations and institutions which mediate between
some given notion of human wants and needs, and their presumed
direct objectification in the perceived man-made world. But
in a dialectic materialist view, objective preferences are not
-innate, nor are .they independent of the mode of production.
They are in fact specific to socio-historic circumstanc
in turn is defined essentially by the social relations or.
production in terms of class and power.'
In making his work a manifesto for the creation of a new
- style.of high art, Venturi's "pop art" continues the insular
tradition of the culture of architecture. In this tradition,
the architect/planner takes his program from some perceived
social context which is misread and finally ignored. Venturi,
like Corbu, does not speak of objective conditions but only
of their epiphenomenal manifestations, whether they be the
roadside strip and the television antenna or the organization
of the machine-'age city and the steamship. This level of
understanding fails in taking the world as given, in terms of.
its images, and making the images the basis of practice.
2) Non-visual functionality through the rationaliza-
tion.of design: Such efforts as Eisenman's and Venturi's
were pitifully inadequate to deal with the environmental and
social problems which attained enough urgency to be concep-
tualized.as the "urban crisis": housing, transportation, the
destruction of the ecological balance, of privacy, of community,
and the like. Two prominent architectural responses to the
continuing urban and professional crises emerged as a) the
conceptualizing of the design product as a process, and b) the
study of man-environment relations.
a) The design prcduct as a process: Like a rerun
of the state of the neo-classical architects, their modern
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descerldents "could not offer any solution. Their answers were
always 'inadequate', 'unrealistic', 'irrelevant', dominated
by the superstitions, the taboos and the obsessions of the
vi-sual order."1 As the architects' visual rationality/
functionality had failed in terms of contemporary problems,
a non-visual and at times non-spatial rationality and scienti-
ficization of design was proposed. This approach took the
urban crises and the crises of the design professions as the
result of inappropriate methodology and a lack of true
rationality in the design process. Environmental design was-
then redefined as "a multi-dimensional organization described
in terms of exclusively empirical and rational theories."2
The priority of design as a visual ordering which only inci-
dentally contained processes was reversed to a concern with the
processes contained in space. 3
In Community and Privacy by Chermayeff and Alexander, the
design product was no longer seen as a building: rather, the
design product"is an interacting pattern of building and
activities, a complex of physical fabric and its use." These
interactions are. so complex that they tax the designers
cognitive capacity beyond its limits. Therefore a better and
stronger logic is necessary. A number of architectural and
ylanning techniques were then used sometimes with computer aid
in the mathematical formulation o"' basic urban and social
processes. -Yet the environmental crises were not resolved. The
new process rationalism suffered the same fate as visual
rationality. The apparent irrational environmental fragmen-
tation of liberal society stems from a rationality of capital-
ist 'imperatives of a different order than the visual or
process variety which are under designers' control.
b) Man-environment relations: Besides the ration-
alization of design, visual rationality was also reversed in
the study of the psychological/behavioral relations of man
and environment through environmental psychology and sociology.
This effort does not answer the substance of the previous cri-
ticisms of Eisenman, Venturi, or the process rationalists.
But it has decisively moved away from the limitations of the
insular architectural cultural system to focus on the human
being as subject. Primary concepts used are "human needs" in
interaction with the "environment" . It is the misfit -between
the two, born of the lack of scientific knowledge of their
relationship, which is posited as the source of the failure
of meaning in architecture and planning. The problem, then,
is posed in terms of the lack of psychological and sociological
knowledge which it is the project of theory and research to
provide.
"Man-environment relations" is no different than Venturi
or Le Corbusier in accepting the culturally-given world as
unproblematic, excepting the perception of misfits between the
environmental and human poles of that world. As such, this
field does not possess a critical base. The solution, rather
than being aesthetic, is now essentially technical and dependent
on psychological and sociological knowledge translated into 213
design, which is still maintained as.the solution to human
needs. This construct does not countenance that"human needs"
themselves are, as defined in man-environment relations, his-
torically and culturally constituted. Neither does the con-
struct distinguish between fundamental and culturally-gener-
ated needs. The problem which man-environment relations per-
ceives is generated not by an environmental misfit but by a
fundamental contradiction between objective needs of the self
(previous to and not generated by the consumer society) and
the alienating social order. Any increase in psychological
knowledge will not resolve the "misfit" without being linked
to the realization that it is power and not knowledge which
is the more fundamental force moving society. Knowledge of
the psychological sources of the misfit will not mean power
in society to rectify that misfit without regard, understanding
and acting on the structural contradictions of advanced
capitalism. Thus, while breaking out of the more narrow aesthe-
tic culture of architecture, man-environmental relations per-
petuates the fallacy that a design solution to the failure of
meaning in architecture and planning is possible 'independent
of dealing with the fundamental societal contradictions which
generated that failure.
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CITY PLANNING IN AMERICA -
Introduction: The early history of American city planning
parallels the European responses to the problems of the indus-
trial city. Private benefactors first dealt with such issues
as housing, sanitation and poverty; local governments then es-
tablished the legal framework for the city planning function.
But, particularly in terms of Europe's greater political and
economic socialization, American capitalism and social relations
took distinct forms which created a unique context for American
planning. This section is therefore devoted to the history of
specifically American planning.
The Utopian and Baroque traditions played some role in
providing physical and administrative models for planning prac-
tice (e.g. the Utopian garden cities and Baroque-influenced
comprehensive designs in L'Enfant's Washington, D.C. and Burn-
ham's and Bennett's Chicago plans). But the essence of Ameri-
can planning history is the growing alliance of planners and
government as an element of the integration of state and pri-
vate interests into what is termed in the thesis the "state-
capital planning system." The following section describes and
critiques the evolution of this alliance from the pre-govern-
mental stage, zoning, the city planning commission and compre-
hensive planning through the Federal housing programs, incre-
mental planning, and finally the advocacy movements. Each of
these movements was developed in response to the inadequacy of
preceding planning practice to rationalize the environment.
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Each movement will be shown to merely perpetuate the problems
it tried to "solve" through an abstract and inadequate under-
standing of the causes of urban fragmentation and unjust allo-
cation of resources.
The stimulus to city planning in America: The discussion
starts with the three characteristics of the Ame'rican industrial
city which led to the development of city planning.
1) Like its earlier European counterparts, the
Nineteenth-century American city was a factory camp, a
machine for the production and capital accumulation whose
elements, (excepting the ruling-class housing and public cer-
emonial structures) conformed to strict criteria of economic
efficiency - the least expended for the maximum productive
return. Hence, disease, poverty, slums, pollution and unre-
strained and destructive competition between capitalists was
rampant. But at a certain point, these symptoms worked -
against profitable exploitation and required some form of
ameliorative action.
2) The great influx of immigrant populations
necessary to man the factories gradually gained control of
city politics, Thus the previous White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant
capitalist regemes were forced out of their political domin-
ance.
3) The newer emigrants became economic competitors
.of the WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) capitalists in the
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building and ownership of slum property. Given the rampant
exploitation of slum housing, property values and fiscal
return became uncertain. Landowners therefore needed protec-
tion against the early free-market exploitation.
The ruling classes then moved to reinstate political,
economic, and ultimately social control through the creation
of a new set of public institutions which a) stabilized th6
land market for upper-class benefit through zoning and com-
prehensive planning; b) circumvented ethnic control of urban
land and related politics through the establishment of plan-
ning boards; and c) created public markets for private
capital as well as socialized-.the costs of private capital
through such programs as subsidized housing and transporta-
tion.
These responses then were essentially instruments of
class conflict through which the dominating classes estab-
lished a new political, economic and legal framework at all
levels of governance to both control city growth and out-
flank newcomers who wanted to play the urban exploitation
game.. The following discussion treats the developmental
stages of American planning primarily in terms of its service
of class domination.
Early .planning: Before the 1920's, city planning was
for the most part carried out by private benefactors and
civic improvement associations run by local business inter-
ests. The "city beautiful" and "city efficient" movements as
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well as the reformers of housing and poverty and sanitation
were motivated by a mixture of moral repugnance at the con-
ditions of poverty, a realization that some rationalization
of the city processes was necessary to maintain and generate
profits, and the need to establish ruling class control over
urban life. Distinctly missing in these early movements was
any realization of the origin of poverty, disease and poor
squalid housing. In class domination the Utopian critique had
vanished, replaced by an understanding of urban problems
through moral and technical analyses which led to the techni-
cal and legalistic resolutions of sanitary regulations, buil-
ding and zoning codes--the Utopian legacy of the efficacy of
ordered environment as a moral force united with a legalistic/
bureaucratic approach to urban problems.
Zoning: Zoning was one of the earliest legal instruments
for controlling urban development, and became the single most
important tool in the planners' kit for many years. While it
may appear to counter individual interests, zoning in fact
stablized and increased property values.
The real object of promoting the general welfare
by zoning ordinances is to protect the private use
and enjoyment of property and to promote the welfare
of the individual property owner. In other words,.
- promoting the general welfare is a means of protecting
private property. 1
Most state enabling legislation for local zoning regula-
tions included a requirement that zoning be articulated in
terms of a comprehensive plan. Some private firms, notably
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that of Harland Bartholomew, developed a large and extensive
practice as a result of these regulations, but the effedt of
those comprehensive plans which were actually drawn up was
generally slight. Zoning became an end in itself subject to
the local particular interests of time and place; any land use
conflicts not settled by zoning boards were usually resolved
in the courts. In effect, land use planning, to the extent
that it existed at all, was largely performed by non-planners
-- sanitary and civil engineers, local businessmen, zoning law-
yers, and judges who served the interests of real estate firms
and middle and upper class property owners.
The city planning commission and comprehensive planning:
The next stage in the institutionalization of planning came
under the Hoover Administration: the preparation of two docu-
ments--the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1924 and the
Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928, which suggested
the legal nomenclature for states to give their cities the
right to zone and plan.
While the Zoning Act only formalized existing legal tech-
nique, the city planning document marked a new step: a call for
local appointive city planning commissions to prepare a plan
which would guide and accomplish a coordinated, adjusted and
harmonious development of the municipality and its environs
which will, in-accordance with present and future needs, best
promote health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity,
and general welfare as well as efficiency and economy in the
process of development.
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The city planning document marked in several respects a
very significant step in the development of the planning func-
tion and profession:
1) Political/economic imoact: The planning com-
mission was established by WASP capitalists to regain political
and economic hegemony threatened by the immigrants. Through
its deliberately depoliticizdd non-elective structure, the com-
mission could make public policy decisions essential to capit-
alist interests (sucn as land use and capital investment) inde-
pendent of a political constituency. The commission was an
instrument of capitalist control of the city level which pre-
saged later depoliticization on state and then federal levels.
2) Professional impact: The commissions established
the parameters for the practice of the American planning pro-
fession, whose organization, the American Institute of Planners,
was established in 1917. The role of the commission and the
planner working under commission authority was to work for the
generalized (and abstract) "public good", independent of the
"evil .influences" of "venal" city hall machine politics (but
responsible to the particularized interests of the planning
commission). Thus, the planner was defined as working above
politics and particular interests, while his legally-defined
position was created to serve partial interests. The planners'
tools became those which served given interests, so planning
epistemology naturally became instrumental rationality which
fits means to pre-given ends.
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3) The impact of the comprehensive plan: The Hoover
guide mandated the planners' product as a comprehensive plan of
a set of complexly interrelated urban functions, neatly sepa.-
rated in space, and prescribed by rigid physical and legal re-
strictions. The plan reflected a belief in the moral efficacy
of built form, a belief in the power of legal and "rational"
controls over the city's anarchy, and a concern for prosperity.
In short, the plan was a version of the Erotestant reconcilia-
tion of morality with gain, an instrument abstractly defined
through exclusively legal and technical measures as a to.talis-
tic plan which nonetheless did not deal with the human and
political realities which were the plans' true subjects. The
abstrac.tion of the plan derived in part from the planners' non-
involvement and the commissions' insulation from the politics
of the city. Yet this insulation was a significant factor in
the planners' failure to achieve the comprehensiveness the
Hoover guide intended. Planners, in their separation from pol.i-
cies, were at a disadvantage in playing the city game and were
unable to become a significant force in city ordering. The
real control of city forces, in spite of planners' ministra-
tions, continued to remain With market preference.s and short-
range advantage. Constrained politically and economically, the
city planner had to practice as an incrementalist technician
while defined as a comprehensive urbanist. His rationality,
defined in the two dimensions of the plan,. was taken as a value
in itself. As. the urban problems were defined as only techni--
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cal, so were the means for their resolution. Questions of
meaning and of social relations were obviated by the planners'
very charge to see the city as an abstract totality in which
competing interests and human meaning were lost through the
abstract technical filter..
Urban planning as an element of the state-capital planning
system: American city planning history until the Depression
largely took place in a climate in which the state and the
planning function had a relatively minor impact on the opera-
tion of capital enterprise, and the social order. But the pre-
Depression reconciliation of the contradictory needs of stabil-
ity and growth broke down with both economic collapse and labor
conflict. Major state intervention ("state" refers to partic-
ularly the federal governmental level) originated at this point.
Pressured by organized masses, the state functioned
as mediator in daily conflicts working out certain.com-
promises. As a non-organized group, libertarian (or now
conservative) American capitalists responded with a wave
of anti-interventionism (anti-dirigism). But the techno-
ogical innovations, the increase in production, the con-
centration and centralization of capital and the strong
organization of the working classes generates a permanent
fear among capitalists of a 'general crisis' and the end
of capitalism. In the absence of any automatic guarantee
of order, stability and it-s maintenan'ce becomes the major
concern of the state apparatus and capitalists, resulting
finally 1'n the United States in a collaboration--organized
monopoly capitalism. Factories and whole industries con-
solidated into large corporations, trusts and monopolies
in order to reduce personal risks, price competition, and
other high insecurities while maintaining economic con-
tinuity and high rates of profit. 1,2
The relation between capitalists and the state was trans-
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formed with increasing monopolization, the concern for a stable
political and economic climate, and the increasing need for
capital (for research and development, profit subsidies, the
establishment of transportation and utilities infrastructures
beyond the means of any single corporation, etc.). The state,
along with science and technology, became a major and integral
partner of capitalism in (what is termed in this thesis) the
state-capital planning system. This system overcame the early
liberal American antipathy towards centralized control.
Long and short-range planning, which is essential
for effective intervention, becomes the most important
element fo.r governing the political and economic pro-
cesses with their continual changes and expansions, and
for maintaining the power of the state and the profits
of private capital...the state (took) action to inter-
vene and indirectly control the desperately needed sta-
bilization and maintenance of the economic cycle.
The functional goals (of the planning system) are:
to provide for the regulated, organized market conditions;
to implement long- and short- range programs for the ab-
sorption of surplus capital while maintaining the exist-
ing class structure and the finance aristocracy; to pro-
vide conditions for stable economic growth; to encourage
the development of system-adapted planning partners; and
to take action against every appearing crisis or reces-
sion with all available means--including armed interven-
tion in foreign countries.
The ideological goals' of state-capital planning are:
to provide a psychological rationalization for the new
economic order; to avoid any kind of open conflicts; to
provide for the maintenan'ce of the bourgeois-democratic
value system and the existing class structure. 1
Instrumental science now became the most important factor
in production. Social control, the control of vast productive
human and material resources, and the continual development of
technologies, were an integral part of capitalist stability
Instrumental'rationality and planning became theand growth.
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dominant form of knowledge and consciousness of monopoly capi-
talist society. The means of control were no longer face-to-
face intersubjective human relations, but the technocracy, ex-
perts. in instrumental rational techniques who serve capitalist
imperatives. The planners took their role definition and con-
sciousness from their function. Democratic participatory de-
cision making was of course proscribed, for society was essen-
tially a totalized productive machine into which human beings
were fit. What democratic determination of public policy did
exist in America disintegrated into democratic myths of ideo-
logical "secondary arguments" taken from the "treasure box of
the democratic value system," 1 to obscure the actual concentra-
tions of power which inevitably depoliticized popular control.
The human implications of the resultant monopoly capital-
ism and depoliticization are appalling. To touch on but one
area, the problem of self:
The philosopher and psychoanalyst R.D. Laing states
that in order to maintain the atrocities of the modern
capitalist world, it is necessary for men to destroy
their capacity to see clearly what is around them and
hide from the horrors which they commit and are forced
to commit.' The ease with which people can delude them-
selves about the true character of the world comes from
the split between the inner and an outer self.
The.inner self of a 'normal person is usually
greatly concealed even from himself--and is seen only
imagination, fantasy and dreams. The outer self, which
Laing calls the 'false self sy.stem', is the person's
active personality. People's actions in the outer world
are for the most part mechanical and so they do not feel
a need to attach or destroy an alien reality within
themselves. The person's well-exercised social person-
ality engulfs his total system and so he loses his criti-
cal potentiality. True possibilities for-him to spon-
taneously manifest in action a persona4 definition of
whom or what he wishes to be cease to exist. 2
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The state-industrial planning system has become the na-
tion's largest and most powerful planning agency. Its p'ower
derives from the unity of planning with the state-industrial
political and economic interests.. Any sort of planning which
runs counter to the direct instrumental interests of capital
as represented in the planning system becomes severed from
power. Such "counter-planning" is therefore in a crisis of
legitimation and survival whose resolution must lie in consid-
ering the total planning system and the interests it serves,
as well as the particular reasoning for using planning as a
tool. The use of urban and social planning as a basis for
making urban-related decisions, as opposed to political or
market decision-making mechanisms depends on at least two fac-
tors: the attractiveness of capital investment in such spe-
cific urban commodities as housing and land (the city is just
one more arena for potential profit); and the relative effec-
tiveness of planning, political or market decision-making in
guaranteeing stability and profits.
Another element in the choice to use planning is the his-
torically changing scale of capital investment. In early cap-
italism, the city was the major'locus of investment. With in-
creasing centralization and monopolization,capitalists have
turned to the regional, national and now international scale,
leaving the smaller petit-bourgeois capitalist to control the
vacated areas of investment and control. The significantly
powerful levels of planning have correspondingly shifted from
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the urban scale upward.
Federal housing programs: The involvement of urban plan-
ners with the federal intervention in private enterprise was
in the federal housing programs. Previous to the 1930's, pri-
vate developers were primarily responsible for housing construc-
tion. But during the Depression, Federal funds became the only
source of capital; government housing programs and the FHA were
then established, both of which were geared to maintaining the
economy and supporting real estate interests. With the legi-
timation of government intervention in the here6ofor private
realm, the housing movement then turned to the advocacy of
public subsidy and the production of low-cost housing which was
not initially advantageous to developers of FHA mid- and upper-
income housing. But paralleling the operation of the private
housing sector, Federal intervention did not pose the problem
of providing adequate housing in terms of the institutional
structure of liberal society. Rather, the problem was seen as
merely an issue of technical adjustments resolvable within the
context of public policy. The extent that the housing move-
ment has been successful in winning actual production of low-
cost housing since the passage of the Housing Act of 1937 is a
consequence of a coalition with various private interests who
discovered that public subsidy housing could be profitable.2
With the passage of the Housing Act of 1949, housing in-
terests were joined with the longstanding professional ideo-
logy of comprehensive planning. This legislation gave explicit
recognition to the fact that housing is a problem of the urban
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environment as a whole. As such, any solutions to the housing
problem must be posed in terms of the whole spatial fabric of
the city. The Act was a strong stimulant to the planning pro-
fession. It required a comprehensive plan, and in the amend-
ments of the Housing Act of 1954 required a "Workable Program"
for slum clearance and urban renewal, including the provision
(Section 701) of government funds for planning. The long
years of professional agitation for comprehensive planning were
now legitimized, sanctioned and funded as national policy. Of
course, there was very little net addition to the low income
housing stock as a result of the housing programs1 nor was
there much effective comprehensive planning. Slum clearance
merely established new slums elsewhere in the city. Urban re-
newal was taken over by downtown business interests, produc-
ing some magnificent skylines and civic centers and a large
private and public profit, but no solution to social problems
and urban squalor. What the federal housing programs did ac-
complish, coupled with an extensive highway building program,
was the vast extension of the traditional city territory into
the suburbs thr6ugh housing loan and loan insurance programs
to middle and upper income citizens. These programs created
a vast housing industry and profit potential as well as the
rapid spread of uncontrolled suburban development. Most impor-
tantly for capitalism the prograns produced a housing commodity
-with attendent services which would involve the money of great
numbers of people for long periods of time (twenty and forty-
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mortgages were common) feeding, by contract, the capitalist
accumulation mill.
Incremental value-free planning: Ironically, it was at
the apotheosis of comprehensive planning that the theorists of
city planning began to doubt its efficiency. Martin Meyerson,
in an influential article in the Journal of the American In-
stitute of Planners in the late 'fifties, noted that the theo-
retical long-range plan was inevitably never realized, and that
city planning actually practiced in the short range of immed-
iate concerns. Meyerson suggested that planners accept and
involve themselves with the real world of market forces which
are the ultimate determinants of urban growth. However, he
suggested that planners still had an important function in
building what he called the "middle-range bridge" in program-
ming municipal capital budgeting in a free market economy.
It was the function of the planner to prepare an analysis and
presentation of alternative policies for the allocation of
municipal resources. The planners' role, then, was to lay out
a decision matrix for elected officials who presumably embodied
and articulated the goals of the elctorate. Implicit in this
idea of planning is the notion of the planner as a value-free
i-echnician defining specific problems and alternative techni-
cal solutions over time. Meyerson proclaimed the end of com-
prehensive planhing and its implicit utopianism. The world
must be taken as given. Reality is only a nonproblematic
positive fact rather than a socio-economic construct to be ana-
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lyzed. and explained.
With the increased social concern of the 1960's, the range
of social problems was perceived to include more than housing
and spatial disorder. City planners, as the comprehensive ur-
banists, re-examined the definition of their profession as the
rational ordering of land uses in a physical plan. The Wetmore
Report to the American Institute of Planners in 1964, recogniz-
ing that poverty is a multi-faceted problem with which planners
should be concerned, recommended that city planning must not
simply concern itself with land use. Rather, planning must em-
phasize the interrelationships of social, economic, and politi-
cal forces which constitute urban activity and urban life as a
whole. As spatial relations were downgraded, the new socially-
oriented city planning was defined in terms of social and poli-
cy planning. The Wetmore Report established the legitimacy of
social and economic planning within the profession. While the
ordering of spatial relations was by no means to be ignored,
planning now took as its major province of activity the alloca-
tion of s'ocietal resources of which land use planning was an
integral, though perhaps minor, aspect.
Contemporary planning, then, recognizes the social, poli-
tical and economic matrix of the city and its problems. But
these problems, and the array of alternative solutions, are
not posed in structural terms but are defined as localized and
technical malfunctions or maladaptions of some evolving and
basically benevolent "post-industrial service society". Dahl
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and Lindblom, in an enoronbusly influential book published in
1953 (Politics Economics and Welfare), can be taken as the
major theorists of the ensuing pervasive ideology of technical
rationality and incremental "problem-solving".manifested in
most contemporary planning theory and practice.
The possibilities for rational social action,
for planning, for reform--in short, for solving
problems--depend not upon our choice among mythi-
cal grand alternatives but largely upon choice
among particular social techniques, 1 -
Fundamental yroblems of socio-economic organization, with
their political implications, are reduced to discrete problems
isolated from that socio-economic base. For Dahl and Lindblom,
the only "pertinent questions turn on particular techniques."2
The general requirements of any system of social control de-
volve upon the more particular requirements of political-eco-
nomic control which in turn are reduced to prerequisite tech-
niques. "Planning is an attempt at rationally calculated
action to achieve a goal."3 Goals in a pluralist democracy
are presumed to be articulated and determined through the
voting process, in the election of responsive and responsible
public officials. Beyond the establishment of social goals,
"the analysis of prerequisites is a scientific, not a moral,
Inquiry." This is the solution of technocrats, who, by de-
finition, are technicians taking values determined by others
and applying the most efficient means to those value-ends
through scientific "value-neutral" methodology. Technocratic
attitudes toward planning practice are clearly manifest in
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such planning methods as statistical decision theory, systems
analysis and simulation modeling and cost-benefit analysis.
All of these techniques may be generally characterized as "sys-
tematic think for social action.".
Bertram Gross, suggesting that the social revolution has
already taken place in the transformation of advanced indus-
trialization into the first service society, views the social
conflict of the 'sixties as only a political maladjustment to
this "revolution". He states that "the forging of tools for
description, measurement and prediction is the most basic
challenge confronting social scientists and planners who choose
to deal with societal change."
A more comprehensive elaboration of planning in these
terms has been developed by Herbert Gans:
By planning, I mean a method and process of decision-
making which includes the proper formulation of problems
which the city needs to solve (or of the goals it wishes
to achieve); the determination of the causes of these
problems; and the formulation of those policies, action
programs, and decisions which will deal with the causes
to solve the problem, and will do so democratically with-
out undesirable financial, political, social or other
consequences. 2
Again, Gans takes the existing order for granted as non-
problematic and not relevant to' the planners' concerns:
In order to deal with their crucial problems, the-
cities will need not physical plans or comprehensive
plans but plans that deal with specific problems and
their causes and that result in policies, or policy
guidelines, action programs. 3
Implicit to this argument is that the causes of urban prob-
lems will be found to be specific to cities themselves and not
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inherent in the socio-economic structure.
Critiue of incremental and comprehensive planning: Incre-
mental and comprehensive planning share an abstraction from the
forces generating the fragmented reality which planners try to
order.
Incrementalist practice is based on the Positivist assump-
tion that it is impossible to understand or operate either ana-
lytically or predictively on the social totality. Reality ap-
pears to pose a series of discrete problems which derive from
apparent immediate causes. The incrementalists then abstract
their definition of planning problems from the totality from
which they derive and participate. If knowledge proves its
truth in its application in the real world (a position common
to Marx and the Pragmatists), the incrementalists reading of
social reality has proved to be false in light of their failure
to rationalize urban decision-making.
The particular failure of the comprehensive planners is
their assumption of reality as an abstract totality which gains
its comprehensiveness precisely to the degree that it withdraws
and abstracts from the reality of everyday life. Law and tax-
onomic physical planning are then taken as adequate to order
that complex reality.
This critique has been of the abstract epistemology which
in part defines the comprehensive and incrementalist movements.
The abstraction is the result, as is bureaucratic organization
itself, of the mystification of the specificity of class inter-
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est through the abstract guise of a universalized epistemology,
ideology, and practice. The gap between the mystification and
the reality of private interests must have been apparent to the
framers of such documents as the Stahdard City Planning En-
abling Act of 1928, the FHA, and other instruments of class
domination. But the planning profession took their definition
in the mystification--planning became the exercise of technical
rationality in the service of efficient and "just" allocation of
"scarce"' resources.. The ends of practice were determined by
the client and/or the subject of planning, but not the planners.
The placing of the locus of value outside of the profession con-
tradicts the planner's claim to be a professional. For is it
not the very definition and history of the professional to exist
outside (at least to a degree) the claims of market concerns to
stand for some notion of- human values vis-a-vis the market and
the state? The planner's abdication of responsibility for
asserting value then places him, to that extent, in the role of
pure technocrat. In pretending to deal with
problems of resource allocation, planners effectively serve only
to legitimate the existing allocation of societal resources.
(A crucial indication of this statement is that the absolute
gap during American history between the power and wealth of the
ruling and dominated classes has been constant or widening, in
spite of planners' ministrations and the general increase in
absolute wealth over time in this context.) Planning essentially
has no content ; the allocation is essentially pre-given, based
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on class and power relationships. Claiming that the profes-
sional task is only to devise alternative ans to achidve ex-
ternally-given goals, planners define themselves in'their
methodology as purely instrumental. Society is seen as a
mechanically-functioning natural order, with the planner keep-
ing the machine in tune, rationally. By reducing basic socio-
political concerns to discrete technical problems requiring
technical expertise, planning serves to depoliticize basic
class conflicts over the allocation of societal resources.
The planning profession inevitably serves the interests of the
dominant class through the management of resources, since the
social goals to which planning responds are determined within
the constraints of the existing socio-economic systems. Con-
sequently, they reflect the dominant power of the ruling class.
The planners' presupposition of technical rationality and value
neutrality is fraudulent--pure ideologymasking by its apparent
rationality the fundamental irrationality of the interests it
serves. As Daniel Moynihan observes,
Urban policy must have as its first goal the
transformation of the urban lower class into a stable
community...(l) and social peace is the primary ob-
jective of social policy. 2
The planning profession is characteriaed by two pervasive
failures:
a) The fai-lure to realize its stated professional ideals
of extending its particular forms of rationalism and methodology
as societal norms in dealing with the social and physical en-
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vironnient. This has been a failure of professinnal effective-
ness. The substantial political and economic imperatives
which condition and relegate planning as useful only. when other
market or non-market methods of securing profit and power are
not effective. The federal planning mechanisms originated only
when private capital could not finance its own operation during
the Depression. One study no'tes that at present, "land is now
being allocated through political conflicts rather than by a
market to whose operations all groups could consent,"1 or by
any planning process.
b) The Profession's failure to realize its function in
seriring the interests of domination: Given the misreading of
its real utility in rationalizing capitalist interests, the
profession has represented itself as a practice generally above
special interests, working toward the "general good." This
self-misrepresentation, a false professional consciousness,
(I would claim) is a major barrier to the possibility of plan-
ning's contribution towards the creation of a truly public
good.
Advocate planning: The professional failures have been
realized by the advocate planners. In the last several years,
a number of professionals realized that the practice of archi-
tecture and planning had been inextricably linked to the values
of the dominant interests. A solely aesthetic or technical
conception of the professional task was a deceptive myth which
legitimated practice which served the interests of class domin-
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ation. Such professionals came to see that people are the
true subject and source of moaning in their practice. The
professional task was redefined as the process and product
of forming a physical and social environment which at minimum
does not contribute to any form of domination, and at best can
contribute to human liberation. This is a project not of
forming yet another aesthetic style, intellectual construct,
or problem-solving technique, but of finding liberative forms
of professional practice in the world of everyday life.
An early form of this new project developed in the mid
and late 'sixties as the advocacy movement. Advocacy assumes
the pluralist model of democracy, in which the allocation of
. societal resources is determined not by class domination but
in the political market place of competing interest groups.
It was assumed that the urban poor had not been able to effec-
tively compete in the decision-making process simply because
they were not professionally represented in' the realm of power
where decisions concerning societal resources are made. Power
was seen to be transferable from one interest group to another
through democratic means. The "voice of the people" would be
heard if articulated in the .technical discourse of architec-
tural and planning professionals.
The advocates assumed that the translation of their com-
munity clients' interests into the technical and problem-
oriented realm of the decision field would engender effective
representation in the process of allocation. to the extent
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that technique is knowledge, and knowledge Is power, technique
in the interests of the poor would enable their effective par-
ticipation in the decision making process with the advocate
architect/planner sitting at the table.
Like their professional colleagues downtown, advocates.
believed that technique and knowledge (the domain of profes-
sionals) could activate societal change, While actively par-
ticipating in the political process (in itself a major concep-
tual'breakthrough for planners and architects), advocates ef-
fectively practiced within the same constraints of technical
rationality which define the profession as a whole. The cli-
ents may have been new to the profession, but professional
practice was essentially the same. As it turned out, the ad-
vocates were unsuccessfal in initiating programs themselves.
The best they and their community clients could do was to re-
sist the initiatives of the dominant interests. The advocacy
movement was important, however, in providing a field of action
and a model of meaning for architects and planners (as well as
their community clients) who recognized the interest base of
their practice and thus chose sides and acted with and for
their clients in the public world.
Inherent in the notion of professional advocacy is the
participation of the poor in the determination and articula-
tion of their own interests; a community acting for itself.
Citizen participation developed not only as a political process
within the constraints posed by the prevailing ideology of
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ethnic and interest group politics, but was also encouraged as
a form of immediate user participation in the process of plan-
ning and design. The articulation of user/community needs
would enable the planners and designers to be more sensitive
to community requirements. In practice, however, the profes-
sionals were faced with an enormous conceptual and cultural gap
in their confrontation with poverty. Their task required that
the community's all-encompassing assertion of poverty and the
demand. for a comprehensive resolution of that condition be re-
duced to discrete and manageable problem-sets within a con-
comitant array of alternative technical solutions. Hence, the
professionals emphasized the primacy of participatory methods
which are designed to be highly goal-oriented towards problem'
solving, set within the professionals' stringent time limits
and work schedule.
These techniques involve the assumption that community
needs'can be meaningfully disaggregated to discrete alternative
preferences defined as specific problems and their solutions.
As such, participation is an effective method of co-optation.
At one level, community members are involved in working for
their own interests, leading perhaps to a local environment
more responsive to their needs and life styles. Yet on the
more fundamental level, their participation is an acceptance of
the problem definition and set of resources determined by the
dominant interests in society. Community members, through
participation, are thus caught in an ambiguous and contradic-
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tory situation. Their involvement creates hopes and diverts
fundamental questioning on the part of the poor of the struc-
tural determinants of their societal position. As Herbert Gans
said, the issue is to "restructure the- decision-making appara-
tus so that citizen participation can be increased without
leading to a total breakdown in decision-making." Citizen
participation serves to stabilize potentially dissident social
classes by involving them in "the political process" and.by in-
corporating them in an apparent effort to make the planning
and design process more responsive to their needs. Planners
and architects participate in this cooptation by appropriating
and reducing the enormous needs of the urban poor to the realm
of technical problem-solving and localized instrumental action.
While the professionals' intent was to introduce the poor into
the realm of political decision-making in the allocation of
societal resources, they have in fact often served to depoli-
ticize real class conflict and social action.
Conclusion: Advocacy was perhaps the only professional
movement to take seriously in a non-paternalistic way the
project of redistributing opportunity and resources to the dom-
inated classes. The advocates realized that this redistribu-
tion would never occur as a.gift, but must be achieved through
political action in which the dominated poor must act to
achieve their own ends (this in distinction to "social policy"
planning which is a new form of paternalism and social control).
But the advocates' implicit critique of obvious inequalities
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suffered by the poor did not extend to a critique -of the
structural domination which generated the inequality. Only
through such misunderstanding could political action be seen
as the vehicle to substantial resource redistribution. The
advocacy movement while having a liberative intent perpetuated
the failures of the earlier professional movements to realize
the interests they served. A critical understanding of the
professionals? role continues to be the precondition of the
resolution of their failures.
Postscript: Liberal society as a total alienation: Both in
conclusion of the present section on the liberal social order
and in anticipation of current forms of alienation described
in the next section on the Post-Liberal social order, a schema
of liberal society as a total alienation follows. Alienation
is defined in its general form as the separation of the indivi-
dual subject (whether it be the person, class, or communrity)
from control over the conditions which affect and determine its
existence. Alienation in liberal society includes the follow-
ing general forms, which will be presented in terms of the
problems of order, method, self, and architecture and planning.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER
1) The alienation of the individual subject from control
over the fundamental institutions which govern its life.
2) The alienation of the individual subject from control
over the ownership conditions, process and product of its labor.
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3) The alienation of the individual subject from the de-
termination of the distribution of its income.
4) The alienation of the individual subject from owner-
ship and control of the forces of production.
5) The alienation of the individual subject from a morally
legitimated community, through the definition of private inter-
ests rather than any form of -collective concordance as the basis
of the social order. As such there is no basis for community
under capitalism.
6) The alienation of the individual subject from control
over the substantive political mechanisms which govern its
life (depoliticization).
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD
7) The alienation of the individual subject from a criti-
cal, non-instrumental knowledge and consciousness and therefore
the possibility of a moral choice over the contents of its con-
sciousness and definition of the self, and forms of existence.
8) The alienation of the individual subject (including
the professional, scientific and educational practitioners of
method) from the constitution of a non-fragmented totalistic
knowledge, theory, and environment.
THE PROBLEM OF SELF
9) The alienation of the individual subject from the pos-
sibility of the realization of the mutually-necessary relation
between self and community, therefore defining the alienated
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self as "real" and "natural"l.-
An individual is alienated from himself or her-
self in the strict sense that the'criteria according
to which'individual capacities are developed derive
from patterns of social activity .nin contexts (work,
community, environment) whose structure and development
in turn do not reflect the aggregation of-individual
preferences, and hence do not reflect the individual's
development needs. Rather, these criteria are based
on profitability and maintenance of capitalist control.
Since culture is the generalized embodiment of daily
life--i.e., is the concrete set of values, norms, ideas
and ideologies validated through social activity--.
cilture is itself alienated in capitalist society., 1
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
10) The alienation of the individual subject from a non-
exploited natural/ecological environment encountered as a
value in itself to be respected and preserved.
11) The alienation of the individual subject from the
land and structures of the humanly-constructed world seen as
the matrix and facilitator of a communal, non-alienated life.
12) The alienation of the individual subject from a
architectural and planning consciousness, theory, and practice
towards the creation of a non-alienated environment.
These particular alienations encompass the whole of human
and natural reality: work, community, the self, environment.
To the extent that the liberal social order is governed by
capitalist institutions, liberal society is a total alienation.
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THE POST-LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
Introduction: The liberal social orders (of the Wes'tern
world (not to mention the traditional and revolutionary socie-
ties, such as Japan or Red China).have failed to overcome the
internal contradictions of the structure of liberalism and cap-
italism which preclude a stable resolution of the problems of
social order, method and self. Science and capitalist impera-
tives are the dominant ideals as well as actuality of liberal
society. But they have failed to create (in theory and practice)
sameaningf,ul legitimation of the liberal distribution of power,
a coherent-map of social-reality, or a basis for
moral decision and action.
The contradictions of the liberal order are generating the
preconditions if not the actuality of (for want of a better
term) a "post-liberal" social order. The nature of this
emerging order will be dependent of the dominance of one of
two principles currently operating now within liberal society:
either an extension of the ideal of democracy (and human
rights) to be a true.political/moral basis of a communal societs
or- the extension of the reality of liberal instrumentality to
create an even more repressive and centralized domination.
Whether community or domination prevails is perhaps the
deepest issue of our time. "The moment of greatest hope is
also the moment- of greatest fear. There is everything to gain,
and everything to lose."
The following discussion of the post-liberal social order
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order.first presents the unresolved liberal contradictions,
and then argues that the formation of a communal non-dominating
society is necessary for a stable resolution of the problems
of order, self, method, and architecture and planning.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER
Two factors are predominant in the failure of the liberal
order: 1) the inability of -capitalist production to infinitely
expand, and 2) the failure of liberal premises of social order
to.generate legitimated authority and value.
1) The limits of capitalist production: The
"higher standard of living" promised through capitalist produc-
tion could never be achieved by the entire population. If
benefits were to be distributed equally, within the United
States, it was materially impossible to put a Cadillac in
every garage. Now it is increasingly difficult even to put a
chicken in every pot. The system is being strained not only
through population growth but through the national and inter-
national "revolution of rising expectations" causing a demand
for an equitable and international redistribution of resources
now hoarded by the few. Increased national and international
demand for food and commodities is an important factor in the
current economic and political havoc of rising worldwide in-
flation and consequent political instability, The "prosperity"
and commodity consumption which was the sole legitimation of
capitalism is now severely threatened.
Corollary to the limits of commodity production is the
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ecological limit being reached through the exploitation and
pollution of nature, such factors as the limitation and ex-
haustion of natural resources, the physical poisoning of the
environment, the approaching limit of atmospheric heat and
other natural reactions to industrialization may pose the first
and most absolute liimit on industrial expansion and commodity
production (which is the basis of capitalism).
2) The failure of liberTism to generate legi-
timated authorityand value: There can be no basis in a so-
ciety of individual ends and non-consensual class domination
for a socially legitimated authority for several reasons: a)
the conflict of role and class; b) the contradictions of the
bureaucracy; and c) the inability of individual interests to
be the basis of a social whole.
a) The conflict of role and class1 : The lib-
eral attempt to substitute the principle of meritocratically-
allocated role for the domination of the aristocratic princi-
ple of class leaves role and class still in conflict. 2
b) Contradictions of the bureaucracy: The
allocation of power in liberalism is not through an informal
community of shared values but through the impersonal bureau-
cratic administration of a social order unified by abstriact
law. While the bureaucracy was established (in part) to,
through its abstract neutrality, escape the personal domina-
tion of the ruler, it has become another form of domination
whose abstractness conceals the concrete interests it serves.
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c) The inabilityof individual interests to
be the basis of a social order: Liberal society has further
failed in its inability to establish a morally-legitimated
social order. In a society of individual interests unified
only by class/role domination and abstract law, there can be no
basis for consensually legitimated moral order or ends-.
There is then a great moral ambiguity reflected in the current
social and individual pathologies (crime, mental disease,
drugs, anomie, privatism, militarism, etc.). The ends of
society are reduced to individual "needs" which are created and
recognized only to the extent that they can be fulfilled by
commodity production. Thus "capitalism does not satisfy many
needs. This should be obvious from the fantastic, overwhelm-
ing subjectively-felt need-deprivation of the mass of Ameri-
cans.
The liberal pathologies and failure to create a consensual
social order results in a continuing fragmentation of society,
self, nature and environment. The conflict of class and role
can never be resolved, for both forms of organization involve
the class domination. The bureaucracy in itself cannot over-
come its internal conflict betwieen impersonally administered
authority, and particularized interests. A moral social order
cannot derive from society as the collection of individual or
particularized' interests.
The social order as a community is-a necessary response
2to these conflicts. Class and role as principles of social
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order -take the human being as fragmented, engaged in the dia-
lectic of domination and submission. The only resolution of
the conflict is the ideal of community, in which each human
being is recognized as a whole person, not the occupant of a
role or class but a being whose right to fulfillment is not
subordinated to the right to gain. This recognition is made
into the fundamental principle of the communal social order.
Self and society, fact and value, are then reintegrated. Soci-
etal domination is not to be feared, and the dialectic of au-
tonomy and communality is resolVed--the community committed
to the recognition of both the need for autonomy and the con-
stitution of the self through social relations. In this de-
finition of community, the theory of society is based on the
theory of the self as a seeking for the unity of the resolu-
tion of the needs of autonomy and community.
Community is further a resolution to the inability of the
capitalist process to generate ends for moral action and a
moral social legitimacy. When commodity production and profit
is elevated to dominate all other social processes, the only
value and end can be the optimizing of production itself--
yet production is a means with no inherent ends, and the socie-
ty's ends collapse to the instrumental concern for means.
But production, when integrated within a communal committment
to human and thus social wholeness, becomes an instrument of
human ends which are then not impelled to be servants of pri-
vate or class profit. Community means then the recovery of
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self, society, labor and its products, environment, nature,
from their alienation in liberal society. Wo/men are free
then to determine their needs and their nature independent of
the artificial definitions and imperatives of -class domination.
The determination of societal ends is once more a social pro-
cess wrested from the imperatives of class domination--the
'public realmt is restored. The-communal social structure is
not a given but a continual public determination of ends and
values through social interaction and the democratic process.
In this process of self-determination, people recreate their
society, their mode of consciousness and knowledge, their
selves and their environment. In spite of the limits on cap-
italist expansion, monopoly capital is increasingly concen-
trating its power in linkage to a centralizing and ,depoliti-
cized state. Capital and state planning mechanisms are in-
creasingly effective in making fundamental political, mili-
tary, economic and social decisions independent of popular
control. But new forms of community and personal consciousness
are emerging as reactions and alternatives to the irresolvable
conflicts of liberalism. In the United States, these include
various religious and secular intentional communities, the
.growing consciousness of racial, ethnic, sexual and class-
based minorities, social revolutionaries and the countercul-
ture. Internationally, emerging third and fourth world nations
are claiming a share of world resources and political indepen-
dence which is straining present power and resource allocation.
0
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Such communist nations as China, Cuba, and Yugoslavia are de-.
veloping social forms in which there is at least the structural
potential of communal and democratic determination over societal
means and ends. Important for this discussion is not the great
differences between these examples, but their common existence
as alternatives to the forms of domination and fragmentation
in Western societies.
THE PROBLEM OF SELF
Community is the necessary precondition for resolving-the
problem of the self, In liberal society, the self can react-
only with alienation or resignation to a social order which de-
nies the whole self's need for both autonomy and community.
Community gone, the self becomes an alienated and instrumental
ego, exacerbated by the experience of the social world as a
domination rather than as a necessary sphere of the self. A
number of social critics (notably the critical theorists of
the Frankfurt School--Marcuse, Horkheimer, Habermas) note the
capitalist impact on the very formation of the psyche. Human
beings are educated, virtually from birth, to define themselves
as alienated and instrumental functionaries of a production/
consumption commodity society. The self then splits into its
socially acceptable and socially repressed parts, reproducing
in the psyche the alienation of the liberal social order.
The dominant consciousness in liberal society is of the
self as instrumnntal, alienated, fearful of social domination,
and distorted in the everyday life of work and social inter-
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action. But in a communal order, society represents not dom-
ination but the necessary social complement of autonomy. The
antagonism in liberalism between the fear of isolation and fear
of domination is reduced to its existential minimum. There is
but one frightening alternative to the reconstitution of the
whole self in a community of mutual recognition as whole beings:
the further fragmentation, alienation and instrumental forma-
tion of the self. The nature of the liberal self is not basic-
ally a psychological problem for the unity of the self is
achieved only in relation to a unified society. As the alien-
ated self derives from the normal operation of the capitalist/
liberal institutions, the resolution of the problem of the self
is ultimately a political act aimed at transforming capitalist
institutions.
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD
The problem of order and self are intimately connected with
the problem of method, the wayof knowing social and personal
reality. Throughout the thesis, dominant method has been
shown to'reflect and serve the interests of the dominant class.-
If this method forms the content of the dominant consciousness,
it is then difficult or impossible within its terms to con-
ceive of an alternative to the given social order'. As Positiv-
ist epistemology is now the dominant method, social conscious-
ness reflects its procedures. Positivist epistemology is capa-
ble of dealing with only logical (rationalist) or causal (his-
toricist) relations. Both logics are relations of sequence--
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the way one element acts *on or causes another through time.
The logics are instrumental rationalities, dealing with the
choice of the- most efficient means to a pregiven and unre-
flected end.
Positivism's instrumental rationality or rationality of
means reverses the traditional philosophic of value rationality
or the reasoning without ends as the dominant intellectual
project of the time. Positivism then does not possess the
methodological tools of value rationality. Instrumental ra-
'tionality is then the epistemology of class domination.
An unalienated communal society requires not an instru-
mental but a value rationality, a way of knowing which can com-
prehend the specific qualities of self and community, whose
truth is as a community of meaning, the unity of subjective
intention and objective -social realization, fact and value,
consciousness and actuality, autonomy and community. The
psychic and methodological conflict between subjectivity and
objectivity so characteristic of liberal society is resolved
only to the extent that observer and participant both share a
common experiende and interpretive knowledge--a situation at-
tainable only in a communal society. The resolution of the
problem of method then is inseparable from the creation of a
communal society where shared experiences and meanings are
possible.. The method of such a sbciety must be able to compre-
hend a social order as a totality rather than a sequence, a
simultaneity of interrelated and evolving human beings and
meanings--not a set-of logical categories abstracted from the
whole and then reordered through a series of linear relation-
ships. Human subject cannot be analytically- separated from ob-
ject, for meaning and experience has a double reference in
being equally real to both subject and observor--both share in
a common meaning. Only in the extreme Positivist separation
of fact and value could an instrumental rationality operate on
"fact!" independent of its meaning in the social totality and
thereby define knowledge as "objective" and "value-free".
The epistemology of a communal social order must be based
not only on a theory of society as a totality of interrelated
meanings but on a dialectical materialist theory of history.
Only on a materialist basis can human beings regain their sta-
tus as the subject of history, which occurs not through the
evolution of an ideal (idealist/rationalist) or historically-
grounded (Hegelian/ biological evolutionist) universal ration-
ality or biological mechanism, but through the conflict of par-
ticular class interests. The recognition of the materialist
basis of society and history restores knowledge to its origin
in history and social relations.
The problem of method, of 'the human knowledge of human
reality, is crucial to the realization of self, communal society
and a liberative architecture and planning. If method is not
based on a theory of the self as a necessary unity between au-
tonomy and community, then the self is condemned to its pre-
sent "normal" alienation. If method is not based on the dis-
tinction between natural and a human reality which demands a
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unique methodological recognition of human meaning and con-
sciousness, then wo/men are condemned to see themselves and
be seen as instruments of abstract capitalist imperatives. The
ideal of the unity of meaning is then collapsed into the rea-
lity of domination. If method is not based on a dialectical
materialist theory of history as based on social transforma-
tion through the conflict of- class interests, then reality is
Seen Positivistically as essential ahistoric, eternal, given,
and unchangeable. Wo/men are condemned to the present. If
method takes the built environment as a collection of aesthe-
tic or functional objects and relationships, the meaning of
of the environment as a concretization of social relations and
interests is lost. The practitioners of architecture and
planning are then condemned to perpetuate the visual/functional
culture which only serves to perpetuate class domination.
The method, the mode of knowledge which is based on the
requirements of a communal society is dialectical materialism.
Its structure and meaning as a knowledge of specifically human
reality, as well as a knowledge for architecture and planning
within the human community, will be explored in the following
section.
THE PROBLEM OF ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
The architectural and planning professions in liberal so-
ciety have been shown to be in a .crisis of their theory and
practice. This crisis is born of three failures: the failure
to rationalize and unify a fragmented environment; the fail-
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ure to ally with and become an element of dominant political/
economic power; and the failure of architectural and planning
theory and practice to comprehend its role and meaning in sup-
porting class domination.
If the professions continue to be unaware of the basis of
their crises, they will become further implicated in thb un-
thinking and technocratic instrumentalism which abdicates the
traditional definition of the professionAl as committed to
human values independent of the interests of class domination
(the original professions were law, medicine and theology).
Alternately, the professionals must realize that their
power to rationalize the environment and realize the traditional
cormittment to human welfare depends first on critical self-
reflection and action on a professional and personal level and
then the existence of a social order committed to the dominance
of.human needs. As this social order does not now exist, the
professionals must participate in its creation. They must
further critique the instrumental and visual rationality (the
dominant epistemologies 'of current practice) which in part pre-
vent the realizition of the social origin and meaning of archi-
tectural and planning practice and products. Only when engaged
in such critical reflection and action intended towards a trans-
formed social order can the professions become a truly social
practice serving human needs. This practice derives its
meaning as an expression of an emerging consensual social unity.
Specific elements of the professional liberative project will
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be discussed in the .Conclusion Section.
Conclusion: a summary of the argument for a communal
society: The preceding study of liberal society leads to the
conclusion that the crises of the- liberal resolutions of the
problems of order, self, method and architecture and planning
cannot be resolved within the liberal social order, but only
through the creation of a communal society. This society is
based on a theory of the realized self as the necessary unity
of subjectivity and objectivity, autonomy and community. The
unity of subjective intention and objective realization is
meaning. Community is defined as a unity of individual mean-
ings grounded in shared definitions and common determination
of the nature of the major elements of social existence, pos-
sible only in a society free of class domination.
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER: The institutions and structure
of the social order are collectively and freely deter-
mined, independent of class domination, in the service
of human needs and freedom rather than of capitalist
imperatives. Collectively determined, the society is'
necessarily the product of a collective meaning.
THE PROBLEM OF SELF: The self is realized only as a
unity of autonomy and community. This unity is the pre-
condition of a meaningful existence, and is predicated
on the existence of common meaning on which community
is based.
THE PROBLEM OF METHOD: The form of knowing for a social
order of unified selves is methodologically and inten-
tionally committed to specifically human reality as the
seeking for meaning, the unification of subjectivity
with a non-dominating objectivity. The method then
comprehends subject and object, intention and realiza-
tion as equally real and meaningful in defining reality.
There is no "objectivity" independent of human intention
.and meaning.
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TEE RQBLEFJ OF ACRITECTURE AND PLANNING: The
professional theories and practice derive not
from their definition as an instrument of
capitalist intentions, or in alienation from
them. Rather, they derive from the common
meanings of the communal society.
The problems of order, self, method, and archi-
tecture and planning are then interdependent and inseparable:
the resolution of one is impossible without the resolution
of all. The social order itself cannot be unalienated with-
out being composed of whole selves for which the communal
society is a precondition. The unity of self and society is
in turn inseparable from being realized through conscious-
ness and the method of knowing. Finally, architecture and
planning can realize an unalienated/unfragmented environ-
ment only when continual fragmentation is not generated by
an alienated society.
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Section III:
TOWARDS A CRITICAL
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRACTICE
FOR ARCHITECTURE AND
PLANNING
CRITIQUE OF POSITIVIST
EPISTEMOLOGY
DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AS
A CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM
AND CAPITALIST DOMINATION
TOWARDS A CRITICAL
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRACTICE
FOR ARCHITECTURE AND
PLANNING
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Introduction: In light of the argument for the- necessity of
a communal society, a critical knowledge (termed dialectical
materialism) is a condition of the resolution of the present
contradictions of the liberal resolution of the problems of
order, self, method, and architecture and planning. Unre-
flective practice inevitably serves the ruling class and con-
tains the seeds of its own destruction. Knowledge and the
act of knowing will alone not change the social order, but
is an essential component of praxis.1
In the following sections, a more formal epistemological
grounding than has so far been presented will be laid for a
critical architectural and planning theory and praxis. A pre-
sentation and critique of Positivist epistemological theory
will show the necessity for a dialectical critical theory to
resolve Positivism's "crisis of reason". This theory, dia-
lectical materialism, will then be presented. Finally, the
theory will be extended as the basis of a critical epistemo-
logy specific to architectural and planning knowledge and
practice.
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CRITTQUE OF POSITIVIST FPISTEMOLOGY -
Introduction: The Positivism of the social sciences, the
epistemological strain which underlies much current "rational"
planning and architectural problem-solving efforts, emerged
from both earlier scientific epistemology and the socio-political
conditions following the French Revolution. The intimate con-
nections between Positivism's formal assumptions and its value-
laden origin and social function must be shown, in view of the
Positivist's claim that their methods are "objective", if not
value-free.
This section then sketches the historic origin of Posi-
tivism, presents its formal epistemological rules, and then
evaluates these rules in terms of their meaning in supporting
class domination. The contradictions within the Positivist
programme are then shown to underlie the Western crisis of
reason.as well as contribute to the failure of recent social
action based on Positivist logic. A dialectical materialist
critique is then claimed to be necessary as a resolution to the
epistemological problems of Positivism, as well as a necessary
component of action aimed at ending class domination.
(Positivism) resonated an emerging structure of
collective sentiments, in which the world was seen to
need-new mappings because the moral commitment to the
traditional social maps had been weakened, while the
prestige of science was growing. Positivism was a re-
sponse to the moral uncertainty and moral exhaustion
of the Restoration, the res.toration of the Bourbon
king Louis XVIII after Napoleon's defeat. It sought
to escape from the Restoration stalemate between the
nobility and the middle class. Against the clash of.
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right against right, Positivism affirmed the pro-
priety of an amoral response to the social world:
it stressed the value of knowledge about society
and universalized this moral escape by transforming
its amoral method for making social maps into a
moral rule. 1
The positivists rose "above" the struggle of both the
bourgeois and the nobility, while being closer to a middle-
class utilltarianism.
(But) to the degree that the middle class with-
held active support, the Positivists had little choice
but to be 'above the struggle.' Not wishing and not
forced to choose among alternatives, what Positivism
made sacred, therefore, was not the map itself but
the rules for making it, a methodology. In this dis-
tinctive way, Positivism was a social movement that
uniquely stressed the possibility of living in the
world without a map with the use only of a rthod and e
the sheer information it produced. 2
The term "Positivism" had the twofold meaning that men
should base their map-making on the scientific methods, but at
the same time should advocate a specific form of society. This
imperative was articulated in the sociological Positivism of
Comte as a religion of humanity, but this "map" did not win
acceptance. The Comtian faction then gave up the effort and
"became increasingly concerned with the methodology of map-
making rather than the map to be made. In relation to the
Positivist's own aspirations, modern 'value free'.0 .(epistemo-
logy and methodology) is the anomic.adaptation of Sociological
Positivism to political failure in which pure knowledge or the
methodology of map-making tends to become an end in itself."3
The Positivist apoliticism lies then in the failure of
the middle class politics to develop a coherent image of the
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new social order. Positivism also reflects the human and pro-
fessional alienation from society. "Objectivity is the 'com-
pensation men offer themselves when their capacity to love has
been crippled...On this level, such objectivity is not neutral-
ity, but alienation from self and society; it is an alienation
from a society experienced as a hurtful and unlovable thing."1
The rules of Positivism--a critique: Divorced from the
project of social reconstruction, Positivism became a collec-
tion of rules and evaluative criteria for determining what
statements about the world constitute valid knowledge. By
these "neutral," "objective" and contentless criteria, tradi-
tional social theory had no scientific status as knowledge,
for that theory was based on a value rationality which assumed
a theory of human nature and the good.
Positivism is formally expressed in the following four
rules:
1) The rule of phenomenalism. There is no difference
between essence and appearance,
2) The rule of nominalism. It cannot be assumed that any
insight formulated in general terms can have any real refer-
ents other than individual conciete objects. Scientific ab-
stractions, such as the notion of a triangle which itself is
an ideal concept, ultimately refer back to empirical reality.
3) The rule that value judgments and normative state-
ments have no cognitive value. The only grounds for our
making value judgments are our own arbitrary choices.
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4) The rule of the unity of the scientific method. The
methods for acquiring valid knowledge are essentially the same
in-all spheres of reality. Thus the method of natural science
is the only valid method for knowledge in the human social
sciences.
Any metaphysical (extra-empirical) bases for the justifi-
cation of truth or power were eliminated by rules one and two
which counteredthe sacred and secular aristocrats' metaphysical
claim to political authority with the demands for a "factual,"
"objective," and "scientific" knowledge. Thus the bourgeois
used the Positivist epistemological critique of metaphysics to
validate its own claims to power.
Further, the claim that value judgments and normative
statements have no cognitive value divorced knowledge (and the
professionals who acquire and use that knowledge) from poli-
tics and morality, the human world. Valid knowledge was rather
claimed to originate in another sphere. In Karl Popper's for-
mulation, there are three spheres of reality: 1) the ordinary
world of tables and chairs; 2) the world of the consciousness
of these ordinary things; .3) the world of objective knowledge
existing independently of human consciousness. For Popper,
and by extension for the Positivists, valid scientific knowledge
lies only in the third abstract world. But this world is ap-
prehended through the application. of a natural-science methodo-
logy in which the unique human attributes, consciousness, sub-
jectivity, and intentionality are vitiated; the rule of the
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unity of scientific method defines natural science knowledge
as the epistemological basis of knowing human as well as
natural-science reality. Then, as natural science was insti-
tutionalized by the bourgeois in an effort to control and dom-
inate natinre, the human sciences were used to dominate wo/men.
Positivism became the basis of the dominant modern social
sciences--political science, economics, sociology, behavioral
and psyiological psychology, as well as instrumental architec-
tural and planning practice..
Positivism can now be understood as the epistemological
correlate of capitalist social relations which toeat unique
human qualities as of marginal value at best. The value of
wo/men in capitalist society is calculated in their utility
as producers and consumers--an objective and subjective defin-
ition of human worth which to be made a social/psychic reality
requires class domination. Therefore human beings are to be
treated as objects of the natural world, alienated from their.
subjectivity and having only those needs which can be met by
the imperatives of capitalist production. This view, in epis-
temological and social terms, is a profound abstraction and
destruction of the self whi6h defines as the only legitimated
reality only what capitalism values of the natural, human and
2
social reality. Human labor and consumption become the ab-
stracted reality of the person; profit and social control be-
come the abstracted reality of the social-order; exbhange
value becomes th)e abstracted quality of the natural and built
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environment; a nervous system--environment interaction becomes
through a biological reduction the abstracted relation of the
human whole to the natural social and built world. The Posi-
tivist epistemology, as an abstraction from the human and natu-
ral totality, is then perfectly suited to the understanding and
instrumental manipulation of human beings valued as abstractions.
This has been a harsh evaluation of Positivism, one taking
literally its anti-metaphysical bias and its notions of what
can be understood about human beings. Perhaps the most radical
Positivist formulation was Wittgenstein's, who said that "of
that which we cannot speak (in logical terms) we must be silent,"
thereby denying as valid knowledge the whole range of human
meanings and intentions which cannot take a logical form.
This is not to deny that the Positivists themselves have
not in some cases denied the universality of their methods,
allowing the meaning of human phenomenon without requiring that
they must assume a form testable as propositions for their
truth or falsity. Yet in the radical version which predomin-
ates under capitalism,
(Positivism) has an entirely different cultural
meaning. It is an attempt' to consolidate science as
a self-sufficient activity, which exhausts all the
possible ways of appropriating the world intellectually.
...the realities of the world--which can, of course, be
interpreted by natural science, but which are in addi-
tion an object of man's 'existential curiosity', a
source of 'fear or disquiet, an occasion for commitment
or rejection--if they are to be encompassed by reflec-
tion and expressed in words can be reduced to their
empirical properties. Suffering, death, ideological
conflict, social clashes, antithetical values of any
kind--are all declared out of bounds, matters we can
only be silent about, in obediance to the principle
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of verifiability. Positivism so understood is an
act of escape from commitments, an escape masked as
a definition of knowledge...Positivism in this sense
is the escapist's design for living, a life volun-
tarily cut off from participation in anything that
cannot be correctly formulated. 1
Positivism as a valid knowledge of the totality becomes
the totalizing reason of capitalism. It penetrates both in-
strumental and intersubjective spheres as the only rational
methodological principle and accounting of reality.2 Pro-
gress,. process and value are defined as quantitative (better
housing, less'crime, more convenient transportation) while
the qualitative meanings (housing, crime, transportation as
aspects of a historically-contingent, interest-bound totality)
go unquestioned.
The crisis or Positivist epistemology: The contradic-
tions within Positivism's claim to objective knowledge reflect
the crisis of Western knowledge itself 3 which was initiated
with the aristocratic/bourgeois destruction of the certainty
of medieval transcendental metaphysics. Given the inadmissi-
bility of all human belief and experience that is not verifi-
able through natural scientific methodology, all .that is spe-
cifically human was reduced to an animal and biological level.
"The world of moral values collapses along with the alleged
eternity, 'objectivity,' or autonomy of aesthetic values."
But even in its Positivist reduction, scientific truth could
not assume a transcendental, absolute status--a failure of a
Positivist ideal which precipitated a crisis of modern know-
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ledge's claim to an absolute objective knowledge. The central
contradiction in Positivism's claim to objectivity is that in
fact Positivism is a normative attitude, constituted by human
beings who set rules on what is admissible as ."knowledge,"
"science," "cognition," and "information." These. norms are
not "objectively" grounded in "anything but cultural values.
This claim is justified in an analysis of the act of in-
duction. Induction from empirical data ias the original basis
of the scientific -method, starting with Francis Bacon. The
scientist collected data, found a pattern, hypothesized a law,
and tried to confirm that law empirically. But hypotheses
could never be conclusively verified, for the one single ex-
ception always invalidates the law. Karl Popper thus re-
formulated the meaning of verification: a law or hypothesis
could never be verified, but it could be shown not to have
been falsified.
Yet this formulation does not solve the problem of the
truth value of scientific statements. As Hume stated the
issue, the logical problem of induction is whether one can be
justified in reasoning from instances of which one has experi-
ences to instances of which one has no experience. In Hume's
terms, there is no absolute grounding, but only a belief which
justifies the induction.
Contemporary responses to the problem of induction have,
in asserting the "conventional" nature of scientific hypotheses,
if anything, weakened the absolute grounding of truth. The
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Conventionalists state -that currently valid modes of scien-
tific knowledge are held as a matter of convention. For
Thomas Kuhn , a "normal science" or paradigm dominates scien-
tific practice in a given period.. The paradigm is replaced
only when sufficient disproving evidence accumulates to cor-
2
rode and overcome its defenses.
Therefore, scientific truth in the views of some leading
contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of science does
not have an absolute grounding. Truth has been shown to be
able to be determined only through the negative affirmation
of falsification, within a paradigm which is not "objective"
but a consensual and cultural construction by human beings
and as such subject to change. While the distinction was made
earlier in this thesis between the human and natural sciences,
the "objectivity" of the natural sciences themselves has been
shown to be a human construction. The crisis of Western rea-
son, in its inability to find a grounding for truth independent
of its reality as a human construction, is not resolved by
classical Positivism or any of its sophisticated successors.
The epistemological failure of Positivism was paralleled
by the failures of its applications as instrumental rationality.
Ironically, Positivism has been used to deal with the very neg-
ative effects which in part derive from its use in both mili-
tary and social control in the first place. The early Ameri-
can defeats in Viet Nam were dealt with by McNamara's systems
reorganization and the application of more advanced technology.
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As the basis of social control, instrumental social science
was the epistemological base of Federal legislation (particu-
larly in the 1960's) concerning urban renewal, housing, educa-
tion, social services, civil rights, economic development and
other areas. These programs were intended in large part to-
contain and stabilize the reaction to the normal operation of
capitalist institutions which threatened the existing balance
of class power and hegemony. The degree of these programs'
failure is also the failure of their epistemological base of
instrumental rationality which, in its lack of reflective ca-
pacity, masks and can not deal with human meaning and inten-
tion. This failure is also experienced in the current crises
of a number of the social-science related fields including
sociology, political science, economics, psychology, and
architecture and planning. These crises are symptomatic of
the crisis of Western reason itself and point to the need of
severely questioning the adequacy of Positivism or instrumen-
tal rationality as a basis for knowledge and action.
As a people we seem to be involved in a patho-
logical syndrome which reacts with new technical
levers to moral and social unrest (law and order);
with violence to any opposition (national security);
and with a repressive authoritarianism to open up
communication about the ends, ideals or goals of
our civilization...We conceal this reality from our-
selves by generating scientific rationalizations that
simply define the normative issues as beside the
point and reorganize for a more effective instrumen-
tal control of the situation. We avoid a public re-
examination of the standards for political judgment...
The American political, economic and military insti-
tutions, and now the scientific (and I would add archi-
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tecture and planning) community have been integrated
into this societal avoidance pattern. The naive
scientism of our technocratic guidance system appears
to be the emergent cultural element that promotes and
conceals this delusory behaviour. We are wedded to
an instrumental concept of reason. whose one-sidedness
blocks our capacity to recognize the sociocultural
significance of our acts and lowers our ability to
act intelligently in novel situations. 1
The necessity of a dialectical materialist critique: Posi-
tiVists protest the meaningless of metaphysical aspiration and
certainty derived from direct experience. Yet men have always
sought a metaphysical certainty, an autonomous realm of reason,
value and meaning independent of animal needs and the empiric-
ally given. If this aspiration is not dismissed as meaningless,
a realm of intention and knowledge must be admitted which de-
rives from the uniquely human. This human knowledge of inten-
tion and meaning, a value rationality, must be granted a con-
sensually-legitimated status and reality in the world which
scientific knowledge now enjoys.2 If wo/men cannot know them-
selves as unique and potentially whole human beings, they are
condemned to know themselves through Positivism (whether as a
formal logic or as the dominant consciousness of everyday life)
as instruments of some abstract imperative as meaningless as
it is compelling. This situation, at the core of liberal rea-
.lity, is a severe destruction of the entire human world of
intersubjectivity and the full range of cultural mediations
between self and society of language, symbolism, environment,
and a communal institutional. framework. The increasing scale
of capitalist 
_domination has overrun the traditional extent of
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technical instrumentalism. In Habermas' formulation , there
have always been two societal systems, "purposive-rational-
action" andi"intersubjective communication." Purposive-rational
action is the the sphere of work, of instru1mental goal-oriented
action, of domination over.nature. Intersubjective communica-
tion is everyday life, culture, the constitution of the self
through interaction with others. While these two social
"action-systems" have characterized every culture, only under
capitalism has the traditional dominance of intersubjective.
communication 'been reversed, the goals and self-representation
of technical rationality becoming the content and conscious-
ness of intersubjectivity. (This formulation parallels the
earlier discussion2 on the emergence of economics to dominate
all other social systems in the liberal social order.)
The dominance and failures of instrumental knowledge and
the liberal society makes a critique of Positivist rationality,
especially its use in architectural and planning theory and
practice, urgent at the present. The "truth" of Positivist
social theory seems less and less to fit the reality the theory
claims to define. The critique of instrumental knowledge is
undertaken not only as an epistemological project, for the Pos-
itivist rejection of the validity of specifically human know-
ledge reflects the same rejection in the social and personal
consciousness and action of capitalist society. The restora-
tion of the uniquely human as a valid epistemological base re-
quires the critique and consequent transformation of the con-
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sciousness, institutional structure and action of the liberal
social order. The critique of epistemology then is the cri-
tique of the social order and the interests it serves; the
transformation of knowledge and consciousness is inevitably
a political act.
The critical knowledge of human reality is dialectical
materialism, which will be presented in the following section.
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DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AS A CRITIQUE OF POSITIVISM AND CAPITA-
LIST DOMINATION 
.
Introduction: Capitalism and its Positivist epistemology
are predominantly abstractions and therefore alienations of
human reality and needs. Dialectics above all is a mode of
knowing which restores that alienated human intention, needs,
and action as the subject of knowledge and history. The his-
tory of dialectical materialism as a critique of domination
will be followed by a discussion of its formal characteristics
and meaning as the epistemology of a dealienated communal soci-
ety.
As an orientation, Lenin is quoted on dialectics as con-
crete knowledge:
...the dialectical method--in contradistinction to
the metaphysical (Positivist or formal logic) method--
is nothing more or less than the scientific method in
sociology, which consists in regarding society as a
living organism in a constant state of development (and
not as something mechanically concatenated and therefore
permitting any arbitrary combination of individual social
elements), the study of which requires an objective
analysis of the relations of production that constitute
the given social formation and an investigation of its-
laws of functioning and development. 1
...Formal logic...takes formal definitions, and
is guided exclusively by what is most customary, or
most often noted...we get an eclectic definition which
points to various sides of the object and nothing more.
Dialectic logic demands that we go further. In the
first place, in order really to know an object we must
embrace, study, all its sides,.all its connections and
'mediations'. We shall never achieve this completely,
but the demand for all-sidedness is a safeguard against
mi ta.kes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic de-
ma ds that we take an object in its development, its
'self-movement',...in its changes. ...Thirdly, the
whole of human experience should enter the full 'defini-
tion' of an object as a criterion of the truth and as a
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practical -index of the object's connection with what
man requires. Fourthly, dialectical logic teaches
that 'there is no abstract truth, truth is always con-.
crete.' 1
The concern with epistemology in this thesis has been pr-
dominantly as it reflects and affects social relations. As ?:5-%
tivism was presented as the mode of knowledge of capitalist
domination, this discussion of dialectical materialism will
emphasize its meaning as a critique of capitalism in the name
of human freedom from class domination.
Dialectic materialism was developed by Marx and Engels2
as a necessary part of their intention to understand and trarns-
form capitalism. The project of knowledge and its methodolc-
gical formalization in dialectical materialism they saw not as
an-abstract end in itself, but as a necessary moment in revol-
utionary praxis, the project of transforming capitalism into a
society of human freedom. Unlike Positivism, dialectical ma-
terialism openly acknowledges its allegiance to particular in-
terests in uniting knowledge with action in the world, theory
and practice, fact and value as mutually necessary components
for realizing a liberated society. Knowledge was not taken as
a neutral and abstract, but as an intentional activity of hurme.
beings, whether for- domination or for liberation. Truth then
could not be determined when abstracted from human intention
and action, nor was there truth in the Positivist's ahistorica.
view of the world as a collection of timeless static categories.
Rather, reality was seen as constantly in transformation throu.
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human practice. Thus,
The question whether human thinking can reach
objective truth is not a question of theory but a
practical question. In practice, man must prove the
truth, that is, actuality and power, this-sidedness
of his thinking. The dispute about the actuality or
non-actuality of thinking--thinking isolated from
practice--is a purely scholastic question.
-Marx: Theses on Feuerbach #2
For dialectical materialism, philosophy ended with Hegel,
who linked the ancient ideal of human freedom with the modern
discovery that wo/men evolved through historical process.
There was nothing more to do but to act in the world to rea-
lize that freedom.
The philosophers have only interpreted the world
in various ways; the point is, to change it..(Theses #11)
(to a) human society or socialized humanity. (Theses #10).
Philosophy became in dialectical materialism a theory of
social praxis towards liberation. Theory was seen as a neces-
sary guide to action for two reasons. First, the origin, de-
velopmental processes, and potential futures of the society
must be understood in order to act. Secondly, theory is neces-
sary to pierce through the deep mystifications of the individual
and social consciousnesses of capitalist society.
When men (in bourgeois society, subject to the
dominant consciousness and Positivist epistemology)
lack a critical understanding of their reality, ap-
prehending it in fragments which they do not perceive
as interacting constituent elements of the whole, they
cannot truly know that reality. To truly know it,
they would have to reverse their starting point. They
would need to have a total vision of the context in
order subsequently to separate and isolate its con-
stituent elements and by means of this analysis
achieve a clearer perception of the whole... (which
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men now) perceive as dense, inpenetrable and envelop-
ing. (Men) must decode a coded concrete situation. 1
The historic develo ment of reason as a critique of domin-
ation: The intent of the critique of domination is as old as
-the Western concept of reason, deriving from the perception
that apparent, empirical appearance of the everyday world
masks the reality beneath. Reason in classical Greek philoso-
phy is the seeing of the invisible in the visible, the essen-
tial in the appearance. The revelation of truth requires a
reflective negation of the appearance of reality. "Thinking
is, indeed, essentially the negation of that which is immedi-
ately before us. ,2 The dwellers of Plato's cave could turn
towards the sun only after realizing, through an act of nega-,
tive reasoning, that the shadows they took for reality were a
mystification due to the domination of conventional perception.
Reason then, in the classical philosophic tradition, is basic-
ally a critique of conventional mystification of appearance,
which then releases a changed praxis, or action. 3
But, in the development of liberal society,
The critical basis of the identification of rea-
son and freedom was lost, and a conformist skepticism
characterized the development of modern rationalism.
The more reason triumphed through technology and natu-
ral science, freedom in man's social life was de-
emphasized. Philosophical rationalism reconciled with
the irrationality of the prevailing social relations
only through reason and freedom becoming only indivi-
dual internal realities. 4
Knowledge and reason became identified with the procedures
of strict science (first developed in the natural science.s and
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now appropriated by the s6cial sciences). The experimental
scientific method became the model for all rational activity,
and human activity/social science was conceptually patterned
on the natural science model instead of being.seen as a unique
sphere of existence with its own appropriate mode. of under-
standing. There was then a growing cultural regession ~in
which social values and norms were replaced by technical rules
which mystified the social world. Beybnd being a crisis of
reason, this regression was a crisis of human subjectivity it-
self beneath the more apparent cultural crisis in which the
bourgeois attempted to fabricate a culture. The very meaning
of being a person was transformed.
The nature of the dialectical materialism in its meaning
as a response to these crises will be approached through a
study of some of its formal characteristics.
The formal characteristics of dialectical materialism:
The nature of dialectical materialism will be further discussed
by presenting some of its formal characteristics: a) in epis-
temological terms; b) in distinction to formal Positivist
characteristics;' and c) in relation to the class oiigin of
both dialectics and Positivism.
1) The materialist basis of consciousness and
knowledge: Dialectical materialism holds that consciousness
and knowledge derives not from our ideas of reality, but from
the human life-processes revealed in (material or concrete)
history and everyday life. Positivism to the contrary lo-
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cates reality not in the objective material world but in
ideas about that world, claiming that nothing exists apart
from our ideas about reality. Ideas are, for the materia-
lists, abstractions, and the abstraction of reality is the
very definition of capitalist domination. The materialist
claim that there is an objective world then establishes on
an epistemological level the hope and possibility that be-
yond the abstract liberal definition of social reality there
is an unalienated reality which corresponds to wo/men's needs.
2) .History as a process of development through -
class conflict towards freedom: Dialectical materialism holds
that the meaning and truth of facts is not in their existence
as static entities but only as part of a process of develop-
ment.
The dialectic -represents the counterthrust to
any form of positivism (which) from Hume to the pre-
sent day...has been the ultimate method of verifica-
tion...To Hegel, the facts in themselves possess no
authority...Verification rests, in the last analysis,
ith (the process of development) to which all facts
are related and which determines their content. 1
All realities pass unto others, as each major social form has
emerged and passed into the succeeding form. Dialectics then
reveals the negation at the core of reality, every given fact
being not static and eternal but containing its own negation
or non-being within. This negation describes and is contained
in the contradictions betwen special class interests, or class
conflict. For example, the medieval social order as a fact
contained its negation in the emergent bourgeois class which
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contradicted the dominant class and eventually overthrew it.1
The contradiction between the bourgeois and medieval social
orders was then essentially a class conflict which for Marx
is the motor force of history. But the transformation of his-
tory is for Marx not blind or endless but has a telos or end
in the progressive development of human existence through
class conflict towards human-freedom. The transformation of
all forms through negation and conflict towards the realiza-
tion of human freedom is the energy of nature and history, the
inner structure of all being and the fundamental end of all-
human intentionality. Thus,
To comprehend reality means to comprehend what
things really are, and this in turn means rejecting
their mere factuality. Rejection is the process of
thought as well as of action. While the scientific
method leads from the immediate experience of things
to their mathematical-logical structure, philoso-
phical thought leads from the immediate experience
of existence to its historical structure; the prin-
ciple of freedom. 2
In distinction to the transformational nature of dialec-
tic thought, the Positivist universe is static and non-
historical--essentially a machine whose structure is to be
analyzed and exploited but whose motive-force is -unknown. Pos-
itivism cannot explain the historic origins, transformations,
or futures of the reality it inhabits, let alone its own ori-
gins or development; its own methodological objectivity as a
universal method is contradicted .by its inability to be ob-
jective about itself.
Positivism then is the epistemological form of the dom-
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inant consciousness of liberal society--that liberal reality,
the given, is the only possible reality because there essen-
tially is no history--only permutations over time of particu-
lar responses to capitalist imperatives. And if there is no
history, people cannot realize their potential and freedom to
create other social forms responsive to their needs.
3) Truth is in the whole: The process of devel-
opmnent to which all facts are related and which determines
their content can be understood as a totalityof interre3lation-
ships. Only when the interconnection of the historical to-
tality is known can there be knowledge, and can there be
meaning. The meaning and reality of a self, fact, or-object 2
has been shown to be achieved only in relation to the mutually
necessary and mutually defining whole. The self is a neces-
sary unity of autonomy and community. A fact can only be vali-
dated in the context of its origin in human valuing. An ob-
ject, such as a building, has me-ning only as an expression of
human intention and relations. The whole then gives meaning
to the parts, which are particular determinants of the whole.
The relations of self, fact and object to the whole are
relations of meaning, of the- correspondence of human intention-
ality to its realization in the world (whether manifested as
the self, in the facts that wo/men determine, or in the ob-
jects that.they create). The understanding of meaning requires
the understanding of the human intention along with its mani-
festation in the world. The truth is then located in the
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simultaneous existence and relation of intention with realiza-
tion, not in Positivism's logical relations which exclude sim-
ultaneity and can understand truth only in relation to one term
of the human meaning at a time. Intention for Positivism means
an'objectivistic psychology (e.g,, behaviourism) while realiza-
tion means a literally mindless (intentionless) empiricism.
But for dialectics, self and society, theory and praxis, in-
tention and realization, the real and ideal are seen as mu-
tually necessary and mutually defining. The reality of each
term is in its relation to the other.
The Positivist atomization of the human intentional total-
ity serves an important purpose in class domination. Valid
knowledge is defined to be reached only through the atomiza-
tion and abstraction of reality. But while all thought is an
abstraction, Positivism. severs thought from the context of its*
origins in the conditions of historical existence, change and
development. Parallel to the condition of human beings and
architectural/planning production in liberal society, ideas
are abstracted, separated and then in this alienated form de-
fined as real. Concepts such as "society,," "Justice," "demo-
cracy," "equality," "human rights," and the like, are such
contextless abstractions which nevertheless are used to mask
the concrete relations of class domination from which these
ideas derive. Only by preventing consciousness of the whole
(institutionalized in Positivist epistemology as well as a
rigid division of labor and class stratification) can the con-
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flict between class interests be obscured to maintain capita-
list hegemony.
4) The logical basis of dialectics: For dialec-
tics, any reality incorporates and implies its opposite or nega-
tion. Logically stated, A and B simultaneously exist as a to-
tality. The existence of a dominating class implies the exis-
tence of a dominated class, the existence of the suburb implies
the ghetto, the existence of the building-object implies its
social relations--one term of the existence cannot be under-
stood in separation from the other. But the logical basis of
Positivism is the law of the excluded middle--if A, not B. If
self, not society, if building, not the social relations it
represents. A and B cannot interpenetrate or be simultaneously
related. There is no overarching category in which the two
qualities or quantities are united simultaneously. Through
such logic, society can be divided into separate realities to
be studied by correspondingly separate fields', the links be-
tween them having far less power than their coherence as indi-
vidual fields. This view is the very model of the "rational"
or "political" or "economic" self-interested alienated wo/man
of classic liberalismi. Fundamental opposition between societal
elements, linked through their contradictions, are then unrecog-
nizable by bourgeois thought.
Conclusion: Beyond a short description of formal bases of
dialectic materialism in relation to Positivism, the preceding
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discussion has focussed on the strong intorelation of epis-
temology and class interests and supports the materialist
premise that ideas or philosophies (in this case epistemologies)
do not derive from universalized and abstract ideas applicable
to all wo/men as the Positivists would have, but from particu-
larist class interests. Dialectical materialism openly an-
nounces its allegiance to the liberation of the dominated
classes; Positivism, as a liberal in;trumental epistemology,
mystifies its equally-strong connection to capitalist interests.
* The commitment of dialectical materialism is activatedin
its being a critical mode of knowledge which comprehends and
anticipates a reconciliation through theory and practice of
the liberal contradictions and alienations. In this sense,
dialectical materialism is the epistemology of the future com-
munal social form in which the resolution of the problems of
order, method, self and architecture and planning lies. Through
its critical uncovering of the potentials of freedom underlying
present domination, dialectical materialism is the tool which'
makes possible a consciousness and theoretical guide--the pre-
condition to action in the public world necessary for the
transformation of the liberal corder.
At the core of the reconciliation of dialectics is. the
restoration of human beings to their true nature as the sub-
jects of history (a recovery of the alienated person from cap-
italist domination). All the products of society, its ideas,
its institutions, its economy, its art and architecture, are
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manifestations of human intentionality and action--not the
operation of autonomous and reified structures which asaume
an alienated identity independent of the human beings who
produced them. Architecture and planning products can then
be- realized as concreti2zed social relations, economy as the
exchange of the products.of human activity, etc. Self and
society, knowing and being, theory and praxis, fact and value
are integrated in a historical project of human beings rea-
lizing their freedom by continually going beyond their given
situation in a reconciliation of the actual with the ideal.
Totalization is necessary because i1n this constant going be-
yond the given, human intentionality is always part of observ-
able action. One knows human beings only through the realiza-
tion of the intended ends of their acts and projects, not just
knowing the acts and projects themselves. Thus the cultural
order is irreducible to the natural order and Positivism can-
not comprehend human reality (Sartre).
Dialectic thought is a tool for analyzing the
world of facts in terms of its internal inadequacy.
Dialectic thought invalidates the a priori opposition
of value and fact by understanding all facts as stages
of a single process--a process in which subject and
object are so joined that truth can be determined only
within the subject-object-totality. All facts embody
the knower as well as the doer: they continuously
translate- the past into the present. The objects
thus 'contain' subjectivity in their very structure.
For Hegel, nothing is real which does not sustain it-
self in existence, in a life-and-death struggle with
the situation and conditions of existence. Reality
then is the conscious or unconscious process in which
that which is becomes other than itself. 1
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TOWARDS A CRITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRACTICE FOR ARCHITECTURE
AND PLANNING
Introduction: The purpose of this section is as a bridge,
linking the discussion so far to the level of the specific con-
temporary issues of a critical epistemology and practice for
architects and planners in the final conclusion section.
Critical practice is first characterized as a projt of
self and society to recover human freedomthrough the transfor-
mation of self and society. As such, professionals must see
themselves first as persons and members of the whole society,
before they can commit themselves to a liberative professional
practice. The general necessity of a liberative practice
through praxis is described actuated through a critical method.
The conditions and necessity of a contemporary critique are
stated in relation to. the potential of transformation and the
probable limits of a current critique. Finally, the arena for
critical practice is described as the world of everyday life
in which architectural and planning products are important
"need-mediating mechanisms."
The project: The profess.ons of architecture and planning,
as social facts and practices, are now moments of the totality
of domination. Like the liberal self and social order, the
architectural and planning process and product are alienated
as instrumental and static fragments whose reality and meaning
as the products of human intention is suppressed. Thus archi-
tecture and planning is not seen in moral terms as a moral
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practice, a concretization of particular choices made in free-
dom about the relations between human beings.
But when the professional's obsessive concentration on ob-
ject-relations is irradiated by the understanding of the to-
tality of human relations and meaning in which their products
participate, professionals can be brought back to themselves
and their freedom. At this point they become moral, for they
recognize their products as choices, the expression of a par-
ticular social resolution of the problems of order, method,
self, and architecture and planning. Professional practice can
then become the dealing with environmental issues of the human
community rather than the servant of some idealized and ab-
stract necessity, whether it be aesthetic, behavioural, eco-
nomic, or any other form of efficiency. The recovery of moral
choice and freedom through critique in theory and practice
undercuts the domination legitimated by abs-traction--the de-
finition and content of liberal society. Realizing the poten-
tial of freedom and the realization of the wholeness of self
and society, wo/men can see the potential of meaning in their
lives and practice and thus embark on the project of realizing
that meaning and freedom. Realizing that professional prac-
tice is a moment of the social whole, the present project of
self, society and the professions is to recover human freedom
in the simultaneous creation of a non-dominated self and non-
dominating society. Wo/men embark on the project as human
beings and as professionals through the critique and negation
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of the given in the creation of new forms of self and society.
Wo/men then can assume some control over their lives, ending
their alienation and recovering their own humanity and the hu-
manity of those they serve from the mystification of a history
and social order which reduces human relation to object rela-
tions, intersubjectivity to commodity exchange.
Praxis: When realized in the world, the project is a
praxis, or practice intended towards human liberation. Only
as committed to the general project of liberation will pro-
fessionals realize their specific professional projects of
creating environmental totalities from the.present fragmenta-
tion.
If men produce social reality (which in the in-
version of the praxis turns back upon them and con-
ditions them) than transforming that reality is an
historical task, a task for men...To no longer be
prey to the (force of oppressive reality that ab-
sorbs those-within it and thereby acts to submerge
men's consciousness), one must emerge from it and
turn upon it. This can be done only by means of the
praxis; reflection and action upon the world in order
to transform it. 1
The practice towards liberation is motivated at the core
by the self searching for a wholeness which can only be reaL
lized through a unity with a communal social order. Profes-
sionals, like 'veryone else in liberal society, are now the
players of fragmented roles; they will not be motivated to at-
tempt a liberative practice until,understanding their suffer-
ing from personal and professional contradictions and aliena-
tions, they realize themselves as whole human beings indepen-
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dent of societal role and class definition. Architects and
planners can then discover their grounding as linked to the
common interests and struggle of all people for a transfor-
mation of self and society, from the totalization of domin-
ation to that of freedom. Once professionals have realized
their fundamental mutuality with others'as a person, they
can begin to search for ways to use their particular environ-
mental concerns as an instrument of the general project, a
mode of relating to a liberative totality.
The necessity of critical knowledge: A practice which
seeks the liberation of what has remained unconsciously, the
hidden humanity beneath the dominating totality, cannot itself
be unconscious. Th6 thrust of the historical section of this
thesis is that unreflective practice can only serve the inter-
ests of domination. The process of recovery of humanity is
possible only through the critique, which uncovers in self and
society the hidden potential of freedom. The critique further
uncovers the processes through which domination originated and
is perpetuated, as well as the contradictions it spawns and the
means through which it may be overcome. Self and-society do
not change by fiat, but through the oppositions of human beings
who refuse to remain alienated. This opposition however only
develops when wo/men are conscious of their domination.
Reification is the necessary immediate reality of
every person living in capitalist society. It can be
overcome only by constant and constantly renewed efforts
to disrupt the reified structure of existence by con-.
cretely relating to the concretely manifested contra-
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dictions of the total development, by becoming con-
scious of the immanent meanings of these contradic-
tions for total development. THE STRUCTURE CAN BE
DISRUPTED ONLY IF THE IMMANENT CONTRADICTION OF THE
PROCESS ARE MADE CONSCIOUS. 1
Thought is a form of reality, of the very fibre of action.
The liberal and Positivist disjunction bet-Teen thought and ac-
tion is false. The duality for dialectical materialists between
thought and reality is overcome with the uinderstanding of the
self and history as a process constantly otalizing itself,
reaching beyond, a projecting from the given to the future.
"Reality is not--it becomes--and. to become, the participation
of thought is needed." 2 Consciousness is a necessary, indis-
pensable and integral part of that process of becoming. Liberal
thought in its atomization prevents consciousness of the struc-
tural domination of the liberal totality. Therefore mass re-
sistance born of the consciousness of common interests is
avoided. 3
Critical knowledge is not the imposition of an exterior
or transcendental value as the basis of a critique such as the
liberal definitions of man or any aesthetic or functionAl ide-
ology. Critical knowledge rather is born of the discovery
within the object of understanding of the hidden core of its
meaning. For the professions, this discovery is of the'archi-
tectural/planning products' embodiment of human relations, as
well as the professionals' role in perpetuating domination.
These discoveries act as both a dialectical contradiction/
opposition to the conventional definitions of professional mean-
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ing; as well as an internal, immanent critique of professional
practice. The practice of architecture and planning as the
creation of reified objects and processes will not end with
such a critique. But if profesionals are motivated by a search
for wholeness and dealienation, they must first realize in con-
sciousness their alienation and then in their praxis be guided
by knowledge as a necessary component of action. To create
consciousness and knowledge is a task of critique.
The present project of critique assumes a particular
meaning and form, because of the nature of knowledge and con-
sciousness in contemporary liberal society.. Scientific and
technological knowledge has replaced labor as the central
form of value in capitalist society. 1 ' 2 It is no longer the
material/physical conditions of production itself (e.g., the
filth and squalor of the industrial city) but the practice and
epistemology of technical rationality which is the major form
of contemporary domination. Science has become the "form of
life", the definition of truth, of industrial societies. The
formal laws of Positivism and the total alienation of contemp-
orary capitalism are mutually defining. Thus, for the Criti-
cal Theorists (such Frankfurt School critical theorists as
Horkheimer, Adorono, Marcuse, and Habermas), the critique of
instrumental reason itself replaces Marx's critique of poli-
tical economy as the contemporary mode of critical praxis.3
"The unleashing of technical rationality- is perceived to be the
most decisive of all forms of domination of men by men,...for
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their.integration into the universal context of delusion is so
inclusive that even the most serious efforts of liberation run
the danger of confirming and stabilizing the existing power
structure."
Instrumental rationality has penetrated to the inter-
stices of everyday life. Not only the productive process it-
self is involved, but every act of cognition and life, its
culture, language, intersubjectivity, values and the very for-
mation. of the ego itself. Capitalist rationality is now only
complete when affecting all life-processes. A contemporary
critique must then deal with and'transform not only the capi-
t.list institutions (which was the prime concern of the later
Marxist critique) but also the transformation/retotalization
of consciousness, the self, and culture itself.
The critical method:
Critical social theory begins with the position
that a codified scientific method is an inadequate
foundation for the validity of truth claims...Social
facts are approached in critical theory from a cul-
tural perspective not neutralized by research tech-
niques which may themselves conceal our prejudgments
of the data. Social inquiry begins from and returns
to the immediate. 2
The critical method then involves two basic processes, to-
talization and negation of the given. While defined separately,
these are both components of a knowledge which sees truth re-
siding only in a complete understanding of the human world.
1) Knowledge as a totalization: As Lenin says, "in order
to really to know an object we must embrace, study, all its
sides,' all its connections and 'mediations'... (as an) all- 290
sidedness...the whole of human experience should enter the full
'definition' of an object." 1  Thus truth cannot be abstract,
idealistic, deriving from conceptions of. reality, but from the
concrete reality itself. The totalizing process is an analysis
of the given historical situation seen in all its aspects as a
totality in which the "object" of analysis can be understood
only in its relation to the whole--its.elf not a static state
but a development and becoming through time.
. 2) KnowledGe as a critique and negation of the given:.
Implicit in the totalizing process is the assumption that the
given is epiphenomenal or a mask hiding an underlying reality.
The critique then, the act of dialectical reasoning, is not a
criticism in the conventional sense but a method of uncovering
the reality beneath appearance. As the apparent is not the
real, a negation of the given is necessary to reach reality.
A dialectical critique then uses a negative reason to pit
an apparent reality against its hidden social meaning as an -
element of a dominating totality. The realization of the con-
tradiction betwe.en appearances and social meaning is resolved
in the direction of at least a theoretical consciousness which
then can lead in the direction of human freedom inherent as a
Value in the critique project itself. By contrast, positive
reason, or Positivism, takes the given as reasonable, as real.
It defines- and collapses the essential to the actual, the under-
lying reality to the given. Hence, Positi ism cannot see social
reality as a mystification. The task of positive reason is only
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to determine. efficient means to ends whose origin,. value and
meaning it is methodologically incapable of dealing with. The
end of positive reason is control; the end of negative reason
is human liberation.
- The historical section of this thesis is a critique in
that it a) attempts to totalize the meaning of architecture
and planning by relating their internal -histories to their
determination by the institutions of each social form, and
b) attempts to reveal the real behind the apparent by contras-
ting the professionals' internal self-representations with
their social function and meaning. The contradictions revealed
by contrasting these two views of professional reality is an
immanent critique of the professional self-representation,
which then opens up the question of how the contradiction can
be resolved.
The assumption of the critical project is that knowledge
has the power to reveal to men their true condition which then
will lead to emancipation, a position identical with the theory
of psychoanalysis. The reconciliation between theory and prac-
tice, subject and object, the actual and ideal then is a cen-
tral concern of the totalizing.effort. Critical practice an-
ticipates a transformed social praxis which it itself cannot
effect but of which it is a necessary element.
The alienated condition of a contemporary critique: At
present, there is not, at least in the United States, the im-
mediate possibility of a mass transformation of consciousness
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or the basic liberal institutions. In this situation a total-
ized critique has to be a practice separate from a broad-
scaled social realization. The critique must then be carried
out in a nece.ssarily alienated state. Presently, the project
of'critique will most likely not be assumed by the working
classes (conventionally defined). While Marx addressed his
critique to the impoverished-proletarians whose labor was the
form of value in his time, the profossionals as the instruments
of instrumental rationality administer social power and value.
Architects and planners must therefore conduct their own cri-
tique.
Everyday life as a terrain for liberative practice: The
previous discussion has argued that the resolution of the lib-
eral problems of order, method, self, and architecture and
planning ultimately lies in the necessary transformation of
the basic capitalist institutions.(as the private ownership and
control of the factors of production and the productive process,
the markets in labor, land and essential commodities, income
determination on the basis of the market-dictated "returns"-to
the owned factors of production). But such a transformation
will be reached only with the creation of a widespread con-
sciousness of alienation and powerlessness. This consciousness
is built only on the revolutionary recreation of everyday life.
"Concrete goals must be focused on the immediate control of our
lives,," There are several reasons for the concentration on
the transformation of everyday life, particularly for archi-
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tectural and planning practice:
1) The origin of consciousness in everyday life:
Practice towards liberation is motivated at the core by the
most intimate and concrete experience of- alienation in the
search for 'wholeness. Thus, the concrete experience of an
alienating everyday life, and not the abstract appreciation
of the structural constraints on freedom, is the origin of the
intention to personally and professionally transform personal
and social reality.
- Everyday life is the realm of what capitalists claim is
the satisfaction of human needs. To the extent that needs are
not satisfied, contradictions and thus consciousness appears.
"The crucial observation is that (the claim of capitalism that
any subjectively felt need can be met by some form of goods
and services consumption) is open to the every-day, phenomenal,
critical testing by worker and citizen. The dialectic of con-
sciousness thus lies in the phenomenology of every-day life,
and revolutionary strategy must make this its organizational
principle."
2) Eve-ryday life as an arena of non-political trans-
formation: "The revolutionary movement is basically a social
movement of which politics is but one dimen-sion...Indeed, the
major contradictions in modern capitalism occur not in the po-
litical sphere, and cannot be corrected through political reme-
dies...The'political is merely one arm of a complex social struc-
ture composed of elements which must develop their revolutionary
conscio'usness th'rough their own internal dynamics." 2 Thus archi-
294
tects and planners as- practitioners within everyday life. are le-
gitimately first concerned with the transformation of their-own
practice.
3) The necessary transformation of culture as a need-
mediator in everyday life: Culture, as experienced in everyday
life, is the mediator between the "species needs" of human beings
(such as described as the problems of order, self, and method)
and the resolution of those needs in a particular social order.
Thus under capitalism, it is essential that human beings are
taught through the cultural definition of reality to value and
"need" only what is required and can be produced by capitalist
2
imperatives. The institutionalization of these imperatives be-
.omes the structure of everyday life and. social relations--the
reality from which wo/men's norms, values, ideologies, personal-
ity, interests, hopes, and cultures derive..Everyday reality in
its pervasiveness appears given, natural, "real," and commonsensi-
cal; but in fact this reality is the need-mediating construction
of a particular and highly unnatural order. In Gintes' words,
a) society creates needs through the effect of
capitalist development on everyday life; b) mediates
the transition of these needs into overt preferences
and motivations by means of a set of commodity fet-
ishist cultural instruments'(empirical beliefs); and
c) supplies the objects of these overt preferences. 3
4) The transformation of architecture and planning
as need-mediating mechanisms in everyday life: An important
role of architectural and planning practice is in creating need-
mediating environmental objects and processes whose impact is
subjectively experienced in everyday life. The environment is
a concretization/objectification of social relationships, a
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need-mediation deriving from capitalist imperatives. For ex-
ample, Americans are taught to desire a home in the suburbs
for its "life style" benefits. But the social fragmentation
and isolation that home represents is an instrument of social
control. Americans are taught to admire "great" skylines and
architectural monuments, but such structures symbolize and are
a product of class domination. Americans are taught that de-
signers and builders produce environments, but this professional
specialization also embodies an alienation of individuals1from
control of their surroundings. The impact, consciousne.s and
contradictions of environmental mediations is first generated
in everyday life.
5) The concentration of architectural and planning
activity at the level of everyday life: Architectural and plan-
ning decision making in America for the most part does not op-
erate at the level of fundamental capitalist institutions at
which the state/industrial complex operates. Rather, the pro-
fessions' impact is in the reinforcing but not structuring of
those institutions; architecture and planning function at the
secondary decision-making level of everyday life. Thus the
following section on the liberative projects for architectural
and planning knowledge and practice concentrates riot on the
transformation of fundamental capitalist institutions but on
the environmental issues of everyday life with which professions
conventionally deal. Work on this level is a precondition to
more fundamental change.
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CONCLUSION
PROJECTS FOR A CRITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRACTICE FOR -
ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
Introduction: This section outlines specific projects that
architects and- planners committed to the general project of so-
cial critique and liberation can realize -within their role as
professionals. The necessary personal commitment of the archi-
tect and planner as person and professional is first discussed.
Specific critiques of the structural elements of the profession
are then outlined, followed by the potentials and dialogic na-
ture of a liberative practice and finally some remarks on the
critique and practice of professional education.
The Projects:
1) The personal project of the architect and planner:
The professionals' project of contribution to the construction
of a non-alienating social order begins with their recognition
of indivisibility with others. Architects and planners must par-
ticipate as whole persons as well as role-occupants with all
other human beings in social transformation which restores the
human being as the subject of self, society and history. The
professional is deeply implicated in his subject, and the sub-
ject/object distinction inherent in his socially-defined role
is fundamentally false, a form of alienation. This realization
has two immediate implications.
a) Epistemology: Professional epistemology and
knowledge must be totalizing and dialectic, since a knowledge
of meanings rather than of abstract reductions can be the only
basis on which any sort of environmental, personal and societal
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unification can occur.-
b) Practice: The professional and client must
create a situation in which both can speak and work with each
other free of the domination of false authority, in full re-
cognition of each others' freedom; this situation is called
dialogue. (Frere). The professionals, normally in a position
of authority, have a strong responsibility to show others
their own freedom while realizing their own. The alternate
can only be for either professional or client to dominate each
other. As a d.ialogue, the professional working situation is a
microcosm of the future free society.
The professionals' knowledge of the world is deeply im-
.plicated in and cannot be separated from knowledge of them-
selves and their position in the social world. Further, know-
ledge changes the knower as much as the known, so reality is
constantly in transformation.
The character and quality of such knowing is
molded not only by-a man's technical skills or even by
his intelligence alone, but also by all that he is and
wants, but his courage no less than his talent, by his
passion no less than his objectivity. It depends on
all that a man does and lives. In the last analysis,
if a man wants to change what he knows, he must change
how he lives; he must change his praxis in the world. 1
Professionals must accept the hazard and potential of all
knowledge which becomes an internal and mutual awareness rather
than an abstracted knowing. The professionals' self, practice
and role-identification may change into presently unidentifiable
forms as a result of his practice--forms which challenge more
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secure but alienated distinctions between professional and
client, design subject and design object.
2) An internal critique of architectural and plan-
ning practice: The architectural and planning professions, as
distinct social practices serving the creation of the world of
everyday life, must conduct a multi-phased internal critique.
Unreflective practice has inevitably served the interests of
the ruling class.
a) Critical history of architecture and planning:
Truth is only in the totality, composed of elements intercon-
nected in a constantly transforming process. Therefore time is
the necessary ground on which the past, present, and future of
architecture and planning practice must be understood. The
history of architecture and planning theory and practice must
be retotalized in the service of liberative intention. (See
introduction section for a fuller discussion on the meaning
and necessity of the historic retotalization). This involves
among other elements:
i) the use of an epistemology which is capable
of dealing with the social/environmental to-
tality. The epistemology involves dialectical
materialism as.well as an as-yet unformulated
phenomenological epistemology of the built-
world, capable of apprehending the specifically
environmental meanings of everyday life (see
the following discussion on a critique of the
epistemology of architecture and planning).
1i) the totalization of architectural and plan-
ning theory and practice as part of the social
whole. The history in this thesis is meant as
a necessarily sketchy, abstract and abbreviated
example of such a totalization. Involved-are:
an articulated theory of the self.and social
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order; a liberative intention; an examination
of all' the factors of the internal theory and
practice of architecture and planning in their
relation to the totality: a critique of exis-
ting modes of architecture and planning history
in light of a liberative' intent.
iii) A special emphasis on deciphering the
secret, the hieroglyph which is hidden within
the formal structure of conventionally under-
stood architectural and plinning objects and
processes. The key of course to deciphering
the secret is the understanding that the ob-
jects and processes are embodiments of social
relations. I see this insight and project as
having a tremendous impact on conventional per-
ceptions of the meaning of form and formal
structures, corroding the fetishistic formal
concerns and thus making possible a realiza-
tion of the necessity of dealing with archi-
tectural and planning products as a direct re-
sponse to social relations. The project I have
termed "critical object-analysis."
b) Critique of the professional structure: The
professions' internal organization and structural relations to
the society are highly determinant of their products, and there-
fore must themselves be subject to critique. Important factors
of professional structure include: occupational role definitidns,
career structures, educational requirements and process, power
distributions, socialization methods, required personality char-
acteristics, professional subcultures, reward systems and rela-
tions (mediations) to other social structures. These factors
at present generally reflect the more general social hierarchi-
calization and fragmentation at the professional level. Thus
the domination the professiQns are ideally committed to elimin-
ate is reproduced within the professional organization itself.
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c) Critique of the _polftical economy in relation
to architecture and planning: This project, not the focus.of
the thesis' historical section, is a historical critique of the
relation of the primary political, economic and social capital-
ist institutions in themselves and in relation to architectural
1
and planning issues. This project is necessary in order for
th.e professionals' break out of their idealistic sleep to con-
front the political and economic forces which determine their
practice. Only with his knowledge can they begin to act effec-
tively, through a realization that they must become political
actors,
d) Critique of the epistemology of architecture
and planning: An important focus of the thesis is the demon-
stration that the epistemology used by architects and planners
establishes the limits and potentials of their practice. In-
deed, epistemology is only the formalization of our method of
knowing which is inseparable from our perception of reality.
Thus the method is a totality itself. There is no such thing
as an epistemological vacuum, or objectivity. We cannot escape
existing and knowing within an attitude which then defines us,
our practice, and our reality.
Two urgent epistemological projects for architects and
planners are i) the need for a critical and specifically human
knowledge, and ~ii) the need for a spedific knowledge of the
built-world.
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j) The need for a soecifically human knowlee:
The specifically human critical knowledge is in the most general
sense dialectical materialism. But this knowledge is at present
more an attitude towards reality than an elaborated systemiza-
tion of methodology, procedures and theories with which to in-
vestigate and participate in reality. The knowledge then is
still in the process of being born and formed and elaborated.
Architects and planners then cannot adopt a ready-made epite-
mology-and methodology, but must participate in its creation.
As has been discussed, the urgency of finding a non-Positivist
.basis for human knowledge is underscored by the failures of re-
cent social and economic policy planning, based on an instru-
mental Positivism. These failures in part demonstrated the in-
adequacy of Positivism as a way of knowing social reality and
acted as a stimulus to the social sciences in their turning to
a dialectical model.2
ii) The need.for a knowledge of the built-world:
Recent architectural and planning thought has been involved with
ways of knowing the specific interactions of man and environment
and environmental meanings which sociological and'psychological
research did not deal with. Most work so far has appropriated
the non-wholistic and non-critical Positivism. Necessary is an
understanding which can comprehend the environment not as a
collection of analyzable objects of specific interactions, but
as the totality in which these objects and interactions parti-
cipate. In this totality (called by Manoff the bilt-world),
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.. we nihilate any distinction between...us and
our environment, for the situation is neither subjective
or objective, but a relation of being between the two
in which both are comprehended fully as all that they
can ever be at that moment.
We are what we are...as subjpc.ts of an environment,
as the embodied choice of some among its-possibilities,
as the closing of its particular openness. (We must)
replace the study of architectonic objects with that of
the processes by which they become such for use, by
which and through we intend them in our praxis, mean
them and assert them as both the product and foundation
of reality.
We return to architecture seeking the modes of our
own performance by which architecture becomes what it
is for us, study the ways we are with architecture and
experience it, how we have a world that is ours in
common. 1
Here wo/men are again made the subject of environmental exis-
tence, recovering their being from its displacement into the
architectural fetish-object. 2
Knowledge of the "built-world" differs from current en-
vironmental psychology's emphasis on either the "'subjective"
or."objective" relations of wo/men to environment by asserting
that any relations can only be understood as a relation of
meaning and intention, a unity of the subjective and objective.
Psychological/sociological research techniques then become at
best a part, a moment, of a totalizing environmental knowledge.
3) A practice fordliberation: The precondition of
architects' and planners' practice for liberation is that they
take seriously their alienation and to some extent recover
their own .needs and intentions from the generalized critical
sleep of society. Professionals then see.their responsibility
not only to technically implement and advocate for the immedi-
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ately-expressed environmental needs of the everyday world. This
world is precisely the locus of a dominated and therefor' re-
pressed consciousness; dominated, people cannot realize their
real needs and take socialized needs as essential. The project
'is first to bring to consciousness the repressed needs and.
mystified structure of societal domination, which then consti-.
tute the contradiction of the given everyday reality (this is
the critical method). With consciousness, wo/men recover the
potential for realizing their freedom.
The commonly-defined professional project of service
through problem-solving is then necessary but radically insuf-
ficient as the basis of a liberative practice. The professional
project is also educative, a leading-forth of human beings from
their alienation to realize their own repression and therefore
recover their potential to achieve freedom and a moral exis-
tence. The context of professional practice must be within a
theory of action which relates action to liberative intention,
and this theory-making is a constant process growing out of
and guiding action.
The mode of non-dominating professional practice must be
participatory and dialogic. Through dialogue, men are freed
"from the thralldom of silence arid monologue"1of human rela-
tions in the alienated everyday world. This world is then made
problematic, not accepted as a given but questioned in its
every natural, cultural and historical dimension. Given this
profound questioning, a systematic doubt, it is first possible
305
to see the world's domination for what it is and thus change
it. This process of questioning in everyday life means the
unity of theory and action. The generation of critical- theory
is a constant and necessary function in everyday life.
There can be no separation of critical theory
and participatory struggles on the level of both social
and personal existence. To restore spontaneous free
existence...on the societal and personal level...is to
regain a sense of totality and the capacity to begin
- anew. Ultimately the critical consciousness is manifest
in its acts, and in its readiness to reflect on them.
Critical action and reflection inscribe an ever-renewable
circle that cannot be stopped arbitrarily or adequately
expressed in a formalistic theory. Indeed, if critical
theory is ever to become a force for change, it must
do so by transforming our consciousness about the de-
velopmental tendencies of both societal and personal
processes. 1
But with the lack of a widespread social movement, an in-
crementalist strategy towards social change "seems tactically
to be appropriate to safeguard the continuation of revolutionary
theory and action until time for a united front will come."2
This incrementalism is unlike current planning "incrementalist"
strategy and theory making in that it is based on a long-range
critical intention of social/institutional transformation, as
well as a constant theoretical and practical activity in light
of that intention. Each particular architecturaYplanning prob-
lem is an opportunity for its being redefined in terms of the
whole. Consciousness may therefore be increased, while the
problem resolution may be aimed atachieving an incremental
degree of freedom which cannot be reversed ("non-reversible"
action).
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The dialogic relation of the professional and client is
itself an important means to raise consciousness, a micro-
cosmic model of the non-dominating relationships of the com-
munal society. In a dialogic relation, the professionals work
not for but with their clients in terms of mutuality, respect,
communality and ultimately love. Love is the only form of
relationship in which the mutual needs of autonomy and community
are reconciled, through the professionals and clients accept-
ance of each other as whole persons, rather than as instru-
mentalities or role occupants. Through the dialogic encounter,
the professionals and clients lose some of their role-identity
and therefore become more humanized. Indeed, the professionals
may eventually hope to eliminate their role in specific situa-
tions, by giving others their power rather than hoarding it--
educating their clients to assume power over the environment and
their lives themselves. Clients can then gain both competence
and their owm meaning and power. In the dialogic encounter,
both professional and client are transformed.
4) Critique and practice of frfessional education:
University departments of architecture and planning are pre-
sently significant socializing agents and research arms of the
professions and capitalism. Yet while the universities gener-
ally perpetuate unreflective comprehension of professionals to
the next generation, they are relatively free zones of con-
sciousness in the society and could be important foci of lib-
erative and critical practice.
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Presently, university departments of architecture and
planning are generally structured around a single or plural-
istic ideology which perpetuates within professional education
the larger society's tactics of domination: as with democracy,
many viewpoints may be tolerated as long as they do not
threaten fundamental capitalist institutions.
Some departments concentrate on single ideologies of
technocratic (SUNY Buffalo) or visual (Princeton) rationality;
the critique of instrumental rationality is a critique of their
curriculum. But in some schools (notably MIT and the University
of California'at Berkeley) a more complex critical problem is.
posed; such schools embrace no dominant 'paradigm' but offer
many approaches. While such educational 'pluralism' opens the
possibility of critical dialogue within a university community,
the departments (at least at MIT) represent a delicate balance
of simultaneous but non-interacting approaches. While appearing
to be the most intellectually honest response to what the
schools read as an indeterminant social/professional situation,
pluralism in fact represents a value statement that no common
determinable value(at least for the present) is possible. Plural-
ist departmental structure is parallel to the supermarket,l whose
diversity of (educational) products for 'sale' belies their
common origin in (and effective support of) a non-critically un-
derstood capitalist order of domination. Any critical intent to
understand and determine the ends and values to which the
variety of approaches are means is eliminated from
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the educational agenda. The lack of dialogue then trivializes
each approach's claim to validity and administratively serves
to stabilize or "keep the peace" between departmental factions.
Students are left as best they can to fulfill (if they are so
inclined) th' critical function themselves. More often, the
critical consciousness is not awakened.
Critical knowledge can develop only when serious alterna-
tives confront each other. Dialogue may be fearful and threat-
ening,- but it is far more dangerous for the universities and
society to avoid such dialogue, to avoid the exercise of a
value rationality.' The universities educate problem-solvers
but cannot comprehend and therefore begin to resolve the basis
of the problem.
The dominance of pluralism or any single visual/instrumen-
tal rationality is a reproduction in the university of the gen-
eral social hierarchicalization and specialization, specific-
ally designed through its fragmentation to prevent critical
consciousness. Organized as such, the university then tacitly
denies the possibility of human-beings collectively determining
common values as the basis of a non-dominating communal social
order. The university thus perpetuates alienation.
If the universities are to emerge from their particular
non-critical sleep, they must engage in a moral education, edu-
cating for a value-rationality as well as an instrumental
problem-solving rationality. The transformation of the uni-
versities becomes an important -part of professional liberative
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practice. In this education it is crucial-that an academic
division of labor does not occur to the extent that archi-
tectural and planning theorists/critics/philosophers develop
independently as the practitioners of a specialized subfield
which does not touch the consiousness and practice of people
"in the field."
I believe that the current situation of architectural
and planning education in most universities is a serious-
abdication of the-universities' intellectual and moral re-
sponsibility and potential. The transformation of the uni-
versities becomes an important part of professional libera-
tive practice.
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CONCTUTJSION
Underlying this thesis has been the theory of the whole
self as the necessary reconciliation of the simultaneous need
for autonomy and community. The whole self is possible only
with the simultaneous possibility of developing individuality
and the existence of a non-dominating communal social order in
which the value of self is recognized by others not as instru-
mental role-occupant but as a whole person. Then the possibil-
ity of an unalienated self is dependent on the realization -of
an unalienated world, possible to the extent that observer and
participant, self and society share a common experience and
meaning--in short, a non-dominating community of shared mean-
ings. The problems of order, method, the self, and architec-
ture and planning are then inseparably linked. A non-dominatirg
social order is predicated on a shared communal knowledge of
specifically human meanings, possible only when human community
poses not a threat but a realization of the self. Architecture
and planning in turn can be liberative only when they partici-
pate in the creation of a non-alienated society. The resolu-
tion of one problem is inseparable from the resolution of all;
the nature of consciousness is inseparable from the politics of
social power.
This totalizing understanding, in which the realization of
the freedom and potential of one element of social reality is
inseparable from. the realization of the social totality, is the
basis for answering the questions which motivated this thesis:.
what is meaning and architecture and planning; what is the
human relation to form and environment; what is my personal
relation to the professions and to the world, and why do I
feel so estranged from both?
Meaning in architecture and planning can exist only when
professional theory and praxis is integrated.into the societa.
project of transforming capitalist institutions, for the pos-
sibility of an ordered and meaningful environment is dependen
on the.existence of a non-dominating society. Human relation
to form and environment can be meaningful only when both termS
of the relationship, human beings and environment, originate
in and are agents of meaningful social relations (meaning de-
fined as the correspondence between inner human needs and -
their realization and objectification in the social world).
Otherwise, forms exist in their presently alienated condition
as a fetishized reality independent of human relations, and
meanings, while human beings exist in their presently alienates
role as instrumental tools of abstract capitalist imperatives.
My felt alienation from the professions and from others
was, to a significant extent, a reflection of an alienated
social order in which community is seen as a domination rather
than a fulfillment and professional practice seemed to repro-
duce alienation despite its best intentions.
A liberated architectural and planning theory, epistemolozy
and practice are then indissolubly linked to ard dependent on
a theory, epistemology and practice of a liberated society
which at base is grounded in a theory of the nature of the
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whole self. The theory and practice of architecture and
planning is the theory and practice of human beings seeking
their own freedom and the freedom of others.
Then as persons and professionals, architects and planners
must "analyze and question the existence of- the (professional)
subject and (professional) object, their roles, function in
society and relations to each other. Radical professionals
gradually begin to question their concepts, their methods,-
the image of the profession, their professional and practical
training, their own valud systems, and those of their clients.
They see that purely 'rational'...methods, removed from a
broader context, do violence to people. In view of this, they
abandon their former 'natural' acceptance of given structural
imperatives.
Since the middle ages, the theorists of architecture and
planning have failed to ground their theories in any adequate
conception of the experienced socio-historical world and a re-
flection on the professionals' place in that world. The
idealist philosophic positions underlying the practice of mod-
ern architecture and planning are separate from the world and
invert the real relationship between thought and reality. It
is not new problem-solving techniques or methodologies that
will change the world. The resolution of the multiple crises
of the present is not in the magic intervention of some new
technique, but in structural change of basic social institu-
tions. This thesis then offers no technical solutions. Its
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involvement with epistemological method is not in terms of
knowledge as a technique, but as a form of critical conscious-
ness, as a means to uncover the need and potential for personal-
and social freedom and wholeness repressed in liberal society.
As Kuenzlen suggests, architects and planners committed to a
liberative practice must instead engage in a thorough-going
examination of the world in which they live and act. This is
a process of critical activity and self-reflection in the con-
text of the perceived realities of one's personal and profes-
sional everyday life.
A result of this linked critical action and reflection is
the realization that the social life world is a human creation.
The dominance of a given form of self, consciousness, social
order, knowledge, architecture and planning is a human choice
among alternatives in an open field of human freedom and po-
tential. The given is not an idealized absolute. Critical
action and reflection recovers the possibility of moral choice
among alternate forms of knowledge, thought, and potentially,
action. The realization that the social life-world is a human
creation is the beginning of freedom, of the possibility of
choosing the way we live, and o-f showing .others their own free-
dom.
In taking seriously their feelings that something is wrong
in "normal" reality, architects and planners can take themselves
and their practice seriously. Their alienation and meaningless-
ness can, on reflection, be understood as an expression of con-
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flicts on all levels of existence whose resolution is dependent
on the creation of community. For the professionals, as for
all human beings, the solutions to the problems of order,
method, self, and architecture and planning must be through
participating in the historic project of the transformation of
society. This thesis is a moment in the search for a ground-
ing for a liberative practice towards that end.
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MARX) WHOSE THEORETICAL CONSCIOUSNESS DERIVED FROM
THE LIBERAL ALIENATION OF THOUGHT FROM A UNITY WITH
SOCIAL REALITY. SEE THE DISCUSSION IN SECTION II, THE
LIbERAL SOCIAL ORDER, THE PROBLEM OF ORDER, ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL THEORY AND THE THEORETICAL
CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER LI.BERALISM.
47 1 POLANYI, KARL , THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME, BOSTON: BEACON
PRESS, 1944, PG. 46
50. 1 UNGER
54 1 THIS TYPE OF CRITICISM CAN BE SEEN IN MANY ARCHITECTURAL
HISTORIES (SEE GIEDION OR SCULLY), ARCHITECTURAL
MAGAZINES (E.G. ARCHITECTURAL RECORD) AND PLANNING
JOURNALS (E.G. ANY ARTICLES DEALING WITH THE FORMAL
PROPERTIES OF MODELS, PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES, ETC.).
61 1 MUMFORD, LEWIS, THFE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS.,ITS
TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ITS PROSPECTS, NEW YORK: HARCOURT,
BRACE AND WORLD, 1961, PG. 13 -
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62 1 FRASER, DOUGLAS, PIljANGEN( IN I
.L, NEW YORK: GEORGE BRAZILLER, 1968, PG. 9
65 1 THE FUNCTIONAL OR VISUAL/AESTHETIC RATIONALITY OF
MODERNIST ARCHITECTURE IS AN EXAMPLE OF FORMAL
IMPERATIVES. SEE SECTION II ON MODERNIST ARCHITECTURE.
2 SEE SECTION III, TOWARDS A CRITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY,
EVERYDAY LIFE.
3 FOR EXAMPLE, PRIMITIVE CULTURES WITH WIDELY DIFFERENT
SOCIAL FORMS HAVE ALL ARRANGED THEIR BUILDINGS IN
PARALLEL ROWS.
66 1 TZONIS, ALEXANDER, TAmijRDSA_njtfnPERESSI ENV I RN-
m. BOSTON, I PRESS, 1972, PG. 36
2 THE GENERIC METHOD OF ENVIRONMENTAL ORDERING WAS AN
ARRANGEMENT OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE NATURAL ENVIRON-
MENT TO REVEAL THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE DIVINE MODEL.
THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH A TAXONOMIC, OR.
CLASSIFYING, PROCESS. FOR THE DOGON OF AFRICA, THE
TAXONOMY WAS REALIZED IN RELATIONS OF CONTIGUITY,
THE CONNECTION OF OBJECTS, SPACES, BUILDINGS AND
LAND WITH EACH OTHER., IN A MODERN PERSPECTIVE, THE
TAXONOMY WAS AN ORDERING OF THINGS WHICH RELIEVED
THE ANXIETY STEMMING FROM THE UNPREDICTABILITY,
INCONSISTENCY, AND CONFUSION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRON-
MENT. BUT IN FACE OF THE GREAT VARIETY AND COMPLEXITY
OF TAXONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS, THE 'ANXIETY' PERSPECTIVE
IS AN INADEQUATE EXPLANATION. RATHER, THE GREAT -
VARIETY OF ARRANGEMENTS REFLECT THE CORRESPONDINGLY
GREAT DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF
THE VARIOUS SOCIETIES.
3 SEE CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER ON UNSELFCONSCIOUS DESIGN
IN HIS NpTES ON THE SYNTHESIS OF FORM, CITED IN THE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
67 1 FINLEY, THE WORLD OF 0DYSSEUS, QUOTED IN TZONIS,
OP. CIT., PG. 36
2 SEE SECTION II, BAROQUE AND LIBERAL ARCHITECTURE AND
PLANNING
3 EXAMPLES OF TRIBAL DESIGN: THE DESIGN OF THE MBUTI
AND-DOGON TRIBES OF AFRICA WILL BE USED AS EXAMPLES
OF VILLAGE DESIGN AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SOCIAL
TOTALITY.
SOlC AL RELATTONS AS THE.BAS QF VILAGE.
DESIGN-THE MPUTT: THE MBUTI PYGMIES OF THE NORTH-
EASTERN CONGO ARE A SURVIVING PALEOLITHIC (STONE AGE)
CLAN OF HUNTERS AND GATHERERS. THE CLAN IS A
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COMPOSITE OF OVER A.DOZEN PATRILINEAGES WHICH JOIN
AND LEAVE THE BAND AT WILL. HOLDING THE BANDS TO-
GETHER IS THE NEED FOR COMMUNAL EFFORT IN KILLING
GAME AND COLLECTING WILD VEGETABLES, YET THE
PRINCIPLE OF COOPERATION IS ARTICULATED NOT AS AN
ECONOMIC NECESSITY BUT ON RELIGIOUS AND MORAL GROUNDS.
THE CALM OF THE FOREST IS USED AS A MODEL OF ETHICAL
HUMAN BEHAVIOUR WHICH PROSCRIBES AGGRESSIVE OR
SELFISH ACTS.
THE MBUTI CAMPS FOLLOW NO PREDETERMINED DESIGN
PRINCIPLE LINKING A SACRED OR SOCIAL IDEAL WITH A
PARTICULAR PHYSICAL FORM. YET, SEVERAL DESIGN-'RULES'
ARE FOLLOWED, EXPRESSING THE CURRENT FEELINGS BETWEEN
THE MEMBERS OF THE BAND. THE ORIENTATION OF THE
OPENINGS OF THE HUTS ACTS AS A SOCIAL SIGNIFIER.
IF THE OPENING FACES ANOTHER- PERSON'S HUT,
FRIENDLINESS IS EXPRESSED; IF THE OPENING IS FACING
AWAY OR.IF THE HUT IS MOVED SOME DISTANCE FROM ANOTHER
PERSON'S HUT, DISPLEASURE IS EXPRESSED. THE PHYSICAL/
ENVIRONMENTAL EXPRESSION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS ACTS~AS
A SIGN WHICH STIMULATES COMMUNITY ACTION TO HEAL THE
DCI AL. BREACH.
HUTS ARE NOT ORIENTED TOWARDS A PARTICULAR
GEOGRAPHIC DIRECTION WHICH RELATES TO A DIVINE
COSMOLOGY. RATHER,-HUTS ARE GENERALLY PLACED TO DEFINE
A CENTRAL PLACE WHICH SIGNIFIES THE SOLIDARITY AND
AUTHORITY OF THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE. SIGNIFICANTLY
IN THE MBUTI EGALITARIAN SOCIETY, THE CENTER OF THE
CAMP IS NORMALLY VOID, SIGNIFYING A COMUNAL AUTHORITY.
BY- CONTRAST, THE TYPICAL BOURGEOIS/LIBEAL DESIGN
PLACES A MONUMENT OR MAJOR STRUCTURE AT THE CENTER OR
FOCUS OF MAJOR SPACES, SIGNIFYING A HIERARCHICAL
TASS-8BASED AUTHORITY.
A-OylhI-L.DLAS-.IEE-BAsL-$1E__vLLME-DEfilDGN-
II±_POGON: A DIVINE MODEL IS THE EXPLICIT BASIS FOR'
VILLAGE PLANNING OF THE AFRICAN DOGON VILLAGERS. THE
HUMAN BODY IS 'THE NATURAL OBJECT OUT OF WHICH MOST
OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE COSMOLOGICAL MODEL IS
EXTRAC-TED BY ANALOGY.' (TZONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 23)
MAN IS THE 'SEED OF THE UNIVERSE...(HE) IS THE IMAGE
NOT ONLY OF CREATION'S FIRST BEGINNING BUT ALSO OF
(THE ORDER OF) THE EXISTING UNIVERSE.' (QUOTED IBID.,
PG. 23) YET MAN CAN DISTURB AND DESTROY THIS ORDER.
DESIGN 'ARRESTS AND RqMOVES' THE DISORDER BY RESTOR-
ING THE STRUCTURE OF THE DIVINE MODEL. EACH RART.OF
THE VILLAGE, THE HOUSES AND SPACES WITHIN, THE VILLAGE
PLAN IMITATING THE GREAT PLACENTA FROM WHICH ALL
HAS EMERGED, THE BUILDING PLAN WHICH IN WHOLE AND IN
PART REPRESENT A PROCREATING MAN, THE CLOTHING AND
UTENSILS-ALL THESE. ARE PART OF THE DOGON ANTHRO-
POMORPHIC DESIGN. 'THROUGH THE SUCCESSIVE REPETITION
OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE COSMOLOGICAL MODEL, A
CONSISTENT ORGANIZED PATTERN IS ARRANGED LEADING FROM
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INDIVIDUAL MAN TO THE TOTAL UNIVERSE.' (IBID. , PG. 27)
As. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT IS AN EMBODIMENT OF THE
DIVINE MODEL, SO IN IDEAL FORM ARE THE RELATIONSHIPS
AND ACTIVITIES OF THE DOGON PEOPLE. THE NATURAL, MAN-
MADE AND INTERPERSONAL ENVIRONMENTS ARE UNITED, ALL
SOCIETAL ELEMENTS, MUTUALLY CONSISTENT AND INTERRELATED,
AS DEFINED BY AN IMMANENT DIVINE MODEL.
4 BOOKCHIN, MURRAY, IHEE MITS OF THE CIT, NEW YORK:
HARPER AND Row, 1964
68 1 QUOTED, IBID., PG. 11
69 1 IBID., PG. 8
2 THE PERSISTENCE OF THE CLAN IS ONE OF MANY INSTANCES
NOTED IN THIS THESIS IN WHICH SOCIAL RELATIONS
DOMINATE AND PRECEED TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION. THIS
IS A POSITION CONTRARY TO THE COMMON TECHNOLOGICAL
DETERMINISM OF CURRENT POSITIVIST INSTRUMENTAL THOUGHT.'
THE .POSITION IS DEVELOPED BY STEVEN MARGLIN IN
LD__OSSSD_?, PUBLICATION OF THE HARVARD
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 1.971.
3 BOOKCHIN, OP. CIT., PG. 14
72 1 MUMFORD, OP. CIT.
2 THE SEPARATION OF THE.SOURCE OF TRUTH AND VALUE FROM
THE EARTH ITSELF (MEDIEVAL SOCIETY WAS NOT THE EARLIEST.
INSTANCE OF THIS SEPARATION) WAS THE RADICAL PRE-
CONDITION FOR THE EXPLOSION OF THE MEDIEVAL UNITY
INTO ATOMIZED INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL FRAGMENTS. THE RESULT
WAS THE UTILITARIAN MAN OF LIBERAL SOCIETY WHOSE ONLY
SOC.IAL BONDING WAS THE HARMONY OF INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS,
AS DEFINED BY LIBERAL SOCIAL THEORISTS. AS GOD DID
NOT INHERE IN THE EARTH ITSELF, THE EARTH COULD BE
EXPLOITED FOR GAIN. WHEN THE DIVINE SOURCE OF UNITY
AND MEANING WAS NOT OF THE EARTH, THE UNITY OF SELF
AND CONSCIOUSNESS HAD TO ENCOMPASS HEAVEN AND EARTH,
THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE. THE BREACH BETWEEN THE TWO
ESTABLISHED THE POSSIBILITY OF WO/MEN SPLITTING THEIR
SELVES, A PORTION OF WVHICH COULD BE SOLD ON THE LABOR
MARKET. THIS SPLIT BECAME THE HUMAN CONTENT OF LIBERAL
SOCIETY.
73 1 MUMFORD, OP. CIT., PG. 268
74 1 IBID.*, PG. 269
75 1 A SENSE OF THE RANGE AND CORPORATE UNITY OF THE
NEDIEVAL CITIZENS IS GIVEN IN THIS DESCRIPTION BY
ALBRECHT DURER OF A PROCESSION IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY
ANTWERP. 321
'I SAW THE PROCESSION PASS ALONG THE STREET,
THE PEOPLE BEING ARRANGED IN ROWS, EACH MAN SOME
DISTANCE FROM HIS NEIGHBOR, BUT THE ROWS CLOSE
BEHIND THE OTHER. THERE WERE THE GOLDSMITHS, THE
PAINTERS, THE MASONS, THE BRODERERS, THE SCULPTORS,
THE JOINERS, THE CARPENTERS, THE SAILORS, THE
FISHERMEN, THE BUTCHERS, THE LEATHERERS, THE CLOTH-
MAKERS, THE BAKERS, THE TAILORS, THE CORDWAINERS-
INDEED, WORKMEN OF ALL KINDS, AND MANY CRAFTSMEN
AND DEALERS WHO WORK FOR THEIR LIVELIHOOD. LIKE-
WISE, THE SHOP-KEEPERS AND MERCHANTS AND THEIR
ASSISTANTS OF ALL KINDS WERE THERE. AFTER THESE CAME
THE SHOOTERS WITH GUNS, BOWS AND CROSSBOWS, AND THE
HORSEMEN AND FOOT-SOLDIERS ALSO. THERE FOLLOWED THE
UATCH OF THE LORD MAGISTRATES. THEN CAME A FINE
TROOP ALL IN RED, NOBLY AND SPLENDIDLY CLAD. BEFORE
THEM, HOWEVER, WENT ALL THE RELIGIOUS ORDERS AND THE
MEMBERS OF SOME FOUNDATIONS, VERY DEVOUTLY, ALL IN7
THEI.R -DIFFERENT ROBES.2
I SEE SECTION II, THE POST-LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER,
DISCUSSION ON HABERMAS' DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
PURPOSIVE-RATIONAL AND SYMBOLIC-INTERACTIONAL
SOCIETAL SYSTEMS.
1 PEVSNER, NIKOLAUS, AN OUT'LINF O FE.UROPEAN
AR CH I TECTURE, BALTIfIMORE; PENGUIN BOOKS, 1960. PG. 95
1 MUMFORD, OP. CIT., PG. 304
2 SEE SECTION II, POSTSCRIPT: LIBERAL SOCIETY AS A TOTAL
ALIENATION
ILSTORIC CONDITIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOTHIC
CATHEDRAL: GOTHIC ARCHITECTURE ORIGINATED IN THIRTEENTH-
CENTURY FRANCE, REACHING A SPIRITUAL DEPTH AND
ASCENDENCY UNHAMPERED BY THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE WHICH
RACKED GERMANY OVER THE INVESTITURES ISSUE. FRANCE WAS
THEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE AN INDEPENDENCE OF CHURCH AND
ST'ATE NEVER ACHIEVED IN GERMANY, A FREEDOM WHICH SET
THE CLIMATE FOR THE MOST INTENSELY SPIRITUALIZED
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ARCHITECTURE OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD.
GOTHIC ARCHITECTURE STEMMED ALSO FROM A CHANGE
IN THE MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY. THE GERiANIC FORM OF
CHRISTIANITY OF THE TENTH THROUGH THIRTEENTH
CENTURIES (FROM WHICH DERIVED THE EARLY CHRISTIAN AND
ROMANESQUE ARCHITECTURE WHICH PRECEEDED THE GOTHIC
STYLE) WAS FOR THE COMMON MAN AN ALOOF FORCE KEEPING
EVIL AT BAY WHICH WOULD -OTHERWISE OVERWHELM THE WORLD.
THE CHRISTIAN DIETY WAS AN OBJECT OF AWE AND TERROR,
WHOSE PROTECTION FROM EVIL FORCES WAS ACHIEVED ONLY
THROUGH SACRIFICES AND GIFTS OF MONEY AND LAND TO THE
CHURCH. IN TURN,. THE CHURCH WAS SEEN AS PRIMARILY A
76
77
78
80
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PLACE OF REFUGE FROM EVIL SPIRITS DERIVING FRO.M A
PAGAN HERITAGE. IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY, THESE
ATTITUDES CHANGED. THE SUPERSTITIOUS CHRISTIANITY
BECAME A FAITH IN AN ALL-PERVADING DIVINE LOVE. THE
IDEAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL UNION WITH GOD, EPITOMIZED
BY THE CULT OF THE COMPASSIONATE VIRGIN MARY, SUP-
PLANTED THE PREVIOUS COMMUNAL RELATION WITH GOD;
GROTESQUE BEASTS CARVED IN THE. ROMANESQUE CHURCHES
WERE REPLACED BY FOLIATED DECORATION. THE SHIFT
FROM THE FEAR OF EVIL SPIRITS WAS REFLECTED IN
SCHOLASTICISM'S STRESS ON THE UNITY OF GOD'S
ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE. ALL BRANCHES OF THE WORLD
WERE SEEN AS MANIFESTATIONS OF GOD AS A PART OF
THE DIVINE MODEL. MEDIEVAL LIFE BECAME INTENSELY
SPIRITUALIZED AND SPAWNED THE WIDESPREAD GROWTH OF
MYSTICAL MOVEMENTS.
SIMULTANEOUS WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS WAS THE
GROWTH OF THE POWER -AND WEALTH OF ROYALITY AND AN
EMERGING BURGHER (BOURGEOIS) CLASS. TRADE SPREAD
BEYOND THE IMPOSED LIMITS OF THE MEDIEVAL TOWN,
AND MONITARIZATION SUPPLANTED BARTER ASZA MODE OF
EXCHANGE. THEN, AT THE SAME TIME THAT SPIRITUALITY
WAS FLOWERING, THE MATERIAL BASIS OF MEDIEVAL
SOCIETY WAS RAPIDLY DEVELOPING ITS OWN DYNAMIC AND
UNITY. AS THE CHURCH BECAME MORE FINANCIALLY AND
POLITICALLY INVOLVED WITH THE EMERGINC SECULAR
INTERESTS, THE CHURCH'S CLAIM TO ULTIMATE RULE
OVER THE UNITY OF SACRED AND SECULAR WAS
DISSOLVED. THIS CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE SACRED
AND SECULAR INTERESTS EVENTUALLY EXPLODED THE
MEDIEVAL UNITY.
82 1 PEVSNER, OP. CIT., PG. 93
83 1 CICHY, BoDo, THE GREAT AGES OF ARCHITECTURE, NEW
YORK: G.P. PUTNAM'S SONS, 1964, PG. 248
85 1 MUMFORD, OP. CIT., PG. 319
86 1 SEE SE.CTION III, CRITIQUE OF POSITIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY,
THE CRISIS OF POSITIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY
2 MUMFORD, OP. CIT., PG. 328
89 1 THE TERM 'PROFESSIONS' HERE DESIGNATES THE ARCHITECTU-
RAL AND PLANNING FUNCTION AS A DISTINCT SOCIAL ROLE,
RATHER THAN THE INSTITUTION OF THIS PRACTICE IN
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIPNS AND LAWS REGULATING
PRACTICE.
91 1 ARGAN, GIULIO, RENAISSANCE CITY, NEW YORK:
BRAZILLER, 1969, PG. 22
323
92 1 FISCHER, ERNST, THE NECESSITY OF ART. A MARXIST
APPEROACHt LONDON: PENGUIN BOOKS LTD.,- 1963, PG. 51
2 ARGAN, OP. CIT., PG. 15
94 1 MUMFORD, OP. CIT., PG. 366
96 1 SEE SECTION II, THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER, THE PROBLEM
OF METHOD, SOCIAL THEORY AND THE THEORETICAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
97 1,2 ALBERTI (C. 1485), QUOTED BY TZONIS, OP. CIT.
3 CICHY, OP. CIT., PG. 298
98 1 TzONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 46
2 IBID., PG. 50
1.00 1 ARGAN, OP. CIT.,
2 IBID. PG. ~21
3 IBID. PG. 106
101 1 MICHAELANGELO'S DESIGN OF RENAISSANCE FORTIFICATIONS
AS WELL AS ST. PETERS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. THE UNITY OF
BOTH EFFORTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN SEEN BY MICHAELANGELO AS THE
INHERENT FASCINATION OF THE TECHNICAL AND AESTHETIC
PROBLEMS OF BOTH CHURCH AND FORTIFICATIONS AS
DESIGN ISSUES,. AS WELL AS THEIR COMMON PRINCELY/
CHURCH SPONSORSHIP. IF SO, SUCH A CONCEPTION OF THE
UNITY OF AN ARTIST'S EFFORT MUST HAVE OVER-RIDDEN THE
CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN
AGGRANDIZING WAR AND SPIRITUAL PERFECTION.
103 . 1 MUMFORD, OP. CIT., PG.-- 371
2 IBID., PG. 363
104 1 IBID., PG. 356
106 1 SCULLY, VINCENT, JR., MODERN ARCHITECTURE-: THE
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, NEW YORK: GEORGE BRAZILLER,
1961, PG. 11
2 PEVSNER, OP. CIT., PG. 181 & PG. 197
108 1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE IS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN
SECTION II, THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER, THE PROBLEM OF
METHOD
110 .1 MUMFORD, OP. CIT., PG. 392
110 2 IBID., PG. 395 324
3 IBID., PG. 379
112 1 THE TERM 'LIBERAL' HAS SPECIFIC MEANINGS AS USED IN
THIS THESIS. UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED,
A) 'LIBERAL' REFERS NOT TO THE POLITICAL LEFT,
AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE 'CONSERVATIVES.' RATHER,
'LIBERAL' REFERS TO THE ORIGINAL LIBERALS WHO WERE
BOURGEOIS AND PETIT-BOURGEOIS CAPITALISTS,
LANDOWNERS AND PROFESSIONALS. THESE GROUPS WERE
ORIGINALLY ANTI-EGALITARIAN AND SUPPORTED LAISSEZ-
FAIRE COMPETITION AND TRADE. THE 'LIBERAL' SOCIAL ORDER
WAS FOUNDED ON THE BASIS OF BOURGEOIS CLASS DOMINANCE
AND NOT THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND JUSTICE
WHICH THE TERM CONNOTES TODAY.
B) 'LIBERAL* IN THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION IS
SOMETIMES USED INTERCHANGABLY WITH THE TERM 'CAPITALIST.'
BUT THE TWO TERMS.HAVE DISTINCT MEANINGS: 'LIBERAL'
IS THE GENERIC TERM USED TO DISTINGUISH THE PRESENT
WESTERN SOCIETIES.FROM THEIR MEDIEVAL AND ARISTOCRATIC
PRECURSORS. 'CAPITALIST' IS A FAR MORE PRECISELY-
DEFINABLE TERM (SEE THE DISCUSSION ON THE CAPITALIST
INSTITUTIONS IN SECTION II, THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER,
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER) REFERRING TO THE PARTICULAR FORM
OF PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL RELATIONS DERIVING FROM
THAT FORM OF PRODUCTION WHICH DOMINATES WESTERN
SOCIETY. To CALL 'LIBERAL' A DESCRIPTION OF THE SOCIAL
FORM AND 'CAPITALIST' THE FORM OF THE LIBERAL ECONOMIC
SYSTEM IS A SERIOUS MISREPRESENTATION. IN LIBERAL
SOCIETY, THE 'ECONOMIC SYSTEM' IS TOTALIZING, DETERMINING
ALL SOCIAL RELATIONS WHICH HAD IN PREVIOUS SOCIETIES
BEEN INDEPENDENT OF THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTION. FOR
THIS REASON, 'CAPITALISM' CAN BE SUBSTITUTED AS A
MORE DESCRIPTIVE AND TECHNICALLY CORRECT REFERENCE
THAN 'LIBERALISM' TO THE DOMINANT WESTERN SOCIAL ORDER.
2 SEE SCHROYER, TRENT, AENAIOJ_AND TH.E_ TIFcTICAL
RARADIGM, MICHIGAN: UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS, INC.,
1969
3 IBID, PG. 260
4 OLLMAN, BERTELL, ALIENAT ION: MARX'S CONCEPTION OF MAN
JN CAPITAJS SOCIETY , CAMBRIDGE: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS, 1971-, PG. 135
113 1 SEE SECTION II, THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER, THE PROBLEM
OF ORDER
2 GINTIS, HERB, 'ACTIVISM AND COUNTERCULTURE' IN
TELOS, NUMBER 12, ST. LOUIS, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, 1972, PG. 45
114 1' UNGER
119 1 ON THE LEVEL OF THE SOCIAL ORDER, CLASS CONFLICT HAS
CHARACTERIZED ALL CLASS SOCIETIES; ON THE LEVEL OF
THE SELF, DEVIANCE OR PATHOLOGY, ALIENATION OR
RESIGNATION ARE BASIC RESPONSES.
121 1 SEE SECTION II, A THEORY OF THE NATURE OF THE SELF
2 THE CONCEPT OF COMMODITY FETISHISM ALLOWS A CRUCIAL
INSIGHT INTO THE MEANING OF ARCHITECTURAL AND
PLANNING PRODUCTS. THE HYPOSTAZATION OF THESE PRODUCTS
AS. REAL, THE SUBJECT OF AN ELABORATED AESTHETIC
AND FUNCTIONAL RATIONALITY INDEPENDENT OF HUMAN
RELATIONS, IS A FORM OF COMMODITY FETISHISM. THE
BUILDING, THE DISTRICT, OR THE PLAN NOW ASSUMES
HUMAN QUALITIES AND IS TO BE DESIGNED WITH AN INTE-
GRATIVE -UNIFYING INTENT. YET THE HUMAN OCCUPANTS
AND USERS OF THESE PRODUCTS REMAIN THE SAME FRAG-
MENTED AND ALIENATED BEINGS.
122 1 GINTES, OP. CIT., PG. 45
123 1 IBID., PG. 48
2 IT IS AN INTENTION OF THIS THESIS TO ESTABLISH A
POINT OF VIEW OUTSIDE THE CLOSED CAPITALIST TOTAL-
ITY THROUGH UNCOVERING ITS STRUCTURE AND POSING
ALTERNATE FORMS OF ITS EVOLUTION. FROM A CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVE, THE DOMINANT CONSCIOUSNESS THAT
THE CAPITALIST TOTALITY IS A NECESSARY REALITY
CAN BE ALTERED, FREEING PEOPLES' POTENTIAL FOR
CHOICE AND SELF-DETERMINATION.
125 1 HOWEVER IN ANY PARTICULAR POLITICAL SITUATION,
THERE MAY BE SEVERAL FRAGMENTED INTERESTS
COMPETING ON THE SAME OR SIMILAR HIERARCHICAL
LEVELS-E.G. AS IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN POOR WHITES
AND BLACKS FOR COMMUNITY CONTROL OF HOUSING AND
SCHOOLS.
126 1 PARAPHRASED FROM UNGER LECTURE, FEB. 6, 1974
2 THIS STATEMENT IS SUPPORTED THROUGH THE HISTORICAL
STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF CAPITALIST APPROPRIATION
OF LAND, DESTRUCTION OF FAMILY, AND DISSOLUTION OF
COMMUNITY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE (SEE DOBB AND POLANYI).
FURTHER, THE DOMINATION AND SUBSEQUENT ALIENATION
-AND LOSS OF COMMUNITY HAVE BECOME CENTRAL 'UNIT-
IDEAS' OR THEMES OF WESTERN SOCIAL THOUGHT (SEE
WORKS OF WEBER, DURKHEIM, SIMMEL, MARX, MARCUSE,
SCHROYER, GINTES, ETC.)
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126 3 GINT.IS, OP. CIT., PG. 51
4 THIS MORALITY WAS INSTITUTED THROUGH THE ENLIGHTENt
MENTS' VALUING OF PROGRESS, AND THE PROTESTANT.
ETHIC OF WEALTH AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD WORKS. PROGRESS
AND WEALTH ARE OF COURSE STILL CENTRAL VALUES, AS
EXPRESSED IN THE CONTEMPORARY FORM OF COMMODITY
FETISHISM.
127- 1 THESE IDEAS ARE DERIVED AND PARAPHRASED FROM UNGER
128 1,2 PARAPHRASED FROM UNGER
129 1 GOULDNER, ALVIN W. , THE COING _QCRSS flF _1ESTF.RT
SncIOljOGY, NEW YORK: AVON BOOKS, 1970, PG. 83
2 THERE MAY BE A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DEMATERIALI-
ZATION OF OBJECTS UNDER CAPITALISM AND THE EMPHASIS
OF THE MODERN MOVEMENT IN ARCHITECTURE ON
TRANSPARENCY AS A STYLISTIC PRINCIPLE. SEE SECTION
II, THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER, THE MODERN MOVEMENT.
3 GOULDNER, OP. CIT.
130 1 ARENDT, HANNAH, THE HUMAN CONDI-TION, CHICAGO:
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1958, PG. 309
2 SEE SECTION III, CRITIQUE OF POSITIVIST EPISTE-
MOLOGY.
3 AN ALTERNATE S.YSTEM OF CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE, DIA-
LECTICAL MATERIALISM, IS DISCUSSED IN SECTION
III
4 OF COURSE, VALUE DECISIONS ARE CONSTANTLY BEING
MADE ON ALL SOCIETAL LEVELS. BUT THESE DECISIONS
MUST ASSUME THE GIVENNESS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
CAPITALIST INSTITUTIONS.
131 1 THE BOURGEOIS OF THE EARLY CAPITALIST PERIOD
DEFINED THEMSELVES VIS A VIS THE FEUDAL AND
ARISTOCRATIC CLASSES-AS USEFUL, VALUABLE IN
TERMS OF WHAT THEY QD. RATHER THAN WHAT THEY
1LF-i/. 'THE MIDDLE CLASS DEMAND FOR USEFULNESS WAS
ABOVE ALL AN ATTEMPT TO REVISE THE BASES ON WHICH
AND HENCE THE GROUPS TO WHICH THE FUBLIC REWARDS
AND OPPORTUNITIES WOULD BE OPEN.' (GOULDNER, OP.
CIT., PG. 64)
132 1 SCHROYER, OP. CIT., PG. 265
2 UNGER '
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139 1. UNGER
2 MEANING IS DEFINED AS THE CONGRUENCE BETWEEN THE IDEAL
(THE REALIZATION OF SELF AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN
TERMS OF A COMPREHENSIBLE WHOLE) AND THE ACTUAL
EXPERIENCED REALITY.
.136 1 THIS ARGUMENT IS DERIVED FROM HANNA ARENDT IN I0-,
H4A.N__OCONDITION, OP. CIT.
2 IBID, PG. 261
137 1 IBID, PG. 284
138 1 IBID, PG. 5
139, 1- SEE SECTION II, CONCLUSION
2 POSITIVISM IS DELIBERATELY TERMED 'INSTRUMENTAL' TO
DISTINGUISH IT FROM SOME OF THE MOST ADVANCED
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT WHICH IS
DEEPL'Y DIALECTICAL AND TOTALISTIC-E.G., THE IDEA THAT
ENERGY CAN NEITHER BE CREATED OR DESTROYED BUT ONLY
CHANGES ITS FORM. IT IS NOT CLAIMED HERE (ALTHOUGH THE
ARGUMENT COULD BE MADE) THAT THE POSITIVISTIC STRAIN
OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD IS ITSELF A DELIBERATE
REFLECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF DOMINATION. BUT THE
METHOD AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE SHARE THE SAME PRINCI-
PLES OF THE SEPARATION OF FACT AND VALUE. THEREFOR
THE METHOD, IN ITS USE BY PROFESSIONALS, VALIDATES
THE CLAIMS OF CAPITALISTS THAT LIBERAL SOCIETY, AS A
FACT, IS INDEPENDENT FROM VALUE. THE DOMINANT FORM OF
KNOWLEDGE, INDEPENDENT OF THE MANIFEST INTENTIONS OF
ITS PRACTITIONERS, IS THEN STRONGLY LINKED TO THE
SUPPORT OF DOMINANT SOCIAL INTERESTS.
140 1 NOTEONCLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SAME SEPARATION OF
FACT AND VALUE WHICH STIMULATED THE FORMATION OF
THEORY HAS STIMULATED A CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
SPECIFIC TO IF NOT UNIQUE IN THE LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER.
CERTAINLY THE MEMBERS OF OTHER CLASS AND ESTATE-BASED
SOCIAL ORDERS REALIZED THE NATURE OF THEIR SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION. THE UNIQUENESS OF MODERN CLASS
CONSCIOUSNESS IS IN ITS DERIVATION FROM UNLEGITIMATED
CLASS pOMINATION.
A SECOND ORIGIN OF MODERN CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS
WAS THAT THE TRADITIONAL UNIT OF SOCIAL INTERACTION
CHANGED IN LIBERAL SOCIETY. WHILE THE INDIVIDUAL,
FAMILY, OR EXTENDED FAMILY WAS THE BASIC SOCIAL
UNIT IN EARLI'ER ORDERS, THE CLASS AND MASS OF PEOPLE
BECAME A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERAL SOCIAL SUBJECT. THIS
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FACT WOULD BE MORE APPARENT, BUT DELIBERATE SOCIAL
HIERARCHICALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION OBSCURES THE
CLASS UNITY BETWEEN APPARENTLY DIVERSE SOCIAL GROUPS.
143 1 AVOIDANCE AND PREVENTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LIBERAL
TOTALITY CAN BE SEEN AS A STRATEGY TO AVERT A
GENERALIZED CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE GREAT CONTRADICTIONS
BETWEEN LIBERAL CLAIMS AND L.IGERAL REALITY. GENERAL-
IZED CONSCIOUSNESS IN TURN IS THE PRECONDITION TO
MAJOR SOCIAL CHANGE. THE LIBERAL CLAIM TO SATISFY
HUMAN NEEDS THROUGH COMMODITY CONSUMPTION IS
CONTRADICTED BY THE SUBORDINATION THROUGH CLASS
DOMINATION OF HUMAN NEEDS TO THE NEEDS OF.CAPITAL-A
CONTRADICTION WHICH IF MADE CONSCIOUS WOULD BE.
POLITICALLY EXPLOSIVE. THE CONTRADICTION WOULD
CONSTANTLY THREATEN TO UNDERMINE THE AUTHORITY.OF
CAPITALISTS WHO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION OF
LEGITIMACY ONLY THROUGH THE POPULATION BEING ABLE
TO CONSOME OR HOPE TO CONSUME A CONSTANTLY HIGHER
STANDARD OF COMMODITY AND SERVICE (THE CURRENT
WORLDWIDE INSTABILITY OF MAJOR GOVERNMENTS-THE
UNITED STATES, CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, ENGLAND,
ITALY, GREECE, AND OTHERS- IS STRONGLY AFFECTED
BY THE WORKING CLASS'S INABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN
COMMODITY CONSUMPTION, DUE TO WORLD-WIDE INFLATION.).
144 1 THIS ARGUMENT IS DERIVED FROM FRAMPTON, KENNETH,
'INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE CRISES IN ARCHITECTURE'
IN OPPOSITIONS A, NEW YORK: THE INSTITUTE FOR
ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN STUDIES, SEPTEMBER, 1973,
FOLLOWING ARENDT, OP. CIT.
145 1 ARENDT, OP. CIT., PG. 280
146 1 FRAMPTON, OP. CIT., PG. 61
2 TzONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 67
3 FRAMPTON, OP. CIT., PG. 63
147 1 IBID., PG. 65
148 1 CICHY, OP. CIT., PG. 364
2 IBID., PG. 366
149 1 BENEVELO, LEONARDO, HISTORY OF MODERN ARCHITFCTURE,
VOLUMES 1 AND 2, CAMBRIDGE: M.I.T. PRESS, 1971,
PG. XXVII, VOLUME 1
150 1 FRAMPTON, OP. CIT., PG. 69
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THE PROBLEM OF BOURGEOIS CULTURE IS STILL UNRESOLVED.
THE BOURGEOIS SOLUTION HAS BEEN BASICALLY EASHIQN. IN
SUCH CULTURAL PRODUCTS AS CLOTHES, AUTOMOBILES,
INTERIORS, AND ARCHITECTURE. FASHION BY DEFINITION IS
INDETERMINANT,' TIME-CONTINGENT, AND THUS CONSTANTLY
CHANGING. THESE ARE PRECISELY THE QUALITIES OF
COMMODITY PRODUCTION, THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE DIFFI-
CULTY IF NOT THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DETERMINING FINITE
ENDS AND VALUES FOR AN INHERENTLY LIMITLESS PROCESS.
3 FRAMPTON, OP. CIT., PG. 69
4 QUOTED IN FRANPTON, PG.. 69
51 TZONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 56
2 THE EVISCERATION OF HISTORICAL CONTENT OF THE A
ATED FORMS PARALLELS THE LIBERAL SOCIAL AND
SCIENTIFIC SU STITUTION OF THE DOMINANCE OF THE
- INDIVIDUAL FOR THE SOCIAL REALM.
PPROPRI-
TZONI.S, OP. CIT., PG. 57
2 PERRAULT'S THOUGHT CAN BE INTERPRETED AS THE ATTEMPT
WITHIN ARCHITECTURAL THEORY TO REVERSE THE FRAGMENTA-
TION OF COMMUNALITY AND THE 'PUBLIC SPACE' iN
LIBERAL SOCIETY. HIS THEORETICAL ATTEMPT FAILED
_ -PROB3ABLY BECAUSE ARCHITECTURAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
CANNOT ITSELF PUT TOGETHER COMMUNAL AND CULTURAL
MEANINGS WHICH ARE STRUCTURALLY FRAGMENTED IN THE
SOCIAL ORDER.
1 TzONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 69
2 VOLTAIRE
T3 zONI-, OP. CIT., PG. 71
I IBID, PG. 75
2 SUCH IRRATIONALITY PRESAGES THE PARADOX OF THE
CONTEMPORARY ARCHITECT AND PLANNER WHO USES RATIONAL
METHODS FOR MAXIMIZING UTILITY IN AN IRRATIONAL SYSTEM
WHICH DOES NOT PERMIT GENERAL, CROSS-CLASS WELFARE.
1 TZONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 78
2 MUCH CURRENT SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
.RESEARCH ALSO DOES NOT ONDERSTAND THE DERIVATION OF
THE 'HUMAN NEEDS' WHICH THE RESEARCH DEFINES. AS SUCH,
THE RESEARCH IS A CONTEMPORARY FORM OF FUNCTIONALISM.
3 LETHABY, DESIGN AND INDVSTRY, QUOTED 'IN TzONIS, OP. CIT.
2
153 1
155
156
-158
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159 1 HUME, ANAURALRELIGION. QUOTED
IN TZONIS, OP. CIT.
2 SORKIN, MICHAEL, THESIS PROPOSAL, (UNPUBLISHED),
M.I.T., C. 1972
160 1 QUOTED IN SORKIN, IBID.
161 1 TZONIS, OP. CIT., 82
162, 1 THE DISTINCTION EETWEEN CULTURE AND UTILITY IS
PARALLELED IN THE CONTEMPORARY DISTINCTION, AS
ARTICULATED BY HABERMAS, BETWEEN INTERSUBJECTIVE AND
PURPOSIVE-RATIONAL ACTION SYSTEMS IN SOCIETY. SEE
HABERMAS, JURGEN, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY-STUDENT
EEIOTEST. SCIENCE, AND POLITICs , BOSTON: BEACON
PRESS, 1971, CH. 6
2 BENEVELO, OP. CIT., PG. XXXII, V. 2
3 IBID., PG. 120
165. 1 ENGLAND WAS THE FIRST NATION TO BECOME INDUSTRIALIZED,
FOLLOWED BY THE CONTINENTAL STATES. NATIONAL
POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION WAS AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR
OF THE RATE OF URBANIZATION; PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY
WAS ESTABLISHED AS THE POLITICAL INSTRUMENT OF THE
ENGLISH BOURGEOIS IN 1688, WHILE GERMANY WOULD
CONSOLIDATE INTO A NATION ONLY IN.THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY.
.2 THE CONVENTIONAL LIBERAL INTERPRETATION THAT WORKERS
IN EARLY CAPITALISM WERE GROUPED IN FACTORIES AND THE
INDUSTRIAL CITIES BECAUSE-OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEMANDS HAS
BEEN DISPROVEN BY STEVEN MARGLIN IN'WHAT..DO BOSSES
Qo?.', HARVARD INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 1971.
A MAJOR FACTOR GOVERNING EARLY URBANIZATION WAS THE
IMPERATIVE OF SOCIAL CONTROL OF HIERARCHICALLY-
DISTINGUISHED CLASSES.
3 BOOKCHIN, OP. CIT. , PG. 58
167 1 BARON HAUSSMANN'S NINETEENTH-CENTURY RECONSTRUCTION
OF PARIS ON FIRST GLANCE APPEARS TO FOLLOW- THE
TYPICAL BAROQUE CITY PLAN OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES. BUT WHILE HAUSSMANN'S BROAD
'AVENUES DID SERVE T.HE PURPOSE OF DISPLAY AND SOCIAL
CONTROL, THEY ALSO CONSTITUTED A DISTRIBUTIVE SYSTEM
FOR COMMODITIES AND INFORMATION WHICH-SERVED THE
NEW REQUIREMENTS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION. A BAROQUE-
BASED VISUAL ORDER SERVING A NON-BAROQUE SYSTEM OF
SOCIAL. RELATIONS IS AN EXAMPLE (ALONG WITH THE
VARIETY OF PRIMITIVE SOCIAL ORDERS USING THE SAME
GENERIC VILLAGE PLANS AND THE APPROPRIATION OF
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CLASSICAL ARCHITECTURAL FORMS IN THE RENAISSANCE
AND NEO-CLASSIC ARCHITECTURE) OF THE NECESSITY OF
UNDERSTANDING THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL MEANINGS WHICH
FORM AT A GIVEN TIME EMBODIES; HAUSSMANN USED THE
VISUAL/SPATIAL FjRMS OF A PREVIOUS SOCIAL ORDER
TO EMBODY A DIiFFERENT LONTENT OF SOCIAL RELATIONS.
167 2 WHILE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY PRE-LIBERAL
PLANNING METHODS WERE APPLIED (THE BAROQUE OR
NEO-CLASSICAL CEREMONIAL FORM OF L'ENFANT'S
WASHINGTON D.C. PLAN AND BURNHAM'S 'CITY
BEAUTIFUL' PLANS; THE BRITISH RESIDENTIAL PATTERN;
AND THE COLONIAL CHECKERBOARD SCHEME), MODERN
TOWN PLANNING WAS THE DOMINANT METHOD.
3 BENEVOLO, LEONARDO, TjHE__RG.IGINS OF _ODOEN TOWN
PLANNING, CAMBRIDGE: THE M.I.T. PRESS, 1971,
PG. XI
169 1 CHOAY, FRANCOISE, THE_ MODJERCN CTTY: PLANN ING IN THE
19TH CENTJURY, NEW YORK: GEORGE BRAZILLER, 1969,
PG. 98
2 CHOAY, IBID.,QUOTING LE CORBUSIER'S PG. 98
173 1 BENEVOLO, ORIGINS, .OP. CIT., PG. XIII
174 1 SEE SECTION II, CITY PLANNING
PLANNING AS AN ELEMENT OF THE
PLANNING SYSTEM.
175 1 KUENZLEN,
I PRESS,
IN AMERICA, URBAN
STATE-CAPITAL
MARTIN, _PtA'ING RN GAMES, BOSTON:
1972, PG. 12
176 .1 IBID., PG. 12
177 1 BENEVOLO, HISTORY, OP. CIT., PG. 48
178 1 IBID., REPORT OF THE HEALTH OF TOWNS COMMISSION
OF 1846
2 IBID.
3 BENEVOLO, ORIGINS, OP. CIT., PG. 147
180 1 THE TERMS 'MODERNIST,''MODERN MOVEMENT,' AND
'IN.TERNATIONAL STYLE' ARE USED INTERCHANGABLY.
181 1 BENEVOLO, HISTORY, OP. CIT., QUOTING BERTRAND
RUSSELL, PG. 377
2 FRAMPTON, OP. CIT., PG. 70
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132 1 FRATPTON, OP.,CIT., PG. 72
2 ID.,PG. 78
183 1 IBID., PG. 76
184 1 LE CORBUSIER, T_.1ASA_.NEhARCHITEC1RF, NE W YORK :
PRAEGER, 1960, PP. 14, 268
-186 1 BENEVOLO, ISTOR-Y, OP. CIT., 445
187 1 IBID.,QUOTING LE CORBUSIER, PG. 536
2 IBID._,QUOTING MIES VAN DER ROHE, PG. 453
3 IBID.,QUOTING LE CORBUSIER, PG. 536
193 1 GOODMAN, ROBERT, AFTER THFF Pl ANNERS, NEW YORK: SIMON
AND SCHUSTER, 1971, PG. 43
1§6 1 Z4ODERNISM AS A STYLE WAS RECOGNIZED EARLY IN ITS
DEVELOPMENT BY H.R. HITCHCOCK IN'THE~NTFRNlATJONA
STYLE, 1932
2 TZONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 88
3 IBID., QUOTING SIBYL MOHOLY-NAGY, PG. 88
200 1 SEE FRAMPTON, OP. CIT., FOR THE IDEA OF
'RESEMANTICIZATION.'
2 IT_ WOULD BE INTERESTING TO STUDY THE HUMAN MEANING OF
THE MlODERNIST TRANSFORMATION OF Ti-E RENAISSANCE
- INDIVIDUAL-BASED PERSPECTIVE INTO THE SPACE-TIME
VJSION OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING.
PERSPECTIVE ITSELF SUCCEEDED A MEDIEVAL, COMMUNAL-
BASED-VISUAL FIELD. WITH SPACE-TIME, THE FOCUS OF
PERSPECTIVAL LINES OF SIGHT WAS SHIFTED FROM THE
STATIC RENAISSANCE INDIVIDUAL, BUT WAS NOT RE-
CONSTITUTED INTO A COMMUNAL VISION. I WOULD SUSPECT
THAT THE VaRY WAY THAT LIBERAL WO/MEN Sj IS AN
ALIENATION FROM SELF-AND COMMUNALITY.
206 1 SEEt GANDELSONAS, MARIO, 'ON READING ARCHITECTURE',
IN PROGRESSIVE ARCHITECTURa, MARCH 1972 FOR A
PRESENTATION OF PETER EISENMAN'S WORK AS WELL AS
RELATED WORK BY MICHAEL GRAVES; VENTURI, ROBERT,
LARNING FROM LAS VEGAS, BOSTON: M.I.T. PRESS, 1973
AND COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE,
NEW YORK: THE MUSEUM OF~ MODERN ART, 1966
1 TZONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 94211
211 2. IBID.,.95 333
3 SEE WEBBER, MELVIN, 'THE URBAN PLACE AND THE NONPLACED
URBAN REALM', IN EMLORATIONSTIN URBAN SRUCTURES,
MELVIN WEBBER, ET. AL., PHILADELPHIA: 1964
4 TZONIS, OP. CIT., PG. 97
217 1 GOODMAN, OP. CIT., QUOTING A COURT RULING, PG. 151
221 1 KUENZLEN, OP. CIT., PG. 12
2 STABILITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL ARE NOT THE ONLY REASONS
FOR THE RISE OF M01OPOLIES. IN STANDARD MARXIST
ECONOMICS FOR EXAMPLE, THE Lt.l LHE FA.LING RATE
OF PROFIT DICTATES THAT TO MAINTAIN A CONSTANT. PROFIT
LEVEL, PRODUCTION MUST EXPAND AND PRODUCTION COSTS
MUST BE LOWERED (SEE SHERMAN, HOWARD, RADICAL POLIITICA.
FCONOM: CAPITA-!S__:A SL ___LREIST-
-Ltj/jAT ijR JRC.T 3, NEW YORK: BASIC BOOKS, INC.,
1972, PG. 371) THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST
PRODUCTION ENTAILS BOTH THE EXPANSION OF THE PRO-
DUCTIVE ENTERPRISE UNDER THE CONTROL OF INCREASINGLY
CENTRALIZED AUTHORITYAND THE INTENSIVE USE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO BOTH .CREATE NEW PRODUCTS
TO SELL AND LOWER THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION BY
ELIMINATING INCREASINGLY-EXPENSIVE HUMAN LABOR.
222 1 KUENZLEN, OP. CIT., PG. 13
223 1 IBID., PG. 13
2 IBID., PG. 21
225 1 SEE 0'CONNOR, JAMES, [HEFISCAL CR SI F TEH. STAT ,
NEW YORK: ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, 1973; AND YONEOKA,
BRAD, TERM PAPER FOR PROFESSOR VITTOREZ'S CLASS IN
REGIONAL ECONOMICS, FALL, 1973 AT M.I.T., 1974
(UNPUBLISHED)
2 WHILE PROFITS ARE GENERALLY QUITE ATTRACTIVE FOR
DEVELOPERS, SUPPLIERS, CONTRACTORS, INVESTORS AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, THERE IS SOME LONG-RUN
UNCERTAINTY FOR INVESTMENT IN THE FIELD. THIS.
UNCERTAINTY IS DUE, AMONG OTHER REASONS, TO THE USE
OF THE HOUSING INDUSTRY BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AS
A MEANS OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION, OF WHICH THE
CURRENT HOUSING MORATOR-IUM AND INDUSTRY-WIDE
RECESSION IS AN EXAMPLE)
226 1 SEE ENGELS, FRIEDRICH, ON TE HOUS INP
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227 1, TO THE EXTENT THAT THE HOUSING MOVEMENT WAS TAKEN AS
A SERIOUS RESPONSE TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS, IT APPROPRI-
ATED THE MYTH THAT DESIGN IS A MORE OR LESS FUNDA-
MENTAL DETERMINANT OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR. THIS IDEA
WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LATER IDEOLOGY OF THE 'CULTURE
OF POVERTY' WHICH, IT WAS SUGGESTED, IS REPRODUCED
UNDER CONDITIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISORDER. IN TURN,
THIS DISORDER IS REFLECTED IN THE DISORDERED LIVES
OF THE URBAN POOR. WHILE THE MERITS-OF THE NOTION
WILL NOT BE DEBATED HERE, THE 'CULTURE OF POVERTY'
IDEOLOGY DID SERVE TO LEGITIMIZE PROFIT-TAKING BY
THE HOUSING ESTABLISHMENT; SUCH IDEAS ARE' IN FACT*
FUNCTIONAL TO THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH PRO-
DUCES AND CONTINUES TO REPRODUCE THE CONDITIONS OF
URBAN SQUALOR. HOUSING, WHILE NECESSARY IN AN
ABSOLUTE SENSE, HAS NOT IN ITSELF EVEN APPROACHED
DEALING WITH THE SYSTEMIC FORCES WHICH CONDITION
- ITS PRACTICE.
2 9 DAHL, R. AND C. LINDBLOM, PIC OMS, AND
_FARE, NEW YORK: HARPER AND ROW, 1953, PG. 6
2-' IBID., PG. 5
3 IBID., PG. 20
4 IBID., PG. 171
230 1 ERBER, ERNEST, ED., URBANP),AMNTNG TN__TRANSITION, NEW
YORK: GROSSMAN PUBLISHERS, 1970, PG. 55
2 IBID., PG. 240, MY EMPHASIS
-3 IBID., PG. 243
232 1 THE ORIGINAL PROFESSIONS WERE MEDECINE, LAW, AND
THEOLOGY.
233 1 GORDON, DAVID M. PROLBLEMS IN POLITICA. FCnNOMY: AN
UREAN PERSPECTIVE, LEXINGTON: D.C. HEATH AND CO.,
1971, QUOTED FROM'TOWARDS A NATIONAL URBAN POLICY'
BY DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, PG. 31
2 IBID., PG. 39
238 1 ERBER, OP. CIT., PG. 243, MY EMPHASIS
241 1 GINTIS, OP. CIT., PG. 48
242 1 THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CONSTRUCT OF A
'POST-LIBERAL ' SOC.IAL ORDER AND SUCH IDEAS IN GOOD
CURRENCY AS THE 'POST-INDUSTRIAL' SOCIETY AND THE
'END OF IDEOLOGY' (C.F. DANIEL BELL, TtlE ENQ__Qj.
foriLOGY , NEW YORKs COLLIER BOOKS, 1961 335
2 UNGER, PARAPHRASED
244 1 THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
ROLE AND CLASS WAS PRESENTED BY UNGER
2 A RECENT EXAMPLE OF THE CONFLICT OF ROLE AND CLASS.
IS THE NEW YORK CITY TEACHERS' STRIKE. THE PRINCIPLE
OF MERITOCRATICALLY-ALLOCATED ROLE (OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE TEACHERS' UNION WHO ACHIEVED THEIR POSITION THROUGH
THEIR QUALIFICATIONS AND MERIT AS TEACHERS) WAS
CHALLENGED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF CLASS (THE RIGHT OF
BLACK COMMUNITIES TO EXERT CONTROL OVER THEIR
SC:OOLS, INCLUDING THE SUBSTITUTION OF BLACK FOR
WHITE TEACHERS.USING CLASS OR RACE AS AN IMPORTANT
CRITERION)
245 1 GINTIS, OP. CIT., PG. 5
- 2 THIS SECTION IS DERIVED IN PART FROM UNGER'S
PRESENTATION ON THE NATURE AND MEANING OF COMMUNITY.
247 1 SEE O'CONNOR, OP. CIT.
SECTIONHI TO1ARDS A CRITICAL EPISTFMO).OGY AND PRACTICE FOR
ARCHITECTURE AND PLANNING
257 1 PRAXIS IS DEFINED AS THEORY AND PRACTICE INTENDED
TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A LIBERATED SOCIETY
259 1 GOULDNER, OP. CIT.., PG. 100
2 IBID., PG. 101
3 IBID., PG. 102
260 1 IBID., PG. 103; THE POSITIVIST METHOD CAN BE SEEN AS
GROUNDED IN A PROFOUND BUT OFTEN REPRESSED CRITIQUE
* BORN OF THE VERY ELEMENTS WHICH POSITIVISM AND
CAPITALISM DENY AS REAL AND MEANINGFUL: THE NEED OF
THE SELF FOR UNITY WITH A COHERENT AND NON-
DOMINATING SOCIAL ORDER.
0
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262 1 BOURGEOIS THOUGHT DEFINES IN ITS OWN TERMS THE
ENTIRE UNIVERSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND DISCOURSE.
AS BUT A SINGLE AND PARTIAL EXAMPLE, A FEDERAL
DECISION TO FINANCE OLD-AGE HOUSING ASSUMES A
UNIVERSE OF DISCOU.RSE IN WHICH THE ELDERLY ARE
NON-FUNCTIONING MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY, OBJECTIVELY
DEFINED (AND THUS STIMULATING A SELF-DEFINITION) AS
SOCIALLY USELESS. THE ELDERLY ARE THEN HELD TO
BE BEST HOUSED IN SEPARATE AND SPECIALIZED,
FACILITIES. THIS DEFINITION OF THE MEANING OF THE
ELDERLY IN LIBERAL SOCIETY THEN SETS THE CONSTRAINTS
UNDER WHICH THE ELDERLY, THEIR FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATORS, ARCHITECTS AND PLANNERS ARE CONSTRAINED TO
OPERATE.
264 1 KOLAKOWSKI, LESZEK,~THE ALIENATION OF REASON:
.LSTORY OF POSITIVIST THOUGHTL, NEW YORK:
DOUBLEDAY AND CO., INC., 1968, PG. 204
2,3 IN I*TS CONTEMPORARY FORMS, POSITIVISM EVEN ABSORBS
RECENT PROCESS CONCEPTIONS OF REALITY. FOR EXAMPLE,
SYSTEMS THEORY AND DYNAMIC TIME-BASED PLANNING
METHODOLOGIES DEAL.WITH CHANGE AND PROCESS, THE
CONCERN OF CRITICAL DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM,
WITHOUT BECOMING A CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIAL MEANING
OF ITS SUBJECT.
4 KOLAKOWSKI, OP. CIT., PG. 205
266 1 KUHN, THOMAS S., THE STRUC "RE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLTIONS, CHICAGO: -THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
PRESS, 1962
2 AN EXAMPLE OF A FUNDAMENTAL PARADIGM SHIFT IS THE
SUPPLANTING OF NEWTONIAN BY EINSTEINIAN PHYSICS.
AT THE LEVEL OF MIDDLE-RANGE 'PLANNING THEORY,
COMPREHENSIVE PHYSICAL PLANNING SHIFTED BY THE
-1960'S AS A MAJOR EMPHASIS IN PRACTICE AND
EDUCATION TO A CONCERN WITH NON-PHYSICAL SOCIAL
AND URBAN POLICY PLANNING-A PARADIGM AT ONE LEVEL
WHICH ITSELF IS BEGINNING TO SHIFT BACK- TO
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS.
267 1 SEE GOODMAN, OP. CIT. *(ARCHITECTURE AND -PLANNING);
GOULDNER, OP. CIT. (SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY);
SHERMAN, OP. CIT. (ECONOMICS)
268 1 SCHROYER, TRENT, THE RIQU OF DOMINATION; THE
O.IG INS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL THEQRY, NEW
YORK: GEORGE BRAZILLER, 1973, PG. 20
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.268 2. ENGELS, IN THFDlLf-TjC O NATURE, 'SEES DIALECTICS
AS APPLICABLE TO NOT ONLY THE HUMAN BUT THE NATURAL
VORLD AS WELL. CONCEIVABLY, EVOLUTIONARY SCIENTIFIC
THEORIES AND- EVEN SYSTEMS THEORY COULD CLAIM THAT
. THEY ARE DIALECTICALLY BASED., SUCH FUNDAMENTAL LAWS
OF MODERN PHYSICS AS THE IDENTITY OF ALL FORMS OF
MATTER IS A DIALECTICAL CONCEPT. BUT BEYOND NOTING
THESE EXAMPLES, I WILL NOT ENTER THE ARGUMENT AS TO
WHETHER' AND HOW THE NATURAL WORLD CAN BE SEEN
DIALECTICALLY; THIS THESIS TREATS DIALECTICAL
MATERIALISM AS A KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIQUELY HUMAN
SPHERE.-
269 1 SEE HABERMAS, OP. CIT., CH. 6
2 SECTION II, THE LIBERAL SOCIAL -ORDER, THE PROBLEM OF
ORDER
271 1 SELSAM, HOWARD , AND HARRY MARTEL , EDS. , aEADFR.IL
E _L_ADI_, NEW YORK: INTERNATIONAL PUB-
LISHERS, 1963, QUOTING LENIN, PG. 110
272 1 IBID., QUOTING LENIN, PG. 117~
2 DIALECTICAL AND MATERIALIST PHILOSOPHIES HAVE
SEPARATELY HAD LONG HISTORIES, FROM PLATO AND THE
EARLIER GREEK PHILOSOPHERS TO HEGEL AND FEUERBACH.
MARX AND ENGELS, HOWEVER, FIRST JOINED THE TWO
PHILOSOPHICAL STREAMS INTO A DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM.
274 1 FREIRE, PAULO, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED, NEW YORK:
SEABURY PRESS, 1968, PG. 95 AND 99-
2 HEGEL
3 THE DIALOGUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IS A MODEL OF A
LIBERATING CRITICAL REASONING, IN HABERMAS'
VIEW.
4 MARCUSE, HERBERT, ERV..Ld)TI
THE _RISE OF SOCIAL THEORY, BOSTON: BEACON PRESS,
1960
276 1 'IBID, PG. 27
277 1 THE TERM 'CLASS' USED HERE IN RELATION TO THE MEDIEVAL
SOCIAL ORDER REFERS LOOSELY TO BOTH MEDIEVAL CLASS AND
ESTATE RELATIONS.
2 MARCUSE, OP. CIT.
278 1 SEE OLLMAN, OP. CIT. ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNAL
- RELATIONS, CH. 3
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27a 2 INTENTIONALITY CAN BE MANIFESTED AS THE FORM OF THE
SELF , IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WO/MEN DETERMINE, OR IN
THE OBJECTS THAT THEY PRODUCE AND CREATE.
202 1 MARCUSE, OP. CIT.
283 1 THIS VIEW IS THE CONTENT OF STANDARD ARCHITECTURAL
AND PLANNING HISTORIES (SEE FLETCHER, SIR BANISTER,
H.STQPY OF ARCHIT_ E_:_ ON THE COPARATTVMETHO,
NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 1961; AND
SCULLY, OP. CIT.); POSITIVIST TECHNOCRATIC THEORY
(SEE DAHL AND LINDBLOM, OP. CIT.) AND METHODOLOGICAL
SCHOLARSHIP (SEE DMG JORNAL. AND THE JOURNAL OF THE
JCA NAN THE OF PLANNERS).
2G5 FREIRE,0P. CIT., PG. 36
207 1 LUKACS, GEORG, ITSTnRY "DCLASS CONS(Oj5 :
STODTFS -IN MAIRXIST__ILCT.CS, CAMBRIDGE: THE M.I.T.
PRESS, 1971, PG.
2 IBID..,- PG. 204
3 THE INTENTIONAL LIBERAL ATOMIZATION OF UNDERSTANDING
REFLECTS THE TRUTH OF ENGEL'S COMMENT THAT THE WORLD
IS NOT TO BE COMPREHENDED AS A COMPLEX OF READY-MADE
AND ISOLATED THINGS., BUT AS A COMPLjEX_fjF PROCESSES.
AND INTERCONNECTIONS (MY PARAPHRASE)
203 1 CITIZEN OPPOSITION TO URBAN RENEWAL IS AN~EXAMPLE OF
-THE GENERATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH THE EXPERIENCE
OF CONTRADICTIONS. URBAN RENEWAL WAS FIRST JUSTIFIED
(AT LEAST PARTIALLY) IN TERMS OF OBJECT-RELATIONS;
THE ENVIRONMENT WOULD BE 'CLEANER,' MORE 'ATTRACTIVE'
VISUALLY. THESE. WERE EXTERNALLY-FABRICATED IDEOLO-
GIES WHICH MASKED THE REAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE
FUNCTION OF URBAN RENEWAL IN ASSERTING RULING-CLASS
CONTROL OVER VALUABLE URBAN LAND. THE REACTIONS OF
THE DOMINATED CLASSES REMOVED FROM HOME AND
COMMUNITY PIERCED THROUGH THE IDEOLOGY OF OBJECT-
RELATIONS BY ASSERTING THE HUMAN REALITY AT ITS CORE.
THIS REACTION WAS AN' IMMANENT CRITIQUE, INHERENT IN
AND EMERGING FROM THE DYNAMICS OF CLASS CONFLICT
RATHER THAN FROM THE EXTERNAL IDEOLOGY .ERECTED TO
. MYSTIFY THE TRUE INTERESTS OF DOMINATION BEHIND URBAN
RENEWAL.
2 HABERMAS, OP. CIT., CH. 6
3 VELLMER, ALBRECHT, CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY, NEW
YORK: SEABURY PRESS, 1971, PG. 130
2S9 1 IBID, PG. 133
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2 SCHROYER, OP. CIT., MY PARAPHRASE FROM PG. 29
290 1 SELSAM AND MARTEL, EDS.,. OP.. CIT., 'LENIN, PG. 117
292 1 GINTIS, OP. CIT., PG. 61
293 1 IBID., PG. 52
2 IBID., PG. 61
294 1 HOWEVER, PRACTICE IS- FRAUGHT WITH PARADOX.
RADICAL TRAN3F2Fj.IATIVE ARCHITECTURAL AND PLANNING
PRACTICE CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE WITHIN A WIDER SOCIETAL
INTENTION TO CRITICAL SOCIAL CHANGE, SUCH PRACTICE
MAY, LIKE THAT OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL OF CRITICAL
THEORY, BE RESTRICTED AT PRESENT TO THEORY. ENGAGE-
MENT MAY ONLY AFFIRM THE VALIDITY OF THE REPRESSIVE
SOCIETY (C.F. KURTZ, STEPHEN A., !ASTFELAND: _UILDING
TH- AMERICAN DREAM, NEW YORK: PRAEGER PUBLISHERS,
1967, PG. 116) FOR WELLMER -(WELLMER, OP. CIT., PG.
132)', THE PROGRESSIVE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETAL
PROCESSES HAVE ONLY RESULTED IN THE PROGRESSIVE
DOMINATION OF WO/MEN.
2 Wn/MEN MUST BE ORGANIZED AS A STRATIFIED YET HOMO-
GENIZED LABOR FORCE;. MUST NOT CONTROL THE PRODUCTIVE
PROCESS OR THE PRODUCTS OF THEIR LABOR; MUST SEE
THEIR ALIENATION FROM SELF, COMMUNITY AND ENVIRON-
MENT AS NATURAL AND RIGHT; MUST BE EDUCATED TO
ACCEPT COMMODITIES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR HUMAN NEEDS
WHICH CAN ONLY BE SATISFIED THROUGH A UNIFIED
COMMUNITY; ETC.
3 GINTES, OP. CIT., PG. 51
SECTION IV: CONCLUSION
298 1 GOULDNER, OP. CIT., PG.
301 1 Two SUCH CRITIQUES ARE MADE IN MASTER'S THESES BY
DAVID WEINBERG (M.I.T. 1974) AND FRANK LEWINBERG
(M.I.T. 1973). SEE ALSO GORDON, OP. CIT.
2 SEE KAPLAN, MARSHALL, URBAN PLANNING IN THE 1960'S:
DF R V CAMBRIDGE: THE M.I.T.
PRESS., 1973
1 MANOFF, ROBERT, M.C.P. THESIS (M.I.T. C. 1972).303
340
303 2 ANOTHER EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROJECT IS THE ATTEMPT TO
APPLY LINGUISTICS AND SEMIOLOGY TO THE STRUCTURE OF
BUILT FORM AS A SIGN SYSTEM-HOW THE FORMAL CON-
STRUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT COMMUNICATES MEANINGS.
WHATEVER ITS VALUE, THIS APPROACH IS ANOTHER FORM
OF OBJECT ANALYSIS WHICH THROUGH ITS FORMAL CONCERNS
ELUDES THE PROCESS THROUGH WHICH HUMAN BEINGS
CREATE MEANING THROUGH THEIR ENCOUNTER WITH BUILT
FORM IN A SlBJECTIVE.-OEJrCTIVE UNITY. FURTHER, THE
. LINGUISTICS/SEMIOLOGY APPnROACH IS INADEQUATE TO A
LIBERATIVE INTENTION IF IT RESTS WITH DESCRIPTION
AND IS NOT CRITICAL.
304 FREIRE, OP. CIT., CH. 4
305 1 SCHROYER, OP. CIT., PG. 34
KUENZLEN, OP. CIT., PG 110
307 1 INSI~GIlT OF ALEXAN6ER Tz ONIS
312 1 KUENZLEN, OP. CIT., PG. 97
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